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1 Introduction to ellipsis
Ellipsis (from the Greek élleipsis ‘omission’) has been a much studied topic in gen-
erative linguistics and still is. The interest for this phenomenon, at least in part,
is due to the fact that there is meaning, but no sound in ellipsis. For example, the
VP ellipsis in (1a) gives rise to the interpretation come home, even though there is
no phonological content. As shown by the examples in (1), aside from VP ellipsis,
different categories can be targeted by ellipsis. Sluicing, in (1b), is ellipsis after a
wh-phrase and deletes a clausal category. NP ellipsis in (1c) deletes a noun phrase.
(1) a. John came home, after Mary did [VP come home]. VP ellipsis
b. John saw someone, but I don’t know who [TP John saw]. Sluicing
c. John ate two apples and Bill ate three [NP apples]. NP ellipsis
The discrepancy between (lack of) form and meaning in ellipsis gives rise to several
interesting questions among which are the following.
1. What is the linguistic representation of an ellipsis site?
2. What is the role of the preceding linguistic context (i.e. what characterizes a
proper antecedent for ellipsis)?
3. What is the role of the preceding linguistic context (i.e. what is the relation
between the antecedent and the ellipsis)?
We will briefly take up these questions one by one in the next sections.
2 1. Introduction to ellipsis
1.1 Theories on the nature of ellipsis
There are two main lines of research when it comes to the analysis of the ellip-
sis site. The first type of approach assumes that the ellipsis site is void of any syn-
tactic structure (e.g. Ginzburg and Sag, 2000; Culicover and Jackendoff, 2005). The
minimal syntax that these theories postulate comes at the cost of a more compli-
cated syntax-semantics mapping. I discuss this approach in more detail in chap-
ter 2, where we will see that it faces many obstacles. The second type of approach
takes the ellipsis site to contain syntactic structure. Two sub-types can be distin-
guished within this tradition. The pro-theory of ellipsis assumes that the ellipsis site
is a null-pronoun (Wasow, 1972; Shopen, 1972; Chao, 1988; Zagona, 1988; Chung
et al., 1995; Hardt, 1993, 1999; Fiengo and May, 1994; Lobeck, 1995; López, 1995,
2000; Depiante, 2000; López, 2000). These approaches are based on the observa-
tion that ellipsis sites share many commonalities with pronouns. For example, both
pronouns and ellipsis are subject to Langacker’s (1969) Backwards Anaphora Con-
straint, which states that anaphoric elements (including ellipsis sites) may not si-
multaneously command and linearly precede their antecedents ((2b) is from (Ha,
2008)).
(2) a. Jeff had to go to church last Sunday, because his children did.
b. * Jeff did, because his children had to go to church last Sunday.
(3) a. Mary went home, after she finished the report.
b. * She went home, after Mary finished the report.
(McCawley, 1984, p.220)
Another example of a similarity between ellipsis and pronouns is that both can have
split antecedents, see (4).
(4) a. Johni arrived and he bought Susan j a drink. Theyi+ j left together.
(Hardt, 1999)
b. Sally wants to sail around the world, and Barbara wants to fly to South
America, and they will, if money is available. (Webber, 1978)
The second type of analysis that assumes that there is structure in the ellipsis site is
the so-called PF-deletion theory. Under this theory there is a full-fledged syntactic
structure in the ellipsis site. As such, the syntax-semantics mapping proceeds as in
a non-elliptical sentence. What sets apart an elliptical from a non-elliptical utter-
ance is that in the former the phonological content is not pronounced (Ross, 1969;
Hankamer and Sag, 1976; Sag, 1976; Wilder, 1997; Lasnik, 1999a,b; Johnson, 2001;
Lasnik, 2001; Merchant, 2001; Tomioka, 1999, 2001; Goldberg, 2005). Over the years,
a lot of evidence has accumulated supporting this view. I’ll mention here three ar-
guments for this approach.
Since there is no audible material in an ellipsis site, the presence of syntactic
material must be detected indirectly. A strong indication that there is structure in
the ellipsis site comes from movement (Johnson, 2001). The examples in (5) show
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that wh-movement out of an elided VP is possible, which strongly suggests that
there is structure in the VP ellipsis site. The examples in (6), on the other hand,
involving the deep anaphor do it , do not allow for extraction (Hankamer and Sag,
1976).
(5) a. I know which book Max read, and [which book]Oscar didn’t [read ti ].
b. This is the book of which Bill approves, and this is the one [of which] he
doesn’t [approve ti ]. (Fiengo and May, 1994, p.229)
(6) a. * I know which book José didn’t read for class, and which book Lulumae
did it for him.
(compare: I know that José didn’t read this book for class, but that Lu-
lumae did it for him.)
b. * This is the book which O.J. Berman reviewed, and this is the one which
Fred won’t do it.
(compare: O.J. Berman reviewed this book but Fred won’t do it.)
(Johnson, 2001)
Supporting evidence for the idea that there is extraction and thus structure in the el-
lipsis site comes from locality effects. The examples in (7) illustrate this on the basis
of VP-ellipsis. What these examples show is that, if there is an island in the ellipsis
site, this gives rise to ungrammaticality. The fact that island constraints, which are
constraints defined in terms of syntactic structure, hold under ellipsis shows that
movement takes place out of the ellipsis site. If there is no structure in the ellipsis
site it is not clear where the ungrammaticality of the cases in (7) comes from.
(7) a. * Abby wants to hire someone who speaks a Balkan language, but I don’t
remember [which Balkan language]i Ben does want to hire someone
who speaks ti
b. * Abby knows five people who have dogs, but catsi , she doesn’t know
five people who have ti .
Another argument that there is structure in the ellipsis site is based on P(reposi-
tion)-stranding. Merchant (2001, 2004) observes that languages that normally allow
P-stranding, also allow for this under Sluicing and Fragments. See, for example, the
English and Swedish cases in (8) and (9). As shown in the b-cases, these languages
allow P-stranding. The a-cases show that P-stranding is available under Sluicing, as
well. Languages that do not normally allow P-stranding, on the contrary, also fail
to strand a preposition under Sluicing and Fragments. Consider as an illustration
the cases in (10) and (11) from Greek and Russian, respectively. As shown by the b-
cases, these languages do not allow P-stranding. The a-cases show that P-stranding
under Sluicing is likewise unavailable. This correlation between the availability of
P-stranding and allowing for it under ellipsis follows straightforwardly if there is
structure in the ellipsis site. In that case, the availability of P-stranding under ellipsis
follows from the availability of P-stranding in non-elliptical cases. If, on the other
hand, no structure is postulated in the ellipsis site, the correlation would have to
follow from something else, though it is not clear what.
4 1. Introduction to ellipsis
(8) English
a. Peter was talking with someone, but I don’t know (with) who(m).


























































































Merchant (2001, 2004) also provides the following argument for structure in the
ellipsis site. In languages in which DPs are marked with morphological case, this
case marking must correspond to the case that is assigned by the verb in the an-
tecedent, as shown in (12) for German. In a theory in which there is no structure, it
must be stipulated that the case on the remnant of ellipsis is the same case as that
of its correlate in the antecedent (e.g. Ginzburg and Sag, 2000), or that the verb in
the antecedent somehow governs the case on the remnant of ellipsis. It is not clear
how such a cross-clausal dependency should be implemented without making any
stipulations. As Merchant points out, if there is structure in the ellipsis site, case


















































‘He wants to praise someone, but they don’t know who.’
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Although the debate about whether ellipsis involves a pro-form or PF-deletion has
not been settled, some of the arguments that have been brought forth to support
the pro-form approach to ellipsis do not necessarily argue against the PF-deletion
approach to ellipsis. Merchant (to appear), for example, shows that the idea that the
ellipsis site contains structure does not rule out the possibility that the ellipsis site
is treated as a variable in the semantics. On the other hand, some of the facts argu-
ing in favor of the PF-deletion approach to ellipsis are hard to account for under the
pro-form analysis of ellipsis. The fact that ellipsis sites show clear signs of the pres-
ence of syntactic structure is hard to account for under the view that ellipsis sites
are structureless pronouns. Of course, it is still possible that both the pro-theory
and PF-deletion are needed to obtain a full empirical coverage, as argued by, for
example, Craenenbroeck (2010). Much of the discussion in this dissertation adds to
the body of evidence in favor of the PF-deletion theory of ellipsis.
1.2 The identity condition
A successful instance of ellipsis requires that there be an antecedent available in
the discourse. This antecedent should be sufficiently identical to the ellipsis site. At
this point, there is no consensus as to what counts as identical. One theory that has
been proposed is that syntactic isomorphism is necessary for ellipsis to go through.
Under this approach, the antecedent and the ellipsis site must have identical syntax
(e.g. Sag, 1976; Fiengo and May, 1994; Chung et al., 1995; Lasnik, 2001; Merchant,
2008a). Another theory that has been proposed is that ellipsis is subject to a se-
mantic identity condition (e.g. Dalrymple et al., 1991; Hardt, 1993; Romero, 1998;
Merchant, 2001). Both camps provide fairly strong evidence in favor of their view.
To illustrate, consider the following argument in favor of a syntactic isomorphism
account. (13) presents examples of Sluicing where the correlate of the wh-phrase is
an implicit argument in the antecedent (these cases are called Sprouting in Chung
et al. (1995)) in which the preposition is pied-piped with the wh-phrase. Chung
(2006, 2013) notes that ellipsis is ungrammatical when there is P-stranding in the
ellipsis site, but not in the antecedent, see (14). Since P-stranding makes no seman-
tic contribution, these facts suggest that the identity condition is at least in part
syntactic/lexical. Chung argues that the ellipsis site may not contain any words that
are not available in the antecedent (the no new words condition).
(13) a. They’re jealous, but it’s unclear of who.
b. Joe was murdered, but we don’t know by who.
c. Last night he was very afraid, but he couldn’t tell us of what.
(14) a. * They’re jealous, but it’s unclear who(m).
b. * Joe was murdered, but we don’t know who(m).
c. * Last night he was very afraid, but he couldn’t tell us what.
On the other hand, there is a plethora of arguments in favor of a semantic identity
condition. These arguments concern cases in which there is no syntactic identity,
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yet ellipsis is perfectly fine. For example, a sentence containing a gerund can an-
tecede a sluice containing an infinitive, see (15). This constitutes a case where the
antecedent and ellipsis are not syntactically isomorphic.
(15) Decorating for the holidays is easy if you know how [to decorate for the
holidays]. (Merchant, 2001, p.22)
Similarly, as is well-known, VP-ellipsis allows voice mismatches under ellipsis. That
is, an active antecedent may antecede a passive ellipsis clause (16a) or the other way
around (16b). These cases constitute another illustration of a syntactic mismatch
between antecedent and ellipsis site (though see Merchant (2008a) for an account
of these data in terms of a syntactic identity condition).
(16) a. Steve asked me to send the set by courier through my company insured,
and it was sent by courier through my company insured.
(Kehler, 2002, p.53)
b. This information could have been released by Gorbachev, but he chose
not to release it. (Hardt, 1993, p.37)
In this dissertation, I adopt the theory of the identity condition as developed in
Rooth (1992) and Tancredi (1992). Rooth and Tancredi propose that the conditions
under which ellipsis is allowed to take place, also govern when deaccenting can
take place. Although I will not discuss deaccenting in any detail in this dissertation,
it is worth noting that this phenomenon shares many characteristics with ellipsis.
Therefore, unless we have solid evidence to the contrary, I believe it is best to treat
ellipsis and deaccenting on a par. The identity condition I adopt is given in (17).
(17) Parallelism:
Every phonologically reduced (elliptical or deaccented) sentence E requires
that the discourse will contain an antecedent sentence A, which belongs to
the focus value of E (A ∈ F(E)). (adapted from Fox, 1999, p.73)
(18) Focus semantic value of α, F(α):
The set of denotations produced by substituting all elements of the appro-
priate semantic type for every focused element in α. (Rooth, 1985)
Rooth and Tancredi propose that both ellipsis and phonological reduction require a
parallel antecedent sentence. Both authors are aware, though, that the facts are, in
fact, more complicated. Specifically, the conditions under which ellipsis may take
place are a little stricter than the conditions under which deaccenting is allowed.
In (19a) (where deaccenting is indicated with cursive font), for example, the an-
tecedent call Mary an idiot allows deaccenting of insulted her. This requires the
inference that calling someone an idiot implies insulting that person. Under the
hypothesis that deaccenting and ellipsis are possible under the same conditions, it
comes as somewhat of a surprise that this inference is not possible under ellipsis,
see (19b).
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(19) a. First Bill called Mary an idiot. Then John insulted her.
b. * First Bill called Mary an idiot. Then John did insult her.
To maintain the idea that the conditions under which deaccenting is allowed are
the same as the conditions under which ellipsis is allowed, Rooth (1992) proposes
that ellipsis and deaccenting both need a parallel antecedent (cf. (17)), but that el-
lipsis (but not deaccenting) is subject to an additional condition that the ellipsis site
needs to be syntactically isomorphic to the antecedent. Under that account, (19b)
is ruled out, because [call Mary an idiot] is not syntactically identical to [insult her].
Merchant (2001) takes a different tack and argues that the identity condition on
ellipsis and deaccenting is semantic. On the basis of the difference between (19a)
and (19b) Merchant proposes that ellipsis is subject to a stronger semantic con-
dition. Roughly, Merchant’s proposal is that in deaccenting, the antecedent must
entail the deaccented phrase. Deaccenting in (19a) is allowed, then, because call-
ing someone an idiot entails insulting that person. For ellipsis, however, the an-
tecedent must entail the ellipsis clause, but the ellipsis clause must also entail the
antecedent (Merchant calls this condition e-GIVENness1). Ellipsis is disallowed in
(19b), then, because the entailment only goes one way: calling someone an idiot
entails insulting that person, but insulting a person does not entail calling that per-
son an idiot. Merchant’s proposal captures the facts, though it comes at the cost
of having to differentiate between deaccenting and ellipsis, thus giving up the idea
that deaccenting and ellipsis are possible under the same conditions. As said, this
is unfortunate, since it is preferable that surface anaphora are allowed under the
same conditions.
Fox (1999), building on Tancredi (1992), shows that there is no need to abandon
this idea. According to Tancredi and Fox, the crucial difference between (19a) and
(19b) is that in (19a), there is overt material in the deaccented phrase. Fox proposes
that deaccented material is accommodation seeking. That is, the non-F marked el-
ements in the deaccenting clause ‘look for’ an antecedent. If that antecedent is not
in the focus value of the ellipsis, then an antecedent that is inferred from the an-
tecedent clause that is in the focus set of the ellipsis may be used instead. The case
of ellipsis in (19b) does not allow for accommodation, as it does not contain accom-
modation seeking material. Under Fox’ theory, then, there is a single condition on
ellipsis and deaccenting.
Hardt (2005a,b) notes that this is not the whole story, since ellipsis also allows
for accommodation, as noted by Webber (1978). To illustrate, consider the following
1Merchant’s (2001, p.26) E-GIVENness condition is given in (i).
i. e-GIVENness
An expression E counts as e-GIVEN iff E has a salient antecedent A and, modulo ∃-type shift-
ing,
i. A entails F-clo(E), and
ii. E entails F-clo(A)
F-closure
The F-closure of α, written F-clo(α), is the result of replacing F-marked parts of α with ∃-
bound variables of the appropriate type (modulo ∃-type shifting).
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example.
(20) Irv and Martha wanted to dance together, but Martha couldn’t.
According to Webber, ellipsis is allowed here, because the following inference holds
Irv and Martha wanted to dance together ⇒ Martha wanted to dance with Irv.2
Hardt notes that the inference that underlies (20) is not freely available under el-
lipsis. In (21), for example, inference is not available. Hardt suggests that this is be-
cause an antecedent is available that does not require inference (namely wanted to
dance together).
(21) Irv and Martha wanted to dance together, but Tom and Susan didn’t want to.
= Tom and Susan didn’t want to dance together.
≠ Tom and Susan wanted to dance with Irv.
Hardt’s point is that Fox’ idea that deaccented material acts as a trigger for accom-
modation is too restrictive. What acts as a trigger for accommodation is a mis-
match between the anaphor (i.e. deaccented or elliptical phrase) and the actual
antecedent. Since both deaccenting and ellipsis allow for accommodation, this no
longer constitutes a reason to distinguish the two. Hardt (2005b) proposes the fol-
lowing condition on economy. The essential idea is that accommodation is only
possible when a violation occurs.
(22) Hardt’s (2005b) economy condition on accomodation:
"[F]or a given discourse D, we produce a default LF L. If L violates no seman-
tically visible constraints, it is the preferred interpretation. If L does violate
one or more constraints, inferences can be performed to derive an alter-
native interpretation L’. L’ is a potential interpretation of D if it avoids the
constraint violations. If there are several such alternatives, those LF’s closest
to L are preferred."
(23) Hardt’s (2005b) notion of closest:
"[I]f A entails B and B entails C, then B is closer to A than C."
With these conditions on accommodation in place, we can now reformulate the
Parallelism condition as follows.
2Hardt (1993) points out that for (20) it is still possible that the ellipsis site simply contains dance and
that the reading dance with Irv is implied by the context. Hardt shows with the example in (i) that this
is unlikely. Although the inference ‘Martha couldn’t nominate Irv’ holds here, it cannot be due to the
ellipsis site containing just the verb nominate, as nominate needs an object.




Every phonologically reduced (elliptical or deaccented) sentence E requires
either
a. that the discourse will contain an antecedent sentence A, which belongs
to the focus value of E (A ∈ F(E)), or
b. that the discourse will contain an antecedent sentence A, which together
with certain shared assumptions entails another sentence, the accom-
modated sentence AC, and AC ∈F(E). (adapted from Fox, 1999, p.73)
In this dissertation, I’ll adopt the idea that both deaccenting and ellipsis are sub-
ject to Parallelism in (24). This idea is attractive as it does not postulate an ellipsis
specific identity condition, and, moreover, does not require a distinct treatment of
the surface anaphora ellipsis and deaccenting. The condition as stated in (24) will
be relevant in chapter 3 (section 3.2.1) where I compare it to an alternative notion.
I also come back to the notion of accommodation in chapter 3 (section 6), where
especially the economy condition as phrased in (22) will be relevant.
1.3 The licensing condition
Since the seminal work of Lobeck (1995), it has generally been accepted that, next
to the identity condition, there is a licensing condition on ellipsis. The idea that el-
lipsis must be licensed is based on the observation that ellipsis is distributionally
constrained. These distributional restrictions do not follow from the identity con-
dition, as that condition says nothing about the specific syntactic environment in
which the ellipsis site is found. To illustrate, consider the example of Sluicing in
(25a).
(25) a. Someone has done the dishes, but I don’t know who.
b. * Someone has done the dishes, but I don’t know the person who.
(Kim, 1997a, p.157)
c. * Somebody stole the car, but no one knew that it was Ben who.
(Merchant, 2001, p.59)
(25a) shows that Sluicing is licensed in interrogative sentences. Sluicing is not li-
censed in relative clauses (25b) or clefts (25c). The idea that ellipsis is distribution-
ally constrained has led to several theories of licensing ellipsis, which I will discuss
in detail in chapter 3. The most stringent question with regard to the distribution
of ellipsis is why ellipsis is contextually constrained. Unlike the identity condition,
which is easily understood to follow from a general requirement on recoverabil-
ity, there is no such guiding intuition when it comes to the licensing condition. In




Gapping is one of the main topics of this dissertation (next to Fragments, see be-
low). Gapping is a term Ross (1967) coined for the constructions in (26). In such
constructions the finite verb in the second conjunct of a coordination is missing.
Next to the finite verb, other material may be silent, too, like the indirect object in
(26b).
(26) a. Some had eaten mussels and others shrimp.
b. Some have served mussels to Sue and others swordfish. (Johnson, 2009)
Another elliptical construction, often taken to be a subtype of Gapping is Stripping.
By definition, Stripping constructions consist of an elliptical phrase consisting of
one remnant plus an additive marker like too (27a) or a polarity marker such as not
(27b).
(27) a. Abby speaks passable Dutch, and Ben, too.
b. Abby speaks passable Dutch, but not Ben.
On account of the fact that Stripping has the same distribution as Gapping, I will
take Stripping to be a subtype of Gapping. The main difference, namely the num-
ber of remnants, seems arbitrary. If we consider the polarity or additive marker in
Stripping to be a remnant of ellipsis (Boone, 2014), Stripping no longer differs on
the basis of the number of remnants.
In English there seems to be a restriction on Gapping that the number of rem-
nants cannot exceed two, see (28).
(28) a. * Simon quickly dropped the gold and Jack suddenly the diamonds.
(Jackendoff, 1971)
b. * John gave a dime to Mary, and Bill a nickel to Jane. (Jayaseelan, 1990)
c. * John persuaded Bill to see a movie and Harry Mary a TV show.
(Pesetsky, 1982, p.657)
I am not aware of any such restriction for other languages which have Gapping. The








































‘John wants to photograph the solar eclipse with a digital camera on Sunday,
but Karel wants to photograph the lunar eclips with an analogue camera on
Monday.’
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If the number of remnants is not restricted in principle (though it might be by some
language particular factor that is independent of ellipsis), a distinction between
Gapping and Stripping based on the number of remnants is arbitrary.
There are many theories on Gapping in the literature. I refer the reader to Tran
(2010) and Repp (2009) for recent overviews and reviews of the literature on Gap-
ping. This dissertation argues that Gapping is a type of ellipsis (i.e. deletion) (cf.
Neijt, 1979; Ross, 1970; Jackendoff, 1971; Hankamer, 1973; Stillings, 1975; Sag, 1976;
Hankamer, 1979; Oirsouw, 1987; Hartmann, 2000). In particular, in chapter 2 I show
that Merchant’s (2004) arguments for analyzing Fragments as a type of ellipsis that
involves movement of remnants extend to Gapping. This provides additional evi-
dence for the view that Gapping is derived by movement of remnants followed by
deletion (Abe and Hoshi, 1997; Jayaseelan, 1990; Sohn, 1994; Kim, 1997b; Larson,
1990; Coppock, 2001; Lin, 2002).
One of the most peculiar properties of Gapping is its distribution. There are
three distributional properties that characterize Gapping, illustrated in (30a-c) (the
examples are taken from Johnson (2009)).
(30) Distributional properties of Gapping
a. Gapping is restricted to coordinate structures:
* Some had eaten mussels, because others shrimp.
b. The gap cannot be embedded:
* Some had eaten mussels and she claims that others shrimp.
c. The antecedent clause in gapping cannot be embedded:
* She’s said Peter has eaten his peas and Sally her green beans, so now
we can have dessert.
I will henceforth refer to the collective of (30a-c) as the Equal Conjunct Require-
ment, of which a descriptive generalization is given in (31).
(31) Equal Conjunct Requirement (ECR):
Gapping only occurs in coordinations where gap and antecedent are directly
conjoined.
Any account of Gapping will have to account for (31). Not many theories have taken
issue with the distribution of Gapping (though see Hernández, 2007). One type of
approach, which I refer to here as ‘low coordination approach’, specifically takes
issue with the restricted distribution of Gapping. The low coordination approach
is admirably successful at capturing the ECR, though it is not without problems. I
turn to discuss this approach in the next section.
2.1 Low coordination accounts of Gapping
The low coordination approach specifically attempts to explain why the ECR holds.
Two theories can be distinguished within this type of approach. Both theories make
use of the idea that the coordination holds at a sub-clausal level. One approach is
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defended in Johnson (2004, 2009), where it is argued that the gap in the second
conjunct is the result of ATB movement of the gapped material to a position domi-
nating the low coordination. The other theory defends the view that the gap in the
second conjunct is created by ellipsis (cf. Coppock, 2001; Lin, 2002; Toosarvandani,
2013). I illustrate both accounts below.
Johnson (2004, 2009) argues that the coordination in Gapping is at the vP-level.
The gap consists of a trace left by ATB movement of the VP. This VP moves to the
specifier of PredP. This approach is illustrated in (32).







eaten t j/k Pred vP
vP and vP
ti v’ DP v’
v VP others v VP
DP j tl DPk tl
mussels shrimp
Noteworthy of this analysis is that the subject of the second conjunct of the coordi-
nation remains in situ, whereas the subject of the first conjunct moves to spec,TP.
This raises two questions. First, why does movement of the first subject to spec,TP
not violate the Coordinate Structure Constraint and second, how does the subject
of the second conjunct get case? Johnson (2004, 2009) argues that A-movement is
exempt from the Coordinate Structure Constraint. First, there seems to be no ev-
idence for the idea that A-movement is subject to the Coordinate Structure Con-
straint. Moreover, there are, in fact, cases which seem to suggest that it isn’t, such as
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(33). In this example, Mason has moved from the spec,TP position in the first con-
junct of the coordination to the object (i.e. accusative case) position in the matrix
clause. The subject of the second conjunct does not parallel this movement, in vi-
olation of the Coordinate Structure Constraint. I refer the reader to Johnson (2004)
and Lin (2002) for further discussion of A-movement and the Coordinate Structure
Constraint.
(33) Liz made Masoni out [TP [TP ti to be intelligent] and [TP Sarah to be kind]].
As for the question how the subject of the second conjunct gets case, this is not
really clear. The data are not particularly helpful in this regard. For examples like the
one in (34), different grammaticality judgments have been reported.3 This variation
in judgments plausibly indicates that Case assignment proceeds exceptionally in
low coordination Gapping cases.
(34) a. She ate the beans, and he the rice.
b. She ate the beans, and him the rice.
Setting aside the problem of Case assignment to the subject of the second conjunct,
there is strong evidence that Gapping can indeed occur in a low coordination. For
example, Johnson (2009) shows that if the subject of the first conjunct is quantifi-
cational it can bind a pronoun in the second conjunct, see (35). This possibility
follows straightforwardly from the parse in (32), where the subject of the first c-
commands the subject of the second conjunct.
(35) [No woman]1 can join the army and her1 girlfriend the navy.
It should be noted, however, that, even though (35) provides evidence that Gapping
is possible in a low coordination, this by no means implies that Gapping must occur
in a low coordination.
Coppock (2001), Lin (2002) and Toosarvandani (2013) advocate a low coordina-
tion approach to Gapping in which the gap is created by VP-ellipsis (the elided VP
is presented here with a box around it).4
3Johnson (2004) notes that both variants are grammatical. Siegel (1987) reports that only (34b) is
grammatical. According to Lee (2005, fn.3), some speakers like (34a) and others both.
4Lin (2002) advocates a low coordination approach to Gapping in which the gap is created by ellipsis.
However, in her account it is not VP-ellipsis, but a distinct ellipsis process. As such, it withstands some
of the critique of the VP-ellipsis approach below, but at the cost of postulating a new ellipsis type.
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ti v’ DP v’
v VP Sally v VP
eaten mussels DP j VP
shrimp eaten t j
How does the low coordination approach to Gapping explain the ECR? First, the
fact that Gapping is restricted to coordinations follows from the fact that vPs are
conjoined: only coordinators are able to conjoin two vPs, subordinators cannot, as
they only coinjoin clauses. The second property, the fact that Gapping cannot be
embedded, also receives an explanation. If the second conjunct were embedded,
hence dominated by a non-shared TP, there would be another T-head in the struc-
ture. This T will spell out as an auxiliary, modal or dummy do, thereby giving rise
to Pseudogapping, not Gapping. According to Johnson (2009), the VP-ellipsis ap-
proach to Gapping fails to explain the third property, namely that the antecedent
of Gapping may not be embedded. In particular, the sentence in (30c) may receive
the following parse under the VP-ellipsis analysis.
(37) [TP Shei has [vP ti [VP said that Peter has eaten his peas]] and [vP Sally eaten
her green beans]]
The ATB account straightforwardly rules out (37), since there is no landing position
for the two VPs ([VP eaten]) that need to move across the board. The only landing
position from which both VPs would bind their trace is spec,PredP in the matrix
clause (giving rise to She has [VP eaten] said that Peter has tVP his peas and Sally
tVP her green beans). In that case, however, the VP of the first conjunct has to skip
the spec,PredP in the embedded clause headed by said, which arguably constitutes
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a minimality violation.5 Even though the VP ellipsis account to Gapping cannot
rule out the case in (37), it is clear that the low coordination approach in general
does very well at explaining the ECR. Nonetheless, this approach is not without
problems.
2.2 Problems for the low coordination approach to Gapping
2.2.1 Problems for the VP ellipsis account
In this section, I present arguments against the VP ellipsis account of Gapping. I
start by presenting three contexts in which VP ellipsis cannot occur, yet Gapping
can.
The first argument against the VP ellipsis approach to Gapping is from Johnson
(2004). He observes that Gapping can target APs, as illustrated in (38).
(38) a. I consider Liz fond of chocolates and Sam fond of pies.
b. I made Sam angry at Beaner and Betsy angry at Perseus.
The problem (38) poses for the VP ellipsis approach to Gapping is that VP ellipsis is
not able to elide APs in these contexts, as shown in (39). It is hard to see what gives
VP ellipsis the ability to elide APs only in Gapping contexts. Proponents of the VP
ellipsis approach would have to tie the deletion of APs to the fact that VP ellipsis
applies in a low coordination. It is unclear how, if at all, this could be executed.
(39) a. * Vivek made Nishi angry at Melissa, before he made Carrie [AP angry at
Melissa].
b. * Will seems happy today, while Nishi seemed [AP happy] yesterday.
c. * I consider Betsy pretty, while you consider Sam [AP pretty].
Below, I add two arguments that are similar to Johnson’s above in that Gapping
takes place in a context in which VP ellipsis is not allowed. Arguably the most severe
problem for the VP ellipsis account is that it is not suited to derive ‘simple’ Gapping
sentences. As is well-known, VP ellipsis is only licensed when T is occupied by an
auxiliary or by infinitival to (see Lobeck, 1995, among others). Neither are present
in (40), yet Gapping is perfectly fine in this context, contrary to what the VP ellipsis
account predicts.
(40) Max ate the apple and Sally the hamburger. (Jackendoff, 1971)
5Alternatively, the VP of the first conjunct can be assumed to have to move through spec,PredP in the
embedded clause to get to the matrix spec,PredP. This possibility can be ruled out by the assumption that
movement to spec,PredP freezes the VP. In any case, movement to a next higher spec,PredP position
must be ruled out to prevent overgeneration. That is, if movement to spec,PredP can skip or proceed
through lower spec,PredP positions, cases like (i) would be incorrectly ruled in.
i. John [PredP [VP left] said he [PredP tVP ]]
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One may try to salvage the VP-ellipsis approach by proposing that an ‘empty’ T
licenses ellipsis in (40). This solution would create more problems than it solves,
however. If an empty T is able to license VP ellipsis in Gapping contexts, it should
be possible for (40) to have the parse in (41).
(41) [TP Max ate the apple] and [TP Sally T [vP ate the hamburger]].
In other words, allowing VP ellipsis under an empty T in Gapping contexts would
essentially reduce a subset of Gapping, namely the cases that occur in a TP (or
CP) coordination, to Pseudogapping. Consequently, the explanation for the ECR
would be lost, since Pseudogapping is not restricted to coordinations, see (42a).
Also, Pseudogapping is possible when the gap is embedded with respect to its an-
tecedent, see (42b).
(42) a. Some had eaten mussels, because others had shrimp.
b. Some had eaten mussels and she claims that others had shrimp.
(Johnson, 2009)
If an empty T licenses VP ellipsis, nothing would rule out (43a,b) either, which only
differs from (42a,b) in that the T that licenses VP ellipsis is now empty. On the other
hand, if an empty T cannot license VP ellipsis, a simple Gapping case like (40) can’t
be derived. I take this conundrum as strong evidence that it cannot be VP-ellipsis
that underlies Gapping.
(43) a. * Some had eaten mussels, because
[TP T [vP others [VP [shrimp]i [VP eaten ti ]]].
b. * Some had eaten mussels, and she claims that
[TP T [vP others [VP [shrimp]i [VP eaten ti ]]].
A third and similar problem for the VP ellipsis approach is posed by sentences
with subjunctive complement clauses. VP ellipsis cannot occur in such contexts
(Potsdam, 1997; Lobeck, 1995), see (44a). Contrary to what the VP ellipsis account
predicts, Gapping is fine in subjunctive complements, as (44b) shows.
(44) a. * They requested that bicycles be stored in the shed and cars be
[VP stored] in the garage.
b. They requested that bicycles be stored in the shed and cars in the
garage.
The examples in (38), (40) and (44) lead to the conclusion that Gapping does not
have the same distribution as VP ellipsis and that Gapping cannot be reduced to a
subtype of VP-ellipsis.
Another argument against the VP-ellipsis approach to Gapping is that Gapping
is wide-spread cross-linguistically, whereas VP ellipsis is not. The VP-ellipsis ap-
proach to Gapping predicts, however, that the presence of VP-ellipsis and Gapping
should coincide. As exemplified for Dutch in (45), though it has Gapping (45a), it

































(intended:) ‘John has seen Peter and Mary has, too.’
2.2.2 Problems for the ATB account
I now turn to discuss several problems for the ATB approach to Gapping. A first
problem is that the ATB approach cannot (straightforwardly) derive cases of Gap-
ping where the gap is not contiguous. An example of such a case is given in (46a).
(46) a. (Context: Who persuaded who to examine Mary?)
John persuaded Dr. Thomas to examine Mary, and Bill Dr. Jones.
(Kuno, 1976)
b. John [VP persuaded ti to examine Mary] j Dr. Thomas, and Bill [DP Dr.
Jones]i t j .
In this example, the gap is persuaded to examine Mary. If this gap is a VP that moves
across-the-board to spec,PredP, then the word order is wrongly predicted to be as
in (46b). It seems, then, that (46a) cannot be derived under the ATB approach.
Similarly, in a language that has verb final word order, such as Dutch, a Gapping
sentence cannot be derived by ATB movement of the VP (nor by ATB movement of
just the verb), because, again, it would lead to the wrong word order (namely verb-
object). This is shown in the derivations in (47b) and (48b) for the Gapping cases
in (47a) and (48a), respectively. (The VP-vacating movement of the direct objects is


































Ik denk dat Jan [PredP [VP ziet]i [vP [vP Marie ti ] en [vP Peter Karel ti ]]]
A second problem for the ATB approach is that Gapping exhibits typical ellipsis
behavior. Coppock (2001) shows that, for one, Gapping is able to disambiguate
strict/sloppy ambiguities and scope ambiguities. Johnson (2009) notes, however,
that these arguments only hold if it can be shown that this behavior is exclusive to
ellipsis, which he shows is not the case for strict/sloppy ambiguities. One property
that is unique to ellipsis which is found in both Gapping and VP-ellipsis is that they
can be resolved by split antecedents. The example in (49a) exemplifies VP ellipsis
resolved by a split antecedent. (49b), in turn, shows that Gapping can have a split
antecedent, too.
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(49) a. Wendy is eager to sail around the world and Bruce is eager to climb Kili-
manjaro, but neither of them can because money is too tight.
(Webber, 1978)
b. Wendy wants to sail around the world because she loves travel, and
Bruce wants to climb Kilimanjaro in order to prove to himself that he
can, but neither in order to show off for anyone. (Coppock, 2001)
Gapping examples with split antecedents cannot be derived by the ATB approach,
since under the ATB analysis of Gapping a single VP moves across-the-board. There
is thus no way to explain the fact that a gap is resolved by two (non-contiguous)
antecedents. Split antecedents, then, pose a severe problem for the ATB approach
but provide an argument in favor of an ellipsis account of Gapping.
A final argument I present here against an ATB movement account of Gapping,
which also appears in Vicente (2010), has to do with the movement of the rem-
nants. The VP-ellipsis and ATB account of Gapping share the idea that VP inter-
nal remnants of Gapping must vacate this VP prior to ATB movement or deletion.
Under the ellipsis approach, this vacating of the VP only occurs in the VP in the
second conjunct that will subsequently be deleted. The existence of such ‘evacu-
ating movement’ has been defended in the domain of ellipsis. The example in (50)
shows that such evacuating movement cannot feed VP movement, suggesting that
‘evacuating movement’ is only possible under ellipsis (cf. chapter 4). Consider first
the example in (50a), which shows that topicalization of a VP without evacuating
movement of the direct object is fine. Next, consider the example in (50b), which
shows that the evacuating movement of the direct object prior to VP topicalization
leads to ungrammaticality. Since having evacuating movement feed VP-movement
is a crucial ingredient of the ATB approach to Gapping, (50) constitutes strong evi-
dence against it.6
(50) a. John said he would photograph Mary and [VP photograph Mary]i he
did ti .
b. * John said he would photograph Mary and [VP photograph t j ]i he did
[Mary] j ti .
To sum up, I have presented several arguments against the existing low coordina-
tion approaches in the literature. Nonetheless, we have seen some evidence that
6In Dutch, direct objects can scramble out of the VP. In this language, the equivalent of (50) is gram-
matical. The contrast between (i)/(ii) and (50) is captured by den Besten and Webelhuth’s (1987) gener-
alization that remnant movement is possible only in case the evacuating movement which creates the






























‘John would never photograph Mary, but he would draw her.’
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Gapping is possible in a low coordination (e.g. scope of the subject of the first con-
junct over the subject of the second conjunct). In chapter 2 I present additional
arguments that Gapping can occur in a low coordination. However, I argue there
against a generalized low coordination approach to Gapping. We have also seen
that Gapping shares several characteristics with ellipsis (e.g. it allows for split an-
tecedents and evacuating movement of the remnants of Gapping). It is therefore
likely that Gapping involves ellipsis, though we have seen that it cannot be VP ellip-
sis that underlies Gapping. In the next section, I compare Gapping to several types
of ellipsis.
3 A comparison of Gapping and other types of ellipsis
3.1 Gapping versus VP ellipsis, Sluicing and Pseudogapping
It is known at least since Jackendoff (1971) that Gapping, but not most other ellipsis
types, obeys the ECR (see (31) above). This difference, which I introduce shortly, has
led several scholars to set Gapping apart from ellipsis (e.g. Williams, 1977; Lobeck,
1995). A number of properties indeed distinguish Gapping from ellipsis types such
as VP ellipsis and Sluicing (identified by, among others, Jackendoff (1971); Han-
kamer (1979); Chao (1988)).
However, some properties that have been identified for Gapping also hold for
Pseudogapping, which is often taken to be a subtype of VP ellipsis (Jayaseelan, 1990;
Lasnik, 1995, 1999b). A typical example of Pseudogapping is given in (51a) and its
derivation under the VP ellipsis analysis in (51b).
(51) a. Mary hasn’t dated Bill, but she has Harry. (Lasnik, 1999b)
b. Mary hasn’t dated Bill, but she has [DP Harry]i [VP dated ti ]
It is important to note that if a property of Gapping is not unique to Gapping,
it should not be uniquely accounted for by an analysis of Gapping (cf. Coppock,
2001). One such property is its inability of being licensed by a non-linguistic an-
tecedent, as it shares this property with Pseudogapping. The examples in (52) show
that VP-ellipsis can be licensed by a non-linguistic antecedent. The examples in
(53) and (54) show that Gapping and Pseudogapping cannot be licensed this way.
(52) VP-ellipsis
a. You shouldn’t have!
b. Don’t.
c. I will, if you do. (Chao, 1988, p.134)
(53) Gapping
Context: Hankamer procudes an orange, proceeds to peel it, and just as
Sag produces an apple, says:
* And Ivan, an apple. (Hankamer and Sag, 1976)
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(54) Pseudogapping
Context same as in (53):
* And Ivan is an apple. (Coppock, 2001)
In addition, Gapping cannot occur before its antecedent, while VP-ellipsis (55a) and
Sluicing (55b,c) can.7 Gapping in (56), as pointed out by Coppock (2001), again pat-
terns with Pseudogapping (57).
(55) a. Because Sue didn’t, John ate meat. (Lobeck, 1995)
b. I don’t know what, but John will have something. (Coppock, 2001)
c. Even though we aren’t sure who, we know that someone bought the
Van Gogh. (Lobeck, 1995)
(56) a. * Sue meat and John ate fish.
b. * Because Sue meat, John ate fish. (Lobeck, 1995)
(57) * Sue will the lamb, and John will have the salmon. (Coppock, 2001)
We have seen above that Gapping cannot be reduced to a subclass of VP-ellipsis. If
Pseudogapping, on the other hand, is a subclass of VP-ellipsis, Gapping must be a
different process from Pseudogapping. Why, then, do Gapping and Pseudogapping
have many properties in common? One possibility is that what unites the proper-
ties of Gapping and Pseudogapping is the presence of contrastively focused rem-
nants that have escaped the ellipsis site. Such contrastively focused remnants are
present in both Gapping and Pseudogapping, but not in VP ellipsis and Sluicing.
Therefore, the properties shared by Gapping and Pseudogapping that are absent
in VP ellipsis and Sluicing might be tied to the presence of contrastively focused
remnants. If on the right track, the task is to see how the presence of contrastive
remnants blocks the possibility of ellipsis with non-linguistic antecedents and cat-
aphoric ellipsis, something I will not undertake here.
3.2 The closest relative of Gapping: Fragments
There are more properties that have been argued to set apart Gapping from other
types of ellipsis (based on Jackendoff, 1971; Hankamer, 1979; Chao, 1988; Lobeck,
1995). As we will see, most of these properties are indeed not shared by any other
ellipsis type, including Pseudogapping, unlike the properties discussed in the pre-
vious section. However, I show that the properties discussed in this section that are
claimed to be unique to Gapping, are actually not unique to Gapping at all. More
precisely, I show that these properties are to a large extent also found in Fragments.
7The example in (55a) obeys the Backwards Anaphora Constraint. Cataphoric VP-ellipsis is not pos-
sible when it does not obey this constraint, as shown by the contrast between (i) and (ii) (cf. Sag, 1976).
i. After Betsy did, Peter went to the store.
ii. * Betsy did, after Peter went to the store.
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Fragments can be defined as clausal ellipsis across utterances. A typical example
of Fragments is given in (58). As shown in (59), Fragments, like Gapping, can also
leave multiple remnants.
(58) A: Who did you see?
B: Bill. Fragments
(59) A: Who ate what?
B: John an apple (and Sally a hamburger). Multiple Fragments
I now turn to discuss the properties that have been claimed to single out Gapping
from other ellipsis types and show that Fragments shares these properties with
Gapping. One property that is claimed to single out Gapping from other ellipsis
types is that Gapping is subject to the Equal Conjunct Requirement, as shown in
(60).
(60) a. * Mary met Bill at Berkeley although Sue at Harvard.
b. * Charlie thinks that Mary met Bill at Berkeley, and Sarah knows that
Sue at Harvard. (Lobeck, 1995, p.22)
No such requirement holds for VP ellipsis (61), Sluicing (62) or Pseudogapping (63)
((61) and (62) are taken from Lobeck (1995, p.22,23)).
(61) a. Mary met Bill at Berkeley although Sue didn’t.
b. Charlie thinks that Mary met Bill at Berkeley, but Sarah knows that Sue
didn’t.
(62) We know someone stole the Van Gogh, even though we aren’t sure who.
(63) a. Some had eaten mussels and she claims that others had shrimp.
(Johnson, 2009)
b. John will have caviar, although others will beans. (Coppock, 2001)
The example in (64) shows that Fragments cannot occur in an embedded clause.
Although this example does not involve conjunction, the similarity to Gapping is
nonetheless remarkable.
(64) A: Who has John invited?
B: ∗I know Mary
A second property that has been claimed to single out Gapping from other ellipsis
types is that the latter are typically phrase final (cf. Lobeck, 1995). In other words,
it appears that Gapping, as opposed to the other ellipsis types, targets non-con-
stituents. As shown in the examples in (65) (and as was noted in the introduction),
VP ellipsis targets a VP constituent and Sluicing targets a TP constituent.
(65) a. John talked to Bill, but Mary didn’t [VP talk to Bill].
b. John met someone, but I don’t know whomi [TP John met ti ].
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Unlike VP-ellipsis and Sluicing, Gapping seems to target non-phrase final material.
(66) a. Some have served mussels to Sue and others have served swordfish to
Sue. (Johnson, 2009)
b. John persuaded Dr. Thomas to examine Mary, and Bill persuaded Dr.
Jones to examine Mary. (Kuno, 1976)
Actually, however, the property of eliding non-phrase final material constitutes an-
other property Gapping shares with Pseudogapping. In cases of Pseudogapping
where the remnant of ellipsis is a VP internal argument, it appears that a non-
constituent has been deleted, as illustrated in (67).
(67) People in Greece drink more ouzo than they do drink brandy. (p.16 Levin,
1979)
Pseudogapping is standardly taken to involve movement of the remnant out of the
VP prior to VP ellipsis (cf. Jayaseelan, 1990; Lasnik, 1995, 1999b). In that case, what
deletes is actually a constituent, as shown in (68).
(68) People in Greece drink more ouzo than they do [brandy]i [VP drink ti ] . (p.16
Levin, 1979)
In chapter 2, I present evidence that Gapping and Fragments also involve move-
ment of the remnants. What is important for our current purposes is that Gapping
shares the property of appearing (at least in many cases) to elide a non-constituent
with Fragments. In (69), for example, the elided material I saw does not form a con-
stituent to the exclusion of the direct object Bill.
(69) A: Who did you see?
B: I saw Bill.
A third property that has been claimed to uniquely identify Gapping is that it does
not seem to be licensed by a licensing element that heads the ellipsis site. VP-
ellipsis, for example, is licensed by an AUX-element (Lobeck, 1995; Johnson, 2001),
such as auxiliaries, modals and infinitival to (arguably negation belongs to the AUX-
family, see Potsdam (1997)), as in (70). Other verbal elements do not license ellipsis,
as shown in (71).
(70) a. José Ybarra-Jaegger likes rutabagas, and Holly does, too.
b. José Ybarra-Jaegger ate rutabagas, and Holly has, too.
c. José Ybarra-Jaegger is eating rutabagas, and Holly is, too.
d. Mag Wildwood wants to read Fred’s story, and I also want to.
(Johnson, 2001)
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(71) a. * Sally Tomato started running down the street, but only after José
started.
b. * Sally Tomato made Mag laugh, and then José made. (Johnson, 2001)
c. * Fire began pouring out of the building, and then smoke began.
(Bresnan, 1976)
If Pseudogapping is an instance of VP ellipsis, the prediction is that it too is licensed
by a member of the AUX-family. The examples in (72) show that if ellipsis is headed
by a verbal element, Pseudogapping is indeed impossible.
(72) a. * Sally Tomato started running down the street, but only after José
started down the alleyway.
b. * Sally Tomato made Mag laugh, and then José made Fred.
c. * First, smoke began pouring out of the building, and then flames began
out of the windows.
Turning to Sluicing next, this ellipsis type is only possible with interrogative wh-
phrases. Sluicing is impossible with complementizers, wh-phrases in clefts and rel-
ative pronouns.
(73) a. Jack bought something, but I don’t know what.
b. * Even though Mary hopes that, she wonders if anyone interesting is
speaking tonight.
c. * Someone has done the dishes, but I don’t know the person who. (Kim,
1997a, p.157)
d. * Somebody stole the car, but noone knew that it was Ben who. (Mer-
chant, 2001, p.59)
Contrary to VP ellipsis (including Pseudogapping) and Sluicing, no licensing ele-
ment can be identified in Gapping. The only elements left after ellipsis are the rem-
nants. There is no particular lexical item in cases of Gapping that can be singled
out as licensor. The same holds for Fragments; what is left after ellipsis are just the
remnants of ellipsis.
To sum up, Gapping and Fragments can be distinguished from other types of
ellipsis on the basis of the following properties (though recall that Pseudogapping
also has the second property).
(74) • Gapping and Fragments cannot occur in embedded contexts.
• Gapping and Fragments appear to elide non-constituents.
• There is no licensing element present in Gapping and Fragments.
Some of the similarities between Fragments and Gapping have not completely gone
unnoticed. Hankamer (1979) argued that Gapping and Fragments fall in the same
category of ellipsis types (cf. also Reich, 2007). In this dissertation I argue that this
view is correct. Besides the ones in (74), I show that Gapping and Fragments have
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many more properties in common. This raises the question whether we have any
reason to formally distinguish Gapping and Fragments. The most obvious differ-
ence between Gapping and Fragments is that Gapping occurs in coordinations,
whereas Fragments occurs across utterances. One of the questions I set out to an-
swer in this dissertation is whether this difference is one which has to be distin-
guished on theoretical grounds. I argue that the answer to this question is negative.
4 Overview of the dissertation
In this chapter, I have introduced the concept of ellipsis and laid out some of my
assumptions. In the rest of this dissertation I will focus on the ellipsis types Gap-
ping and Fragments. What is important for what will come in the next chapters,
is that Gapping is subject to what I called here the Equal Conjunct Requirement.
This distributional characteristic has so far not received a satisfactory account. The
most successful account is the low coordination approach discussed in section 2.1.
I showed, however, that this account has several shortcomings. Many problems for
the low coordination theories come from the fact that they are tailor-made to work
for English and do not straightforwardly extend to other languages. Since Gapping
is not specific to English, but is, in fact, a wide-spread ellipsis type, I look for an al-
ternative explanation of the Equal Conjunct Requirement in this dissertation. One
of the theses I will defend in this dissertation is that Gapping constitutes the same
ellipsis type as Fragments. That is, both Gapping and Fragments have a similar syn-
tax and are licensed under the same conditions. I show that putting Fragments in
the picture helps in finding the correct characterization of the Equal Conjunct Re-
quirement on Gapping.
In chapter 2, I argue on the basis of Merchant’s (2004) argument for Fragments
that there is syntactic structure in the ellipsis site. I show moreover, that the syntax
of Gapping, like the syntax of Fragments, involves movement of the remnants of el-
lipsis out of the ellipsis site. The syntax of Gapping and Fragments is thus identical,
as illustrated in (75). I also show in chapter 2 that what gets targeted by Gapping
and Fragments is not a fixed constituent. In other words, the category of XP in (75)
may vary.
(75) a. Max ate the apple and [DP Sally]i [DP the hamburger] j [XP ti ate t j ]
Gapping
b. Who did you see? - [DP Bill]i [XP I saw ti ] Fragments
The question that arises from the conclusion that the syntax of Gapping and Frag-
ments is identical, is whether these two ellipsis types should be formally distin-
guished. The answer depends on the distribution of Gapping and Fragments. Su-
perficially, Gapping and Fragments differ in their distribution in that Gapping tar-
gets the second conjunct of a coordination, whereas Fragments targets a stand-
alone utterance.
In chapter 3, I adopt the hypothesis that the distribution of ellipsis, including
Gapping and Fragments, is governed by the so-called Licensing Condition on ellip-
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sis. Without getting into the details here, the idea is that ellipsis can take place if
the Licensing Condition is satisfied. The question to be answered, then, is whether
the second conjunct of a coordination and a stand-alone utterance are different
contexts for the purposes of the Licensing Condition. I argue that they are not. I ar-
rive at this conclusion as follows. I first show that the distribution of Gapping and
Fragments is very similar. In particular, I show that something similar to the Equal
Conjunct Requirement on Gapping holds for Fragments, as well. For example, as
noted above, Fragments may not be embedded, just like Gapping, see (76) and (77).
I show that the comparison does not stop here, but that Gapping and Fragments
are similarly restricted in a number of other ways, as well.
(76) a. * Harry has invited Sue and I know (that) Bill Mary.
b. * John knows a man that caught a salmon on Sunday and Bill knows a
man (that) a trout on Thursday.
(77) A: Who has John invited?
B: ∗I know Mary
Having identified the (similar) distributional properties of Gapping and Fragments,
I proceed by discussing the theories of licensing in the literature, which come in
two basic varieties. One account holds that licensing is a matter of syntax, while
the other holds that licensing is done in the discourse component. I argue that the
syntactic licensing theories cannot account for Gapping or Fragments. The main
reason is that the syntactic licensing theories postulate a very local licensing re-
lation between a licensing element and the ellipsis site (e.g. Lobeck, 1995; Mer-
chant, 2001). These theories are therefore ill-equiped to account for the distribu-
tional facts, such as those illustrated in (76) and (77). Inspired by the discourse the-
ories of licensing, in particular that of López (2000), I propose a particular discourse
licensing condition on Gapping and Fragments. This licensing condition dictates
that the ellipsis site and the antecedent must be in a particular discourse relation.
Having shown that the same licensing condition governs whether ellipsis can take
place in Gapping and Fragments, together with the conclusion from chapter 2 that
Gapping and Fragments have the same syntax, it can be concluded that Gapping
and Fragments should not be formally distinguished.
Chapter 4 deals with movement under ellipsis. Gapping has traditionally been
considered as a type of non-constituent ellipsis. Fragments, in fact, can also be con-
sidered a type of non-constituent ellipsis. However, under the movement plus dele-
tion approach to ellipsis, which I argue for in chapter 2, both Gapping and Frag-
ments involve deletion of the constituent that has been vacated by the remnants
of ellipsis, cf. (75). This movement out of the ellipsis site is often exceptional in the
sense that this movement is not allowed when no ellipsis takes place, as shown in
(78) on the basis of Gapping.
(78) a. * Max ate the apple and [DP Sally]i [DP the hamburger] j [XP ti ate t j ]]]
b. Max ate the apple and [DP Sally]i [DP the hamburger] j [XP ti ate t j ]]]
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In chapter 4, I deal with the theory of exceptional movement. The question that I
specifically address there is what constrains this movement and what makes this
movement possible. To do this, I adopt Fox and Pesetsky’s (2005) theory of phases.
This theory holds that a set of ordering statements is calculated upon Spell-Out,
which are then added to an ordering table. After Spell-Out, no movement may take
place that creates a conflicting ordering statement. I argue that, while exceptional
movement leads to contradictory ordering statements, exceptional movement is
nonetheless possible under ellipsis, because ellipsis has the ability to eliminate the
problematic ordering statements.
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation. It provides a summary and discusses av-
enues for future research. Part of this chapter is concerned with showing how Gap-
ping and Fragments differ from other types of ellipsis and what these differences
might stem from. To explain these differences, I entertain the possibility that the li-
censing condition on ellipsis is not a condition specific to ellipsis, but follows from
a general requirement on recoverability. With this hypothesis in place, the differ-
ences between Gapping/Fragments and other ellipsis types are shown to follow.
CHAPTER 2
The syntax of Gapping and Fragments
1 Introduction
In this chapter, I investigate the syntax of Gapping and Fragments. In Gapping, at
least the finite verb is missing (1a), but other material may go missing, too. In (1b),
besides the finite verb, the direct object is missing, in (1c) the indirect object and in
(1d) the adjunct.
(1) a. Max ate the apple and Sally the hamburger. (Jackendoff, 1971)
b. Some served mussels to Sue and others to Jane.
c. Some served mussels to Sue and others shrimp.
d. Some congratulated Sue with John’s birthday and others Suzan.
In Fragments, a remnant can function as the answer to a question (2a), an elabo-
ration (2b) or a correction (2c). Fragments differs from Gapping mainly in that a
fragment is not embedded in a syntactic context, whereas the remnants in Gapping
are part of a coordination.
(2) a. A: Who did you see?
B: Bill.
b. A: I saw someone.
B: Yeah, Bill.
c. A: You saw John.
B: No, Bill.
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Although B’s responses in (2) consist of a single nominal phrase, they are nonethe-
less understood as propositions. In (2a), for example, B’s response is understood
as ‘I saw Bill’. The question is how the single remnant in B’s response can be un-
derstood to convey a proposition. This same puzzle presents itself in Gapping. The
second conjunct in (1a), Sally the hamburger, conveys the meaning ‘Sally ate the
hamburger’. In this chapter, I investigate the syntax that underlies Gapping and
Fragments and the syntactic environments these elliptical constructions occur in.
In section 2, I present Merchant’s evidence for assuming that a full-fledged syn-
tactic structure underlies fragment responses. The evidence comes from so-called
connectivity effects. I show that the same arguments hold for Gapping, thus indicat-
ing the presence of a full-fledged syntactic structure in Gapping. If this theory is on
the right track, the fact that Gapping and Fragments are understood as propositions
is no longer mysterious: the presence of a full-fledged syntactic structure predicts
that the semantics underlying Gapping and Fragments is exactly the semantics un-
derlying non-elliptical sentences, namely a proposition.
(3) a. Max ate the apple and Sally ate the hamburger. Gapping
b. Who did you see?
I saw Bill. Fragments
In section 3, I discuss Merchant’s (2004) arguments for postulating movement of
remnants out of the ellipsis site. Merchant presents several tests for diagnosing
movement of remnants out of the ellipsis site in Fragments. I show that these tests
lead to the same conclusion for Gapping. I assume throughout that the remnants
adjoin to the ellipsis site, as in (4). I furthermore assume that extraction of remnants
is free and does not involve any checking (or valuation) of features.
(4) a. Max ate the apple and [[DP Sally]i [[DP the hamburger] j [XP ti ate t j ]]]
b. Who did you see? - [[DP Bill]i [XP I saw ti ]]
In section 4, I consider what exactly is targeted by ellipsis. In other words, I identify
what XP stands for in (4a,b). I present evidence that XP does not stand for a fixed
constituent in Gapping. More specifically, I show that Gapping can target at least
vP, TP and CP.
Section 5 concludes this chapter. The main conclusion is that the syntactic de-
rivation of Gapping and Fragments is identical.
2 Syntactic structure in the ellipsis site
In this section, I review Merchant’s (2004) arguments for postulating a full fledged
syntactic structure in the ellipsis site. One of Merchant’s arguments comes from
so-called connectivity effects. A connectivity effect obtains when the remnant and
the part of the sentence that has been elided show a dependency. The crux of Mer-
chant’s argument is that these relations between remnant and ellipsis site are cap-
tured straightforwardly if there is a syntactic relation between remnant and ellipsis
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site. In section 2.1, I consider case connectivity and in section 2.2 binding connec-
tivity effects.
2.1 Case connectivity effects
Merchant (2004), building on Merchant’s (2001) theory of Sluicing, presents a the-
ory of Fragments, which postulates the presence of a full fledged syntactic structure
in the ellipsis site. A strong argument in favor of this claim is that remnants show
grammatical dependencies to the ellipsis site, so-called connectivity effects. One of
these connectivity effects is ‘case matching’, first noted by Ross (1969). Consider the































Examples (5) and (6) show that the case of the fragment must correspond to the
case that the elided verb assigns. In (5a), for example, the Fragment dem Lehrer
bears dative case. As (5b) shows, it can’t surface with accusative case. Merchant rea-
sons that if there is a full-fledged syntactic structure in the ellipsis site, the fact that
the Fragment can only bear dative case follows straightforwardly. If a full-fledged
syntactic structure underlies the elliptical clause, dem Lehrer is actually selected by
folgt, which is a verb that assigns dative case, not accusative. By parity of reason-
ing, den Lehrer in (6b) must bear accusative case, because sucht in the ellipsis site
is a verb that assigns accusative case. Case connectivity, then, suggests that what

















Theories that do not postulate syntactic structure in the ellipsis site must postu-
late additional machinery to explain the case connectivity facts. In Ginzburg and
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Sag (2000), for example, Fragments are introduced by the phrasal type headed frag-
ment-phrase which must dominate the Fragment, whose CATEGORY and CONTENT
values are the same as those of the correlate. Case and φ-features are subtypes of
CATEGORY and CONTENT, respectively. Ginzberg and Sag account for the case con-
nectivity facts by stipulating a constraint which forces remnants to bear the same
case as the correlate. As such, Ginzberg and Sag’s account can be considered a sup-
plement to a theory of ellipsis. Merchant argues that no such supplement is needed
in an account of ellipsis that postulates syntactic structure in the ellips. In that
case, the case connectivity facts follow straightforwardly from the syntactic struc-
ture present in the ellips.
The examples in (8) show that the remnants in Gapping exhibit case connec-
tivity, too. The same reasoning that applied to Fragments applies here. That is, the
postulation of syntactic structure in Gapping explains why the remnant must bear










































‘Hans is looking for the teacher and Peter for the dean.’
(8a,b) illustrate case connectivity in Gapping. I take this as an indication that there
is a full syntactic structure underlying the ellips in Gapping. In (8a), the remnant
dem Dekan must bear dative case. This is precisely what is predicted if there is syn-
tactic structure in the Gapping clause. The dative case on the remnant is expected
given the presence of the dative assigning folgt ‘follows’ in the ellips. Similarly, it
follows from the presence of the accusative assigning verb sucht ‘seeks’ in (8b) that
the remnant den Dekan must bear accusative case.
2.2 Binding connectivity effects
Another type of connectivity effect that remnants of Fragments exhibit is related
to binding. The reasoning here runs parallel to the discussion on case matching
above. Merchant (2004) shows that the behavior that Fragments show with respect
to Chomsky’s (1981) Binding Theory is exactly the behavior observed in the non-
elliptical counterparts.
Consider the case involving Principle A of the Binding Theory in (9). As (9a)
shows, a reflexive is not an appropriate answer to the question in (9). Significantly,
this patterns with the judgment of the full answer in (9b). Merchant reasons that
this receives a straightforward explanation if (9a) is derived from (9b).
(9) Who did John think Sue will invite?
a. ?? Himself.
b. ?? John thinks Sue will invite himself.
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The example in (10a) shows the same as (9). This time, though, the Fragment is
grammatical. Again, this can be explained by assuming that (10a) is derived from
(10b) by ellipsis. In (10b), the reflexive gets bound locally in accordance with prin-
ciple A of the Binding Theory.
(10) Who does John like?
a. Himself.
b. John likes himself.
Next, I turn to Principle B. The answer in (11a) is ungrammatical. As before, the un-
grammaticality stems from the fact that (11a) is derived from (11b) by ellipsis. The
answer in (11a) is ungrammatical, because principle B is violated in the underlying
structure (i.e. the pronoun is not free in its binding domain).
(11) Who did John1 try to shave?
a. * Him1.
b. * John1 tried to shave him1.
We can repeat the refrain for Principle C. The fragment answer in (12a) is ungram-
matical as a response to the question in (12). Again, this makes sense if the under-
lying source of (12a) is (12b), in which a Principle C violation occurs.
(12) Where is he1 staying?
a. * In John1’s appartment.
b. * He1 is staying in John1’s appartment.
As with the case connectivity facts, the binding connectivity facts can be taken to
signal the presence of a full fledged syntactic structure in the fragment utterance.
The fact that remnants must obey the Binding Theory as if they were in a non-
elliptical utterance, remains either a mystery or must be explained by additional
machinery in theories that deny that there is syntactic structure in the ellips. Be-
low I show that Gapping exhibits the same binding connectivity properties as Frag-
ments. Before turning to these, however, it should be noted that a full paradigm of
the binding connectivity facts cannot be obtained. The reason is that the remnants
of Gapping are subject to a Clause Mate Condition (cf. Lasnik, 2013).1 This condi-
tion states that the remnants of Gapping must originate in the same clause. The
ungrammaticality of the Gapping case in (13a) is due to the fact that the remnants
Peter and Martin are not understood as being in (or originating from) the same
clause, as is clear from (13b), the putative source of (13a).
(13) John claims that Mary will invite Bill and
a. * Peter Martin.
b. * [Peter claims [that Mary will invite Martin]].
1Gapping is not the only ellipsis type that is subject to the Clause Mate Condition; Multiple Fragments
and Multiple Sluicing are also subject to it (cf. chapter 4).
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The Clause Mate Condition prevents us from testing non-local binding relations
in Gapping, as the test cases will be ungrammatical regardless of the Binding The-
ory. To clarify this, consider (14). In (14b), there is a Principle A violation: himself
is bound non-locally by Peter. If (14b) is the source of (14a), then its ungrammati-
cality is explained. At the same time, though, (14a) is also ungrammatical because
the requirement that remnants be clause mates is violated. This example makes
clear that we can only test for binding connectivity if we can ensure that in the un-
grammatical examples, the ungrammaticality results only from a Binding Theory
violation.
(14) John claims that Mary will invite Bill and
a. * Peter himself.
b. * [Peter1 claims [that Mary will invite himself1]].
In what follows, I only consider cases in which the Clause Mate Condition is satis-
fied. In such cases, binding connectivity provides evidence that there is syntactic
structure underlying ellipsis in Gapping. The examples in (15)-(17) show that the
grammaticality judgments of the a-cases involving Gapping track the grammatical-
ity judgments of the b-cases, the putative input for Gapping under the hypothesis
that there is syntactic structure in the ellipsis site.
(15) John will invite Mary and
a. Peter himself.
b. Peter will invite himself. Principle A
(16) John admires Mary and
a. * Bill1 him1.
b. * Bill1 admires him1. Principle B
(17) In July, he1 is staying in Bill’s apartment but
a. * In August, in John1’s apartment.
b. * In August, he1 is staying in John1’s apartment. Principle C
Similarly, the possibility of a bound pronoun in Fragments depends on whether this
is possible in the non-elliptical utterance, see (18). The same holds for the case of
Gapping in (19).
(18) A: Who does every Englishman1 admire?
a. His1 mother.
b. Every Englishman1 admires his1 mother.
(19) Some teachers gave [every student]1 a book in his1 favorite cafe and
a. other teachers in his1 favorite restaurant.
b. other teachers gave [every student]1 a book in his1 favorite restaurant.
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Scope ambiguity constitutes another connectivity effect in Fragments (20) and in
Gapping (21). The scope ambiguities present in the a-cases of these examples are
the same scope ambiguities present in the non-elliptical b-cases.
(20) How many diplomats did every translator greet?
a. Three. 3 >∀/∀> 3
b. Every translator greeted three (diplomats). 3 >∀/∀> 3
(21) Every translator greeted three diplomats and
a. every journalist four. 4 >∀/∀> 4
b. every journalist greeted four (diplomats). 4 >∀/∀> 4
What (15)-(17), (19) and (21) show is that the dependency between the second rem-
nant and the first in Gapping is the same dependency found in the non-elliptical
b-cases. If a full fledged syntactic structure underlies the a-cases, the fact that the
grammaticality of the Gapping cases tracks the grammaticality of the non-elliptical
b-cases is accounted for without the postulation of any ad hoc principles.
2.3 Summary
We have seen in this section that connectivity effects support the idea that there is a
full fledged syntactic structure underlying ellipsis. If correct, the elliptical construc-
tions Fragments and Gapping are syntactically and semantically identical to their
non-elliptical variants (modulo deletion of the backgrounded part of the utterance,
and the movement of the remnants, as we will see in the next section), as illustrated
in (22).
(22) a. Max ate the apple and Sally ate the hamburger. Gapping
b. Who did you see? - I saw Bill. Fragments
Theories that refrain from postulating syntactic structure in Gapping and Frag-
ments must invoke mechanisms that ensure that the remnants of ellipsis have the
same properties and show the same behavior as they do in the corresponding non-
elliptical utterance. Although such mechanisms can no doubt be hypothesized,
they unnecessarily complicate the grammar. If we accept that there is syntactic
structure in the ellipsis site, the connectivity facts follow straightforwardly, without
the need to postulate additional conditions and constraints.
3 Movement of remnants
In the previous section, I have presented evidence that there is syntactic structure
in the ellipsis site. In this section, I show that remnants ‘escape’ ellipsis (i.e. do not
undergo deletion) by moving out of the ellipsis site. I review Merchant’s (2004) ar-
guments that remnants move out of the ellipsis site in Fragments and show that
the same arguments extend to Gapping. The fact that remnants move out of the
ellipsis site, constitutes additional evidence for structure in the ellipsis site, since
extraction entails that there is syntactic structure to extract from.
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3.1 Complementizer omission
In certain contexts, omission of the complementizer is not possible with a fragment
(23), even though omission of the complementizer is possible in the corresponding
full answer (24).
(23) A: What does no one believe?
B: ∗(That) I’m taller than I really am.
(24) B’: No one believes (that) I’m taller than I really am.
Merchant notes that extracted CPs cannot omit the complementizer (cf. Stowell,
1981). This is illustrated in (25).
(25) ∗(That) I’m taller than I really am, no one believes.
The fact that remnants in Fragments cannot omit the complementizer, then, pro-
vides evidence that the remnants undergo movement.
The following example shows that complementizer omission is not possible in a
remnant of Gapping. This, in turn, provides evidence that the remnants in Gapping
undergo movement out of the ellipsis site, just as the remnants in Fragments.
(26) a. John believes (that) he is taller than Bill.
b. Bill believes that he is taller than John and John ∗(that) he is taller than
Bill.
Similarly, Merchant reports an interesting observation by Morgan (1973). Morgan
discovers that with certain verbs, there is a discrepancy between Fragments and
the non-elliptical variant. Whereas B’s response is grammatical as an answer to A’s
question, this fragment answer seems unlikely to have originated from its base po-
sition, see (28).
(27) A: What are you ashamed of?
B: ∗(That) I ignored you.
(28) * I’m ashamed of that I ignored you.
Merchant notes that the apparent mismatch between (27) and (28), whatever its
cause, actually provides evidence for the claim that remnants undergo movement.
He notes that, even though B’s answer is not grammatical in its base position (28),
the sentence is grammatical when the complement has undergone movement, see
(29). If remnants of ellipsis undergo movement, the expectation is that they pattern
with (29), which involves movement, rather than (28), which doesn’t. The grammat-
icality of (27) with the complementizer present can thus be taken as evidence that
the remnant has extracted from the ellipsis site, because it patterns with (29), not
(28).
(29) ∗(That) I ignored you, I’m ashamed of.
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The examples in (30) illustrate for Gapping the impossibility of complementizer
omission when the remnant is the complement of ashamed.
(30) a. John is ashamed of his hurtful comments towards Mary, and Bill ∗(that)
he ignored her.
b. John is ashamed of not having invited Mary, and Bill ∗(that) he insulted
her.
In sum, if the impossibility of complementizer omission is a hallmark of displaced
CPs, CP remnants in Fragments and Gapping show at least one hallmark of moved
phrases. The next section presents another argument that remnants of ellipsis are
extracted from the ellipsis site.
3.2 Predicate remnants
In this section, I consider remnants that are not arguments or adjuncts, but predi-
cates. Merchant (2004, p.24) provides the following example of a fragment answer
consisting of a predicate.
(31) A: What did he do to the car?
B: Totaled ∗(it).
What (31) shows is that one cannot respond to A’s question with just the verb, even
though the verb is the sole focus of the answer. In Merchant’s theory, this restric-
tion follows from the fact that remnants escape ellipsis through movement. Mer-
chant submits that remnants move to the specifier of a functional projection FP.
This makes the prediction that only maximal projections, but not heads, can move
to spec,FP. As noted above, I assume here that remnants adjoin to the ellipsis site.
Given that heads cannot undergo adjunction to a maximal projection, we can still
adopt Merchant’s account in terms of structure preservation for the ungrammati-
cality of B’s response when it consists of just a predicate. A problem with Merchant’s
example in (31) is that it is unclear whether it involves topic drop of the subject, and
hence no ellipsis, or whether we are dealing with a VP remnant (that has been ex-
tracted from the ellipsis site). To see whether answering with a VP fragment is possi-
ble at all, we can rule out the possibility of subject drop by embedding the correlate
of the fragment in the antecedent, as in (32).
(32) A: What did he want to do to the car?
B: (∗He) total ∗(it).
In the case of (32) it is clear that B’s fragment answer can only consist of a VP. This
example cannot involve subject drop, as having a (overt) subject is impossible in
the first place. Here again, the impossibility of leaving out the direct object shows
that the fragment must be a VP and cannot consist of just a verb.
At this point, it is instructive to consider predicate answers in Dutch. Dutch is
interesting in this respect, because it has verb second and scrambling. The example
in (33) shows that the restriction that a single verb cannot be a fragment answer
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holds in Dutch, too. This is expected if the fact that verbs cannot be remnants is due
to structure preservation, which, assuming structure preservation is part of UG, the














Dutch has the property of verb second in main clauses. This means that only one
constituent can precede the finite verb, which I assume is in T in subject initial
clauses and in C in clauses involving topicalization of a non-subject.2 Dutch also
has Scrambling. A DP is ‘scrambled’ if it has moved to a VP-external position (cf.
Bennis and Hoekstra (1984) that this involves A-movement and Wyngaerd (1989)
that this involves A’-movement). For ease of representation, I assume that a scram-
bled DP has adjoined to the VP. The examples in (34) show that Scrambling is op-
tional for definite DPs (indefinite DPs can only scramble when they are discourse
familiar).




























‘that John read that book yesterday.’ (Ruys, 2001)
The optionality of Scrambling with definite DPs can also be observed in cases of
VP-topicalization. The following examples show that when a VP undergoes topi-
calization, a definite DP object can move along when it is part of the focus (35a).
VP-topicalization can also move the VP, leaving the definite DP behind. In this case,
the DP has scrambled out of the VP prior to VP-topicalization, see (35b) (cf. the
discussion in section 2.2.2, especially fn6, in chapter 1).















‘I have never wanted to buy that car.’















‘I have never wanted to buy that car.’
With this background on verb second and Scrambling, consider the syntactic struc-
ture of (33) in (36). In (36), it is clear that the verb verkocht ‘bought’ in T cannot
2Besten (1989) and Bennis and Hoekstra (1989) argue that the finite verb always moves to C. Travis
(1984) and Zwart (1993) argue that the verb moves to T in subject initial sentences. It only moves to C
when a non-subject undergoes movement to Spec,CP. For our purposes, nothing hinges on the choice
of where the verb is in subject initial clauses.
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het boek ti t j
The following example differs minimally from (33) in that here the main verb has

















In contrast to (33), B’s response in (37) is grammatical. The difference between the
examples is that B’s answer does not contain a finite verb. In (37), verkocht ‘bought’
is non-finite and has thus not moved to T as part of the verb second process (the
finite verb heeft ‘has’ has moved to T instead). Verkocht can constitute a fragment
answer when the whole VP is extracted as a remnant. Prior to this, the definite DP
het boek ‘the book’ must scramble out of the VP. The syntactic structure that under-
lies B’s elliptical utterance in (37) is given in (38), where the circled VP indicates that
it is the remnant of ellipsis.
3From the ungrammaticality of (33), it also follows that kocht cannot be part of a bigger remnant
either. The smallest possible remnant containing kocht is the whole CP. If this whole CP would be a
remnant, ellipsis would have to target the material within this CP, namely hij het boek. One problem
is that hij het boek is not a constituent and ellipsis only elides constituents (cf. Merchant, 2004, p.663).
Moreover, if non-constituents could elide in the first place, the movement of the CP remnant would not
be necessary.







het boek ti verkocht
In general, in order to spell out just the verb in a fragment, the remnant must be at
least as big as a VP. Any VP internal material must have vacated the VP before the
VP undergoes movement. In (38), the direct object of verkocht has scrambled out.
Once the direct object of verkocht has vacated the VP, the VP contains just verkocht.
This VP can be a remnant, giving the impression that head movement has taken
place.
We will now turn to Gapping and show that, once again, it patterns with Frag-
ments. The following example from English shows that a remnant consisting of a
predicate cannot be a head, but must minimally consist of a VP (cf. (32) above).
(39) John has always wanted to clean the car and Bill total ∗(it).
The same restriction holds for Gapping in Dutch. The fact that verkocht cannot be
a remnant in (40) parallels the facts in (33). Verkocht is a finite verb in (40), hence
it must undergo verb second. When in C, there is no possibility for verkocht to be-
come a remnant of ellipsis, because it is a head and therefore cannot move out of
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As with the Fragments case in (37), a fragment answer constituting a single verb is
possible if a derivation is available in which the VP is emptied prior to movement as
a remnant. This is the case in (42). (43) illustrates the input for ellipsis. The circled

























het boek ti V
verkocht
3.3 Invalid tests of movement under Gapping
Merchant (2004) discusses several other tests that are supposed to show that rem-
nants escape ellipsis by means of movement. Although some of these tests are good
tests for movement in and of themselves, they cannot be applied to Gapping.
One of these tests involves islands. Merchant points out that if the remnants
in Fragments undergo movement, they should be subject to constraints on move-
ment. One well-known constraint on movement is that movement cannot cross is-
land boundaries. Merchant shows that the remnants in Fragments obey this condi-
tion.
(44) Does Abby speak Greek fluently?
a. No, Albanian.
b. No, she speaks Albanian fluently.
(45) Does Abby claim she speaks Greek fluently?
a. No, Albanian.
b. No, she claimed she speaks Albanian fluently.
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(46) Does Abby speak the same Balkan language that Ben speaks?
a. * No, Charlie.
b. No, she speaks the same Balkan language that Charlie speaks.
One could turn to Gapping and conclude precisely the same. If the second remnant
moves across an island, the result is ungrammatical.
(47) Abby speaks the same language that Ben speaks and
a. * Beth Charlie.
b. Beth speaks the same language that Charlie speaks.
This conclusion would be premature, however. Recall that Gapping is subject to the
Clause Mate Condition. This condition rules out cases where the remnants do not
reside in the same clause, as in (48). This is an even stronger condition on move-
ment than islands pose, since a second remnant cannot even cross a finite clause
boundary without violating the Clause Mate Condition.
(48) Abby claims that Ben speaks Albanian and
a. * Beth Charlie.
b. Beth claims that Charlie speaks Albanian.
Another test Merchant discusses to diagnose movement is preposition strand-
ing. Merchant (2001) discovers that there is a corollary between preposition strand-
ing and Sluicing. The corollary is that languages that allow for preposition stranding
in non-elliptical utterances, also allow for it in Sluicing. Languages that do not allow
for preposition stranding in non-elliptical utterances, do not allow for it in Sluicing
either. Merchant (2004) notes that the corollary holds for Fragments, too. That is,
languages that allow for preposition stranding in non-elliptical utterances allow for
it in Fragments, too.























As was the case with locality of movement, Gapping does not fully pattern with
Fragments. It is well-known that in Gapping, the second remnant cannot strand a
preposition (cf. Jayaseelan, 1990; Abe and Hoshi, 1997), see (51).
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(51) a. John talked about Bill and Mary talked about Susan.
b. John talked about Bill and Mary ∗(about) Susan.
The island and preposition stranding facts do not directly support the hypothe-
sis that remnants undergo movement in Gapping. We have seen in this section,
though, that the remnants in Gapping show properties of displacement. For this
reason, I will not abandon the hypothesis that remnants undergo movement in
Gapping. In chapter 4, I will elaborate on the locality constraints on remnants and
their preposition stranding behavior.
3.4 Summary
In this section, I have shown that remnants move out of the ellipsis site, which dove-
tails with the conclusion established in the previous section, namely that there is
a full fledged syntactic structure in the ellipsis site. If remnants escape ellipsis by
movement, their base position is situated in the ellipsis site. This entails that there
must be syntactic structure in the ellipsis site.
Another important result of this section is that the evidence for postulating
movement of remnants in Fragments carries over to Gapping. Ellipsis in Fragments
and Gapping can thus be represented as in (52). In the next section, I explore what
constituent XP stands for in (52).
(52) a. Max ate the apple and [DP Sally]i [DP the hamburger] j [XP ti ate t j ]
Gapping
b. Who did you see? - [DP Bill]i [XP I saw ti ] Fragments
4 The size of the ellips
What does ‘XP’ stand for in (52)? Below, I start by looking at Gapping, which has
received the most attention in this regard. In section 4.3, I turn to Fragments. For
Gapping, both vP (Johnson, 2009, 2004; Coppock, 2001; Toosarvandani, 2013, a.o.)
and TP have been suggested as the label of XP. Some have claimed that XP is am-
biguous in Gapping and can stand for both vP and TP (e.g. Repp, 2009; Centeno,
2012; Sailor and Thoms, to appear; Potter, 2014). Reich (2007) argues that Gapping
always elides a CP. In this section, I show that the ambiguity view of XP is correct.
Specifically, I show that Gapping can at least target vP, TP and CP.
4.1 Gapping in vP and TP coordinations: evidence from modals
and negation
In this section, I consider the scope of modals and negation relative to the coordi-
nation in Gapping. I present data from both English and Dutch in this section. As
we saw in chapter 1, the Dutch data are important, since they allow us to exclude
certain analyses for Gapping and Fragments, namely those that postulate that Gap-
ping depends on English specific syntactic operations, such as VP ellipsis.
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Siegel (1987) discusses the behavior of modals and negation under Gapping.
Consider first the examples in (53) without Gapping. (53a,b) can be interpreted as
describing two situations at two time intervals. (53a), for example, describes a situ-
ation in which Warren can’t go out drinking at some point in time and that his wife
can’t stay at home with the baby, possibly at a different point in time. It is clear from
the meaning of the examples in (53) that both conjuncts of the coordination con-
tain a modal and a negation. Syntactically, this means that both conjuncts must at
least be as big as TP, as illustrated in (54).
(53) a. Warren can’t go out drinking and his wife can’t stay home with the baby.
(Siegel, 1987, p.56)
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ti go out drinking t j stay at home
with the baby
Siegel notices that modals and negation can also scope over the coordination in
some cases. Such sentences involve auxiliary Gapping and necessarily describe a
single situation at a single time interval.
(55) a. Warren can’t go out drinking and his wife stay home with the baby.
b. John can’t eat caviar and Mary eat beans. (Siegel, 1987, p.56)
¬◇(A & B)
(55a) looks similar to (53a). (55a), however, describes a situation where, at a contex-
tually determined time, Warren cannot go out drinking while his wife stays home
with the baby. That is, the examples in (55) necessarily describe situations that hold
at a single time interval. I take these auxiliary gapping sentences to involve coordi-
nation at the vP-level, as in (56). This analysis explains why there is only one tense
specification and only one negation. It also explains why both the modal and the
negation take scope over the coordination. Furthermore, it accounts for why the
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modal seems ‘gapped’ in the second conjunct: there simply is no modal to begin















The analysis in (56) requires that the subject of the second conjunct, his wife, re-
mains in situ. The presence of a single TP implies that there is only one spec,TP
position available. This position is normally associated with nominative case as-
signment to the subject by T. As discussed in chapter 1, the subject of the second
conjunct is likely to get case exceptionally in vP coordinations. As noted there for
Gapping, evidence that coordination at the vP-level is possible comes from the fact
that the subject of the first conjunct can bind the subject of the second conjunct (cf.
McCawley, 1993; Johnson, 2004). If binding takes place under c-command, the ex-
ample in (57) shows that the subject of the first conjunct c-commands the subject
of the second conjunct. This is precisely the case in a vP coordination like (56).
(57) a. Not every girl1 ate a green banana and her1 mother a ripe one.
b. No boy1 joined the navy and his1 mother the army.
(taken from Johnson, 2004)
If the analyses of (53) and (55) in (54) and (56), respectively, are on the right track,
they make the following prediction. As we have just seen, the subject of the first
conjunct can bind the subject of the second conjunct in a vP-coordination. This
predicts that the subject of the first conjunct in (53) cannot bind the subject of the
second conjunct in a TP coordination, as the subject of the first conjunct does not
c-command the subject of the second conjunct. As the example in (58) shows, this
prediction is borne out. In this example, the coordination must be at least at the
TP level, as both conjuncts need to accommodate a modal. The ungrammaticality
of this example shows that when coordination is high, binding of the second con-
junct’s subject by the first conjunct’s subject is impossible.
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(58) * [TP No woman1 can join the army] and/but [TP her1 girlfriend can the
navy]
We now turn to Gapping. Siegel (1984, 1987) points out that Gapping cases are am-
biguous between the readings we have seen in (53) and (55).
(59) Ward can’t eat caviar and Sue beans.
The example in (59) is ambiguous between the following two readings. One reading
can be paraphrased as ‘It is not possible (or desirable) for Ward to eat caviar and for
Sue (simultaneously) to eat (merely) beans.’ This reading is true just in case it can’t
be that they both eat the foods mentioned. The reading obtained here entails that
the eating events take place simultaneously. This reading corresponds to the read-
ings of the examples in (53), where the modal and the negation scope over the coor-
dination. The other reading of (59) can be paraphrased as ‘Oh, no, I made caviar and
beans for dinner, and then I found out that John can’t eat caviar and Mary, beans.’
This reading is true just in case neither person can eat the food named. The reading
obtained does not entail that there is a single event. This reading corresponds to the
readings of the examples in (55), where a modal and a negation are present in both
conjuncts. We can account for the ambiguity of (59) if we analyze this example as
structurally ambiguous between involving a vP-coordination or a TP-coordination.
TP-coordination would give rise to the dual event reading (cf. (54)), whereas vP-
coordination gives rise to the single event reading (cf. (56)). If Gapping involves
ellipsis, this analysis of (59) entails that what has been elided in (59) can either be
a vP or a TP. The derivations of both readings of (59) are given in (60) and (61). In
(60) the modal and negation take scope over the vP-coordination, giving rise to the
single event reading of (59). In (61), both conjuncts contain a modal and negation:
this corresponds to the dual event reading of (59).
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(60) a. “It is not possible (or desirable) for Ward to eat caviar and for Sue (simul-
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(61) a. ‘Ward can’t eat caviar and Sue can’t eat beans.’ & <¬ < ◇
b. TP
TP and TP
DPi T’ DPk TP
Ward T
can












tk eat t j
Repp (2009) notes that there are three scope possibilities for negation in Gapping.
Besides the distributed scope in (62a) and high scope in (62b), which are like the
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examples in (60a) and (61a), negation may also take scope in just one of the con-
juncts, as in (62c).
(62) a. Pete hasn’t got a video and John a DVD. (¬ A) ∧ (¬ B)
= [It is not the case that Pete has a video] and [it is not the case that John
has a DVD].
b. Pete didn’t clean the flat and John laze around all afternoon. ¬ (A ∧ B)
= It is not the case that [Pete cleaned the flat and John lazed around all
afternoon.]
c. Pete wasn’t called by Vanessa and John only by Jessie. (¬ A) ∧ (B)
= [It is not the case that Pete was called by Vanessa] and [it is the case
that John was only called by Jessie]. (Repp, 2009, p.2)
I have argued that (62a) involves a TP-coordination in which both TP conjuncts
contain a tense specification and a negation. (62b) involves a vP-coordination in
which there is only one tense specification and one negation. (62c) involves a dual
event reading and thus patterns with (62a). In (62c), though, there is no negation
interpreted in the second conjunct. We can straightforwardly analyze this example
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The following examples from Dutch show that this language allows for the same
range of interpretations of modal and negation under Gapping as English does. This
is important to acknowledge, as many of the analyses that have been proposed for
Gapping are based on English data and make use of particular strategies not avail-
able in Dutch. In other words, the fact that Dutch allows for the same interpreta-
tions as English under Gapping calls for a uniform analysis of Gapping for English
and Dutch (Centeno (2012) shows that the same range of interpretations is avail-
able in Spanish, too).


























































‘John hasn’t eaten caviar, but Mary has eaten beans.’
4.2 Gapping in CP coordination: evidence from Wh-movement
Another piece of evidence that the missing part in Gapping can be of variable size
comes from cases with wh-remnants. The example in (67a) involves Gapping with
a wh-phrase as the first remnant. To ensure that (67) really involves Gapping and
not a case of Sluicing (involving, next to the wh-phrase, an additional remnant), we
can try to embed the ellips. Recall from chapter 1 that a Gapping clause must be
directly conjoined to its antecedent and can’t be embedded, whereas Sluicing can.
The ungrammaticality of (67b) shows that the wh-phrase + XP order of remnants
cannot be embedded and thus represents a case of Gapping. That means that (67a)
must be a case of Gapping.
(67) a. ? Which book did John recommend and which book Mary?
b. * I know which book John recommended, but I’d like to know which
book Mary.
The example in (67a) can be straightforwardly analyzed as involving a coordination
of CPs (cf. Pesetsky, 1982), in which Gapping targets the second CP, as indicated in
(67b). López and Winkler (2003), however, note that the facts are more complicated.
They claim that negation cannot be gapped in disjunctions (68b). For this reason,
the parse of (68) must be as in (68a), not as in (68b).
(68) Bill asked which books we didn’t give to Mary or which records to John.
a. or which records we gave to John.
b. * or which records we didn’t give to John.
For this example, the wh-phrase remnant which records must have adjoined to the
vP in the second conjunct. López and Winkler (2003) argue that this is possible
since wh-phrases may check their [wh]-feature at the edge of vP. The parse of (68)
is given in (69).
4The example in (65) reveals an interesting difference between English and Dutch. We have seen in
the distributive scope reading in (62a) that the negation is elided in English. In contrast, the negation in
Dutch cannot be elided in the distributive scope reading (cf. Repp, 2009).




















to John we give tk tm
The question remains whether (67a), involving the coordinator and, can have the






which book DP j CP
Mary did ti recommend t j
There is reason to believe that Gapping can target CP, even in the case of (68) involv-
ing the coordinator or. It turns out that not everybody agrees with the judgments
on López and Winkler’s data. Regarding (68), repeated here as (71), my informants
(three speakers of British English) get both readings in (71a,b), although both are
judged as a little marked.
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(71) Bill asked which books we didn’t give to Mary or which records to John.
a. ? or which records we gave to John.
b. ? or which records we didn’t give to John.
These judgments indicate that the example in (68)/(71) involves the same type of
ambiguity that showed up in the previous section. Negation under Gapping gives
rise to an ambiguity where the negation either takes scope over the coordination or
is interpreted in both conjuncts. The ambiguity of (68a = 71) indicates that the same
structural ambiguity obtains in cases of Gapping with a wh-remnant. That is, either
Gapping occurs in a vP-coordination, in which case negation scopes over it (anal-
ogous to the structure in (69)), or the gap is a CP, in which the negation is present
in both conjuncts (analogous to the structure in (70)). For the speakers who do not
accept (68b), it might be the case that they can’t gap negation in a CP-coordination
headed by or. Nonetheless, the fact remains that some speakers can. (71), therefore,
provides evidence that Gapping can target CPs.
The example in (72a) shows that Gapping can target CPs in Dutch, too. Again,
to ensure that we are really dealing with Gapping, (72b) indicates that the order
wh-remnant + XP is only possible when directly coordinated to its antecedent, a

















































Intended: ‘I know when Wim kissed Sofie, but I want to know when
John kissed Mary?’
To sum up, in sections 4.1 and 4.2, I have shown that the level of coordination in
Gapping is variable; coordination can be at the vP, TP or CP level.5 This conclusion
is in line with recent work by Repp (2009); Centeno (2012); Sailor and Thoms (to
appear); Potter (2014).
4.3 The size of Fragments clauses
Compared to Gapping, the size of the phrase that gets targeted in Fragments has
not received much attention in the literature. Standardly, Fragments is taken to be
a type of TP-deletion (cf. Merchant, 2004), though there is not much empirical data
5In chapter 1, we already saw examples of Gapping targeting APs. It remains an open question, how-
ever, whether ‘small constituents’ such as NP and PP can be targeted, too. Chaves (2005), Postal (2004)
and Yoshida (2005) claim that Gapping can also target a nominal phrase. Yoshida et al. (2012), on the
other hand, argue that Gapping in the nominal domain should be distinguished from Gapping in the
clausal domain. I leave the question of whether Gapping can target small phrases for future research.
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to support this assumption. There seems to be no a priori reason to assume that it
cannot also target other phrases. The null hypothesis, therefore, is that Fragments
can target any phrase, just like Gapping. Without evidence to the contrary, saying
that Fragments is confined to TP ellipsis is a stipulation. However, since Fragments
by definition targets clauses, even if it is not confined to delete a fixed constituent, it
can only target clausal categories such as TP and CP. Other phrases are simply ‘out
of reach’, because they do not constitute clauses. Most typical cases of Fragments
are likely to involve TP ellipsis, such as the case in (73). However, if questions are
CPs, the case in (74) plausibly involves a case of Fragments targeting CP.
(73) A: Who did you see?
B: [DP Bill]i [TP I saw ti ]
(74) a. A. John lent me his favorite book.
B. Really, [DP his favorite book]i [CP John lent you ti ]?
b. A. When did John arrive today?
B. [DP John]i [CP when did ti arrive today]?
A subtype of Fragments, known as Why-Stripping, provides reason to think that
Fragments can target constituents even smaller than TP. Typical examples are given
in (75).
(75) a. A. John ate natto.
B. Why natto?
b. A. They’re leaving for Italy on Tuesday.
B. Why on Tuesday?
c. A. Gazpacho soup is served cold.
B. Why cold? (Weir, 2014)
Weir (2014) analyzes these cases of why-Stripping as follows. Following Yoshida
et al. (to appear), he assumes that why is base generated in spec,CP, and that the
remnant of why-Stripping moves to the specifier of a Focus phrase (FP) below CP.
Weir assumes, like Yoshida et al., that the complement of FP is targeted for ellip-
sis. Unlike Yoshida et al., who assume that what is targeted by ellipsis is a TP, Weir
presents several arguments that why-Stripping actually targets VoiceP and that the
TP projection is, in fact, absent from the structure. Weir’s analysis of (75a) is as in
(76).
(76) [CP Why [FP nattoi [VoiceP [vP [VP John ate ti ]]]]]
If Weir’s analysis is correct, why-Stripping is a type of Fragments in which the el-
lipsis site is lower than TP or CP. In that case, why-Stripping supports the idea that
Fragments can in principle target any phrase. Since there is no evidence to the con-
trary, I henceforth assume that any constituent can be targeted by ellipsis in Frag-
ments.
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5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown, following Merchant’s (2004) theory of Fragments that
(i) there is syntax in the gap, and (ii) remnants move out of the ellipsis site. We can
conclude, then, that Gapping and Fragments are identical when it comes to their
syntactic derivation. Moreover, in these ellipsis types, the ellipsis site can vary in
size. These similarities between Gapping and Fragments raise the question whether
they should be formally distinguished. Before taking up this question, we have to
consider the distribution of Gapping and Fragments. This is what I set out to do in
the next chapter.
The conclusion that remnants move out of the ellipsis site, also raises several
questions. Most obviously the question of why remnants have to move out of the
ellipsis site and what allows this movement to take place in the first place. These





In the previous chapter I showed that the syntax of Gapping and Fragments is virtu-
ally identical. I followed Merchant (2004) in arguing for a movement plus deletion
approach to ellipsis, under which the derivation of typical cases of Gapping and
Fragments come out as follows.
(1) a. Max ate the apple and [DP Sally]i [DP the hamburger] j [ti ate t j ]
b. A: Who did you see?
B: [DP Bill]i [ I saw ti ]
The syntactic similarity of Gapping and Fragments begs the question whether we
have any reason to formally treat Gapping and Fragments as distinct phenomena.
Traditionally, Gapping and Fragments have been considered different types of el-
lipsis. This is mainly due to the observation that Gapping occurs in the second con-
junct of a coordination whereas Fragments occurs in a stand-alone sentence.
In principle, there are at least two reasons for which one could distinguish be-
tween different ellipsis types. One reason is that the ellipsis types have a different
constituent size. Generally, TP, VP and NP ellipsis are considered different ellipsis
types. Another reason to distinguish ellipsis types is their distribution. Gapping, for
example, only occurs in coordinations and not in subordinations, whereas VP el-
lipsis fairs fine in both those contexts. This, in fact, has led some authors to suggest
that Gapping should not be considered a type of ellipsis at all (e.g. Lobeck, 1995;
Johnson, 2004). This is an unfortunate conclusion, as Gapping shows many of the
hallmarks of ellipsis, such as strict/sloppy ambiguities and allowing for split an-
tecedents (Coppock, 2001). In this chapter I argue that there is no reason to formally
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distinguish between Gapping and Fragments. To arrive at this conclusion, I study
the distribution of Gapping and Fragments and show that their distributional pat-
terns are virtually identical. I show, moreover, that Gapping and Fragments are not
licensed by a syntactic licensing condition. I propose that Gapping and Fragments
are licensed when a particular discourse configuration obtains. With the licensing
condition on ellipsis holding at the level of discourse, any syntactic differences (i.e.
Gapping occurs in coordinations, Fragments in a stand-alone utterance) are irrele-
vant for whether or not the licensing condition is satisfied.
In section 2, I discuss the distribution of Gapping and Fragments. In section
3, I discuss ellipsis licensing and show that none of the theories in the literature is
capable of extending to Fragments and Gapping. Section 4 presents arguments that
show that Gapping is not licensed in the syntax. In section 5, I account for the facts
discussed in section 2 and 4. Specifically, I propose a theory in which Gapping and
Fragments are licensed when they are in a particular discourse configuration with
respect to their antecedent. Section 6 addresses some problems for the account
given in section 5. Section 7 concludes.
2 The syntactic distribution of Gapping and Fragments
In this section, I discuss in which contexts Gapping and Fragments can occur. It
turns out that the distribution of Gapping and Fragments is very restricted. Signif-
icantly, the distributional restrictions well-known to hold for Gapping turn out to
hold for Fragments, as well.
As we have seen in chapter 1, Gapping is subject to the Equal Conjunct Re-
quirement, which says that the ellipsis site may not be embedded relative to its
antecedent, nor may the antecedent be embedded relative to the ellipsis clause. In
(2a), the Gapping clause ‘Bill Mary’ is embedded under the matrix clause headed
by know.1 (2b) is also ungrammatical. Here ellipsis takes place in a relative clause.
(2) a. * Harry has invited Sue and I know (that) Bill Mary.
b. * John knows a man that caught a salmon on Sunday and Bill knows a
man (that) a trout on Thursday.
Interestingly, the no embedding restriction also holds for Fragments (cf. Hankamer,
1979). The similarity between (2) and (3) is remarkable. Nevertheless, this fact has
received little attention in the literature.
(3) A: Who has John invited?
B: ∗I know Mary
1An exception to the no embedding restriction are instances of Gapping under ‘bridge verbs’ (say,
think, etc.). An example is given in (i). See Temmerman (2013) for a discussion of embedded Fragments
in Dutch.
i. Harry has invited Sue and I think Bill Mary.
I discuss this exception to the no embedding restriction in section 6.
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The no embedding restriction on the ellipsis clause in Gapping and Fragments is
depicted schematically in (4).2
(4) Asymmetrical embedding of ellips
*
antecedent (&)
. . . ellips
Significantly, ellipsis types other than Gapping and Fragments are not subject to the
no embedding condition. This is illustrated for VP ellipsis in (5a) and for Sluicing in
(5b).
(5) a. Harry has invited Sue and I know (that) Bill has invited Sue, too.
b. Harry has invited someone, but I don’t know who Harry has invited.
Johnson (2004, 2009) shows that the antecedent of Gapping cannot be embedded
either. The example in (6) is ungrammatical with the bracketing as indicated. In this
structure, the Gapping clause is not embedded under she’s said. The fact that the
antecedent for the gap is embedded under she’s said gives rise to ungrammaticality.
(6) * [She’s said [Peter has eaten his peas]] and [Sally has eaten her green
beans] so now we can have dessert.
The following examples show that the antecedent for Fragments cannot be embed-
ded either. If it could, we would expect the examples in (7) to be ambiguous be-
tween a ‘large’ and a ‘small’ antecedent reading, contrary to fact. The instances of
Fragments can only take the large antecedent.3
2Although there is no syntactic connection between the antecedent and the instance of Fragments,
for the sake of convenience, I represent it here as such. In section 5, I argue that there is a discourse
relation between the Fragments clause and its antecedent.
3It should be noted that the examples in (7) are not ruled out because the discourse is incoherent.
As shown in (i) and (ii), Fragments with a small antecedent is ruled out, even though the non-elliptical
version is perfectly fine.
i. A: What did John say Mary has eaten?
B: Mary has eaten beans, but I’m not sure if that’s what John said.
B’: ∗Beans Mary has eaten, but I’m not sure if that’s what John said.
ii. A: John said Mary has eaten BEANS.
B: He’s wrong, Mary has eaten CAVIAR.
B’: ∗He’s wrong, CAVIAR Mary has eaten.
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(7) a. A: What did John say Mary has eaten?
B: Beans. question-answer Fragments
≠ ‘Mary has eaten beans.’
= ‘John said Mary has eaten beans.’
b. A: John said Mary has eaten BEANS.
B: No, CAVIAR. corrective Fragments
≠ ‘Mary has eaten caviar.’
= ‘John said Mary has eaten caviar.’
The examples in (6) and (7) show again that asymmetrical embedding is disallowed.
This time, however, it is the antecedent that is embedded with respect to the ellipsis
clause, as schematically represented in (8).
(8) Asymmetrical embedding of antecedent
*
& ellips
antecedent . . .
Elaborative Fragments seem to be less sensitive to asymmetrical embedding of the
antecedent, as shown in (9).
(9) a. A: John said Mary has eaten something.
B: Yeah, beans. elaborative Fragments
= ‘Mary has eaten beans.’
= ‘John said Mary has eaten beans.’
The possibility of taking a small antecedent in Fragments seems to track the pos-
sibility of taking a small antecedent in Sluicing. As shown for Sluicing in (10), the
possibility of resolving ellipsis against a large or a small antecedent is available here,
too, just as it is for Fragments in (9).
(10) a. John said Mary has eaten something, but I don’t now what.
= ‘I don’t know what Mary has eaten.’
= ‘I don’t now what John said Mary has eaten.’
The following example shows that when a small antecedent is unavailable for Frag-
ments, it is also unavailable in Sluicing.
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(11) a. A: What did John regret Mary has eaten?
B: Beans. elaborative Fragments
≠ ‘Mary has eaten beans.’
= ‘John regretted Mary has eaten beans.’
b. John regrets Mary has eaten something, but I don’t know what. Sluicing
≠ ‘I don’t know what Mary has eaten.’
= ‘I don’t know what John regrets Mary has eaten.’
Whatever it is that makes available the possibility of taking a small antecedent in
elaborative Fragments, it should not carry over to question-answer and corrective
Fragments. I will leave the exploration of the similarity between eleborative Frag-
ments and Sluicing for future research. Here, I assume that asymmetrical embed-
ding of the antecedent with respect to the ellipsis clause is impossible in Fragments
(i.e. (8) holds). In section 6, I discuss several cases where the no embedding re-
striction on the antecedent is violated. In general, it seems that embedding of the
antecedent with respect to the ellipsis clause is more flexible than embedding of
the ellipsis clause with respect to the antecedent.
Next, consider the case of VP ellipsis in (12). This example shows that the no em-
bedding restriction does not hold for this ellipsis type. Whether a small antecedent
or a large antecedent is chosen to resolve ellipsis depends on the context. It differs
in this respect from the Gapping and Fragments cases in (7), where no context, no
matter how rich, is sufficient to ‘bypass’ the no embedding restriction.
(12) John knows that Mary goes skiing in the weekends, but I’m not sure if Bill
does, too.
= ‘I’m not sure if Bill goes skiing in the weekends, too.’
= ‘I’m not sure if Bill knows that Mary goes skiing in the weekends.’
One might suspect at this point that Gapping and Fragments are main clause phe-
nomena. The following example shows for Gapping that it is not. That is, Gapping
can be embedded, but only if the antecedent is embedded, too. This is illustrated in
(13) and depicted schematically in (14).




The example in (15) is a case of symmetrical embedding. Nonetheless, ellipsis is
ungrammatical in this context.4
4This shows that there is no ‘higher clause matching’ in the sense of Rooth (1992) is possible. That is,
even though the matrix clauses (X knows) match, ellipsis is not possible.
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(15) * I know that Harry has invited Sue and Sarah knows Bill Mary.
(16) Illicit symmetrical embedding
*
&
antecedent . . . . . . ellips
The generalization seems to be that ellipsis clause and antecedent must be directly
‘next to each other’ in some way. Being ‘next to each other’ is not enough, though.
The example in (17) illustrates the well-known fact that Gapping cannot occur in
an adverbial clause. For this reason, Gapping is often thought to be a ‘coordinative
ellipsis type’ (i.e. it only occurs in coordinations).
(17) a. Max ate the apple and Sally the hamburger.
b. * Max ate the apple, because Sally the hamburger.
Let us now turn to Fragments. It is clear that Fragments cannot occur in a subor-
dinated adverbial clause, since Fragments is an ellipsis type that occurs in a stand-
alone sentence. Two clauses that are not syntactically connected can, however, give
rise to a subordinative interpretation. Consider the example in (18a). This example
has a subordinative reading in which S2 specifies the cause of S1. This same inter-
pretation is the preferred one in (18b). When it comes to their interpretation, (18b)
and (18a) are identical. Thus, although only (18a) involves syntactic subordination,
both (18a) and (18b) involve subordination at the level of interpretation.
(18) a. [S1 John got upset,] because [S2 his favorite cookies were sold out.]
b. [S1 John got upset.] [S2 His favorite cookies were sold out.]
The examples in (19) and (20) show that Fragments is impossible when the sentence
receives a cause-effect interpretation, similar to the reading of (18b). Consider the
example in (19a). B’s response can be interpreted as stating that the fact that John
has red hair is due to his parents having red hair. (19b) shows that this subordina-
tive cause-effect interpretation does not license ellipsis. B’s Fragments utterance is
ungrammatical, even though S1 provides a matching antecedent. Similar consider-
ations hold for (20b). Here, the interpretation of B’s utterance is that the sun’s shin-
ing causes the moon’s shining. Again, this subordinative cause-effect interpretation
does not license ellipsis, as shown in (20b).
(19) a. A: [S1 John has red hair.]
B: (Of course) [S2 His parents have red hair.]
b. * A: [S1 John has red hair.]
B: (Of course) [S2 His parents have red hair.]
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(20) a. A: [S1 The moon is shining.]
B: (Of course) [S2 The sun is shining.]
b. * A: [S1 The moon is shining.]
B: (Of course) [S2 The sun is shining.]
Just as with the no embedding condition, VP ellipsis and Sluicing are not subject to
the no subordination condition either, as shown in (21a) and (21b), respectively.
(21) a. Harry has invited Sue, because Bill did invite Sue, too.
b. I’m convinced Harry has invited someone, although I don’t know who
Harry has invited.
To summarize, both Gapping and Fragments are subject to severe restrictions on
their distribution. An approximation of the generalization on the distribution of
these ellipsis types, is that they are only possible when the ellipsis clause and an-
tecedent are directly connected and no (semantically) subordinative relation holds
between them. These distributional restrictions are absent in VP ellipsis and Sluic-
ing. This difference in distribution raises the question as to what governs the dis-
tribution of Gapping and Fragments on the one hand and the distribution of VP
ellipsis and Sluicing on the other. I address this question in the next section.
3 Existing theories of ellipsis licensing
It is standardly accepted that a successful instance of ellipsis must obey two pre-
conditions. One is that there must be an identical antecedent available in the dis-
course. This condition is what we have called the identity condition. Intuitively, it
is easy to grasp why there is an identity condition on ellipsis (whatever its precise
formulation might be): if there is no sufficiently identical antecedent, the deleted
material is not recoverable and no interpretation can be assigned to the elliptical
clause. The other precondition on ellipsis is the so-called licensing condition. The
licensing condition is generally thought to govern the distribution of ellipsis. That
is, a context in which ellipsis is allowed is a context in which the licensing condition
is satisfied. If we want to determine the nature of the licensing condition, we have
to study the contexts in which ellipsis can take place and compare these to the con-
texts in which it cannot. Although the terms ‘licensing’ and ‘distribution’ are some-
times used interchangeably, the two are not the same. In many theories, licensing is
a formal (grammatical) requirement that must be met for ellipsis to take place suc-
cessfully. The nature of this formal requirement is often taken to be syntactic. The
output of this grammatical operation, in turn, is what determines in which contexts
ellipsis can apply (i.e. its distribution).
The evidence for a licensing component in ellipsis is based on the following
observations. As is well-known, Sluicing is possible with interrogative wh-phrases.
(22) a. Somebody just left – guess who. (Ross, 1969, p.252)
b. Anne invited someone, but I don’t know who. (Merchant, 2001, p.40)
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Importantly, Sluicing is only possible with interrogative wh-phrases. Sluicing is im-
possible, for example, when the sluice is headed by a relative pronoun (cf. van
Riemsdijk, 1978; Lobeck, 1995), see (23b). The grammatical case of Sluicing in (23a)
differs only minimally from (23b) in that here the wh-phrase that heads the sluice
is an interrogative wh-phrase.
(23) a. Someone has done the dishes, but I don’t know who.
b. * Someone has done the dishes, but I don’t know the person who.
(Kim, 1997a, p.157)
Similarly, Sluicing is not licensed by wh-phrases that head clefts.
(24) a. * We thought it was Abby who stole the car, but it was Ben who.
b. * Somebody stole the car, but noone knew that it was Ben who.
(Merchant, 2001, p.59)
The examples in this section show that Sluicing is dependent on the presence of an
interrogative wh-phrase, which I refer to as the licensor.5 There are two important
questions raised by the idea that ellipsis must be licensed. How is ellipsis licensed
and why must ellipsis be licensed? As for the how-question, the question is what
the grammatical relation is between licensor and ellipsis site. The more intriguing
question is why ellipsis needs to be licensed. As said, it is not clear intuitively why
ellipsis should be subject to such a condition in the first place.
Two types of approaches can be distinguished in the literature on licensing el-
lipsis. The first type of approach takes it that a certain syntactic relation must hold
between licensor and ellipsis site (e.g. Zagona, 1982, 1988; Chao, 1988; Lobeck,
1995; Merchant, 2001). The second type of approach argues that licensing is a mat-
ter of having a proper discourse relation between ellipsis site and antecedent (e.g.
Asher, 1993; Hardt, 1993; Hardt and Romero, 2004; Klein, 1987; Prüst et al., 1994). In
the next section, I discuss some of these theories and review how and to what extent
they answer the how and why of licensing. In the discussion, I focus on Sluicing,
though much of it carries over to other ellipsis types as well.
5I will not discuss the licensing condition on VP-ellipsis here. The main reason is that VP ellipsis is
typologically rare, unlike clausal ellipsis types such as Sluicing, Gapping and Fragments. How VP ellipsis
is licensed can thus only be answered by conducting a cross-linguistic investigation, which is out of the
scope of this dissertation.
If we just look at English, though, it is easy to see that licensing plays a role in VP ellipsis. Observe
the contrast between (i) and (ii). Whereas VP ellipsis is fine in (i), it is not in (ii). According to Johnson
(2001), the correct generalization is that VP ellipsis is impossible in island contexts.This cannot be the
whole story, however, since VP ellipsis is not only impossible in islands. As noted in Potsdam (1997),
subjunctive clauses also resist VP ellipsis, see (iii). See Lobeck (1995); Johnson (2001); Aelbrecht (2010);
Thoms (2010) for theories on licensing VP ellipsis.
i. Mag Wildwood wants to read Fred’s story, and I also want to. (Johnson, 2001, p.445)
ii. * Mag Wildwood came to read Fred’s story, and I also came to. (Johnson, 2001, p.445)
iii. * We can’t count on Josh to be waiting for us at the airport so we request that you be instead.
(Potsdam, 1997, p.537)
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3.1 Syntactic licensing theories of ellipsis
3.1.1 The Agree approach
Lobeck (1995) adopts the view that ellipsis sites are silent pronouns and that these
pronouns need to be identified. In Lobeck’s theory licensing ellipsis is on a par with
the licensing of empty categories, such as pro. Parallel to how pro in null subject
languages is licensed by the agreement on the verb, ellipsis is licensed by a proper
head-governor specified for strong agreement (i.e. productive agreement that is
spelled out on either Probe or Goal). For Sluicing, Lobeck argues that a [+WH] fea-
ture on C licenses ellipsis. To rule out Sluicing in relative clauses (which, recall, do
not allow Sluicing, cf. (23b)), Lobeck follows Rizzi (1990) in assuming that in those
cases C is equipped with a [-WH]-feature.6
Merchant (2001, 2004) builds on Lobeck’s proposal. He argues that ellipsis is
licensed by an E-feature, the properties of which are listed in (25).
(25) E[uF∗]
JEK = [λp: e-GIVEN(p). p ]
φCP→∅/E
Under Merchant’s theory, ellipsis is licensed when all requirements of [E] are satis-
fied. One requirement is that the ellipsis must be e-GIVEN. [E] is a partial identity
function over propositions. An expression E is e-GIVEN iff there is an antecedent
A which entails E and which is entailed by E, modulo ∃-type-shifting (Merchant,
2001). Semantic composition of E and its complement succeeds only if the com-
plement of E is e-GIVEN. This semantic requirement is what I have been referring
to as the identity condition. Relevant for our current purposes is that the E-feature
also requires that it be checked by a particular syntactic feature F. Merchant (2001)
argues for Sluicing that the licensing feature that bears this requirement is a [uWH,
uQ] on C. This licensing feature has an EPP property (indicated by the ∗), which
requires overt movement of the Goal to the specifier of [E]. In effect, the E-feature
requires that a wh-phrase moves to its specifier and checks its [uWH, uQ]. For Frag-
ments, Merchant (2004) argues that the E-feature is situated on a covert functional
head. [E] furthermore requires that it be checked by a focus-feature, which attracts
a focused remnant to its specifier. When this particular checking requirement of
[E] is satisfied (and e-GIVENness holds), the E-feature instructs PF not to parse its
complement (this is expressed in the last line of (25)).
It is clear that Merchant’s and Lobeck’s accounts are to a large extent similar
(cf. also Aelbrecht, 2010). If we set aside the difference of postulating structure in
the ellipsis site, a matter that is largely independent of the licensing question, all
of these accounts share the idea that the licensor must be involved in a particular
6Merchant (2001) points out that for Rizzi, C in relative clauses can either carry a [+WH] or a [-WH]-
feature. For this reason, Merchant assumes that it is a [+WH, +Q] feature that licenses ellipsis and that
the C in relative clauses carries a [WH, Q]. Kim (1997a) assumes that the C-head that licenses Sluicing
carries a [+WH, +FOCUS]. Since the exact feature content of the licensor is not important for the discus-
sion, I do not discuss it further here.
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Agree/checking relation for ellipsis to be licensed.7
López (2000) expresses some criticism of Lobeck’s account, which extends to
Agree approaches to licensing in general. First, it is not clear what the particular
Agree relation has to do with the licensing of ellipsis. In the case of licensing pro,
the agreement on the verb is actually sufficient to retrieve pro’s content. Crucially,
the licensing agreement relation postulated for ellipsis does not recover the content
of the ellipsis site. Second, why does an interrogative wh-feature license Sluicing
whereas other features do not? Essentially, the Agree approaches only answer the
how-question of licensing, but not the why-question. If the Agree relation is a pre-
requisite for ellipsis, one would like to know why that is the case. It is this criticism
that strikes at the heart of the Agree approaches. Under the Agree approach, licens-
ing is an idiosyncretic syntactic condition, where the variation in ellipsis types is
governed by variation in the lexicon. The obvious drawback is that any ellipsis type
can be ‘captured’ this way, simply by postulating a(nother) licensor along with its
idiosyncretic checking requirement in the lexicon. The Agree approach thus denies
that the fact that only interrogative wh-phrases license Sluicing is something that
needs to be explained. This does not seem correct in light of the fact that many
languages have Sluicing with interrogative wh-phrases. The fact that Sluicing oc-
curs in typologically unrelated languages (cf. Merchant, 2001) indicates that there
is something special about interrogative wh-phrases that other (wh-)phrases lack.
If licensing were just a matter of lexical variation, we would expect to find an even
distribution between languages that employ Sluicing with interrogative wh-phrases
and languages that have Sluicing with, say, relative pronouns. Although this type
of ellipsis does exist, observe the examples in (26), this type of ellipsis is very rare
































lit. ‘Kofi will call someone, but I don’t know the person who.’
(Lipták and Aboh, 2013, p.105)
The rarity of the Sluicing type in (26) and the wide-spread occurrence of Sluicing
with interrogative wh-phrases indicates that interrogative wh-phrases have some
property that sets them apart from non-interrogative wh-phrases when it comes to
licensing ellipsis. If we can tease apart what that property is, we are a step closer to
answering what licenses Sluicing.
Gapping and Fragments pose another problem for the Agree approaches. The
main problem for the Agree approaches is that they cannot predict the distribution
of Gapping and Fragments. Take, for example, the contrast in (27) between the frag-
ment in B and B’. The Agree approaches cannot predict this difference. This is so,
7One difference is that in Merchant’s implementation of Lobeck’s theory, licensing is no longer a gen-
eral grammatical principle on licensing empty categories (i.e. the ECP), but an ellipsis specific syntactic
condition.
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because the ellipsis clause is identical in B and B’. Therefore, if the Agree relation
that licensing ellipsis is satisfied in B (for Merchant (2004), for example, [E] must
be checked by a focus-feature), it should also be satisfied in B’.
(27) A: Who came?
B: [John]i F[E] [ti came]
B’: ∗I know [John]i F[E] [ti came]
To give one more illustration, consider the example in (28) which illustrates the
ban on Gapping in adverbial clauses. As shown, the syntax of the Gapping clause
in (28a) and (28b) is identical. The difference between the two, and thus the cause
of the contrast, is the difference in connectives. A conjunction headed by and al-
lows Gapping, but a subordination headed by because does not. The agreement ap-
proaches, however, are unable to predict this difference, since the Agree relation
(whatever it is) is satisfied within the ellipsis clause and should therefore not be
sensitive to the relation the ellipsis clause bears to its antecedent.
(28) a. John invited Mary and [Paul]i [Suzan] j [ti invited t j ]
b. * John invited Mary, because [Paul]i [Suzan] j [ti invited t j ]
One of the problems for the Agree approaches regarding Gapping and Fragments is
is that there is no licensing element in these ellipsis types. What surfaces in Frag-
ments and Gapping are just the remnants of ellipsis. These phrases cannot be the
licensors, as they can be XPs of any category and thus do not form a natural syntac-
tic class. For this reason, Merchant (2004) argues that Fragments is licensed by an
[E] on a covert functional head. The Agree relation here is argued to involve focus-
features. Since neither the functional head that [E] sits on nor the Agree relation
has any morphological reflex, I consider this proposal as another indication that
the Agree approach to licensing is too flexible in that it can capture any ellipsis type
by simply postulating an Agree relation. Even if we grant that there is an Agree re-
lation in Gapping and Fragments, we end up with the same problem, namely that,
at the point at which the Agree relation is established in the ellipsis clause, it is not
clear what relation ellipsis clause and antecedent will ultimately bear to each other.
3.1.2 The move + delete approach
Thoms (2010) presents another syntactic licensing account. Thoms’s account, how-
ever, is not based on establishing a particular Agree relation to license ellipsis. In-
stead, the account generalizes ellipsis licensing to the deletion of copies left by
movement. Unlike the Agree approaches, therefore, Thoms’ account does not pos-
tulate an ellipsis specific licensing mechanism. Thoms argues that ellipsis is li-
censed by non A-movement (A’- and head-movement). A non A-moved element
can trigger ellipsis of its sister. In (29) for example, who A’-moves to spec,CP and
triggers ellipsis of its complement, C’.
(29) Anne invited someone, but I don’t know [CP [who]i [C′ Anne invited ti ]]
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Thoms adopts Kayne’s (1994) Linear Correspondence Axiom (LCA), which says that
if an element A c-commands B, A will come to precede B at the point of Lineariza-
tion. From the LCA, it follows that A cannot c-command B and B c-command A at
the same time, as that would lead to contradictory ordering statements. This means
that in a configuration in which A has moved over B, resulting in [A B A], copy dele-
tion must target one of the occurences of A. This is typically the lower copy (cf.
Nunes, 2004). Thoms argues that, instead of deleting the lower copy of A, the com-
plement of the higher instance of A may be deleted. In other words, ellipsis obtains
when, instead of copy deletion, deletion of the complement of the moved element
is resorted to. The reason why ellipsis only occurs in movement contexts, is because
Delete (of which copy deletion and complement deletion are instances) is a costly
operation and can only apply when a violation of the LCA would otherwise arise.
Under Thoms’ account there is no ellipsis specific licensing condition, as ellipsis is
simply an instance of Delete. Ellipsis occurs when complement deletion is chosen
over copy deletion in a movement configuration.
Although a theory that dispenses with licensing is to be preferred over a theory
that does postulate it, the obvious downside is that the different licensing contexts
are no longer accounted for. Recall that Sluicing is only possible with interroga-
tive wh-phrases and not possible in relative clauses and clefts, see (23b and (24a),
repeated here as (30a) and (30b), respectively. On Thoms’ movement account, all
of these involve A’-movement and are predicted to license ellipsis. In other words,
Thoms’ account overgenerates, because complement deletion is not sensitive to
the precise content of the moved element. As long as this element has undergone
non-A movement, ellipsis is predicted to be licensed.
(30) a. * Someone has done the dishes, but I don’t know the person [who]i [ ti
has done the dishes]
b. * We thought it was Abby who stole the car, but it was Ben [who]i [ti
stole the car]
Like the Agree approaches, Thoms’ account also suffers from the problem that it
cannot account for the distribution of Gapping and Fragments. The reason, again,
is that the licensing requirement on ellipsis, whether it involves Agree or move-
ment, is a local relation between licensor and ellipsis site. Hence, the licensing con-
dition is already satisfied at a point when there is no relation yet between ellipsis
site and antecedent.
(31) a. * Harry has invited Sue and I know (that) [DP Bill]i [DP Mary] j [ti has
invited t j ]
b. * John ate a hamburger because [DP Sally]i [DP an apple] j [ti ate t j ]
Under Thoms’ movement account, movement of Mary in (31a) and movement of
an apple in (31b) should license ellipsis (i.e. complement deletion). In both (31a)
and (31b), the relation between licensor and ellipsis site is already established at a
point where it is not yet clear what relation the antecedent will bear to the ellipsis
clause (embedded, subordinated, etc.).
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3.2 Discourse licensing theories of ellipsis
3.2.1 The Question under Discussion approach
Next to syntactic licensing theories, there are theories that hold that ellipsis is li-
censed when the ellipsis clause and the antecedent satisfy a particular discourse
condition. One such theory has it that the remnants of ellipsis must answer the
Question under Discussion, or QUD for short (see Weir (2013) for Fragments, Re-
ich (2007) for Gapping and Fragments and Ginzburg and Sag (2000) for Sluicing).
Informally, the QUD can be viewed as the question obtained by replacing the fo-
cused phrases in an utterance by wh-phrases. In (32), for example, Bill and Harry
are focused. If we replace these focused phrases with wh-phrases, we get a QUD of
the form ‘who met whom?’. Roberts (1996) proposes that participants develop the
discourse by making a contribution to the QUD.
(32) BILL met HARRY.
Implicit QUD: who met whom?
According to the QUD licensing theory of ellipsis, ellipsis is licensed when the cur-
rent QUD is answered by the remnants. This QUD can be overt, as in question-
answer Fragments, but the QUD may also be implicit, as in the case of Gapping and
elaborative and corrective Fragments. In the Gapping case in (33), the QUD of the
antecedent is ‘who met whom?’ (cf. (32)). Since ‘Sue Sally’ is an answer to this QUD,
ellipsis is licensed.
(33) BILL met HARRY and SUE SALLY.
Implicit QUD: who met whom?
A problem for the QUD approaches arises when we consider Gapping in embedded
contexts. In (34), assuming focus is on the object, the QUD is ‘what did I review?’.
Under the QUD approach, a ‘secondary’ QUD must be assumed to be evoked by the
focus structure of the embedded antecedent, namely ‘who read the paper when?’.
Although this is possible in principle, intuitively it is far from clear that there is a
‘secondary’ QUD that is guiding the discourse here. Since embedding is recursive
and, in principle, possibly infinite, the number of QUDs is predicted to be possi-
bly infinite, as well. From the perspective that answering the QUD is an overarch-
ing common goal of participants, we must wonder what the explanatory value of
a QUD theory is if the number of QUDs were indeed to grow with every level of
embedding.
(34) I reviewed a paper which [[Harry read yesterday] and [Bill last week]].
Even if we grant that QUDs can be embedded, the QUD approach wrongly predicts
ellipsis in embedded clauses to be fine, as well. In (35), Bill Mary answers the QUD
‘who invited whom’, which is provided by the antecedent. Yet, ellipsis is not licensed
here.8
8One might oppose that the answer to the QUD is embedded under the predicate know and that the
QUD should, for this reason be, as well (Dan Hardt, pc). Note, however, that the non-elliptical version
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(35) * [Harry has invited Sue] and [I know [(that) Bill Mary]].
QUD: Who invited whom?
Even though the QUD approach cannot account for (35), for many cases it seems
that the QUD, set by the antecedent, gets answered by the Gapping or Fragments
clause. Can we explain these facts without making recourse to the QUD? To answer
this question, I compare, in the next section, the QUD approach to the Parallelism
approach adopted in this dissertation (cf. chapter 1, section 1.2).
3.2.2 The QUD approach versus Parallelism
As noted, the QUD is obtained by replacing the focused phrases in the antecedent
with wh-phrases. Therefore, the prediction is that the focus structure of the ellip-
sis clause is determined by the QUD. That is, according to the QUD approach to
licensing, the general requirement of focus congruence between question and an-
swer determines that the remnants of ellipsis must be focused, because their corre-
lates in the antecedents are focused. In principle, it could be the other way around.
In fact, in the next chapter, I argue that remnants of ellipsis must be focused in or-
der to escape ellipsis. If correct, this means that the remnants of ellipsis must be
focused independent of the focus structure in the antecedent.
In chapter 1, I have adopted the view that ellipsis can take place when it has
a parallel antecedent, see the notion of Parallelism in (36) (cf. Rooth, 1992; Tan-
credi, 1992; Fox, 1999). Given (36), the tendency for the focus structure of the ellip-
sis clause to be parallel to the focus structure of the antecedent is explained by the
fact that the antecedent must be a member of the focus value of the ellipsis clause.
(36) Parallelism:
Every phonologically reduced (elliptical or deaccented) sentence E requires
that the discourse will contain an antecedent sentence A, which belongs to
the focus value of E (A ∈ F(E)).9 (adapted from Fox, 1999, p.73)
In many cases, the QUD approach and the Parallelism account make the same pre-
dictions. Consider the following example.
(37) JOHN gave Bill A BOOK and PETER A CD.
Under the QUD approach, the focus structure in the antecedent evokes a QUD
‘Who gave Bill what?’ Since the ellipsis clause answers this QUD, the example is
of (35) is fine. If the QUD were not answered by the embedded clause, then the prediction is that the
discourse should be incoherent, contrary to fact. It is possible that there is, in fact, an incoherent dis-
course here, but that accommodation ‘takes care of this’. In that case, however, the null hypothesis is
that accommodation is available for the elliptical sentence, too.
9For convenience sake, I give here the definition of focus semantic value, repeated from chapter 1,
section 2.1.
Focus semantic value of α, F(α):
The set of denotations produced by substituting all elements of the appropriate semantic type
for every focused element in α. (Rooth, 1985)
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correctly predicted to be grammatical. Under the Parallelism account, the ellipsis
clause must have an antecedent that belongs to the focus value of the ellipsis clause.
This is the case here, since the antecedent John gave Bill a book is a member of the
focus set [Peter]F gave Bill [a CD]F (= ∃x∃y[x gave Bill y]). To differentiate between
the two approaches we need to find cases in which the QUD is not answered, but
the antecedent is nonetheless a member of the focus value of the ellipsis clause. It
turns out such cases are quite common.10
(38) a. A: What did the cat eat?
B: The cat ate RICE. Not THE DOG, though.
b. A: What are we having for dinner?
B: We are having SPAGHETTI for dinner.
C: ME, too?
These examples show that answering the QUD is not a necessary condition on ellip-
sis.11 In (38a), the antecedent gives rise to a QUD of the form ‘what did the cat eat?’.
The ellipsis clause ‘not the dog’, however, is a (partial) answer to a QUD of the form
‘which animal ate rice?’. The QUD approach to licensing therefore wrongly predicts
this example to be ungrammatical. Similarly, in (38b), the QUD evoked by the focus
structure of the antecedent (i.e. B’s utterance) is ‘what are we having for dinner?’ C’s
response, in turn, is itself a question (something like ‘am I having spaghetti, too?’),
clearly not an answer to the QUD. Under the Parallelism account, these examples
receive a straightforward explanation. In (38a), abstracting away from the negation,
the antecedent the cat ate rice is a member of the focus set of the ellipsis clause [the
dog]F ate rice (= ∃x[x ate rice]). In (38b), ellipsis is licensed because ‘we are having
spaghetti for dinner’ is of the form ‘x is having spaghetti for dinner’.
I conclude that the fact that the ellipsis clause often seems to answer the QUD is
an epiphenomenon of focus theory and the identity condition in (36), rather than
a condition on its occurrence. Before we carry on, however, we must consider (39),
10I do not discuss a class of examples that fall under the rubric of Sprouting. These cases are more
complex in that the remnant of ellipsis has no (overt) correlate.
i. A: John is jealous.
B: Yeah, of Bill [John is jealous].
It should be clear, though, that the fragment of B does not answer the QUD. If A’s utterance is out of the
blue, the QUD could be of the form ‘who is jealous?’ or ‘what is John?’, neither of which B’s response
is an answer to. Rather, B’s response is an answer to ‘Whom is John jealous of?’, which does not follow
from the focus structure of A’s utterance. It is thus not clear how the QUD approach would handle the
example in (i).
11Reinhart (1991) presents cases very similar to the ones in (38) for Stripping, where the correlates in
the antecedent are not focused, see (i) and (ii) (via Van der Heijden, 1999).
i. A: Where is the ice cream?
B: I ATE it, and the cake too.
ii. A: What happened to Felix?
B: We lost track of him on our way back, and of Lucie too.
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which is not ruled out by the identity condition in (36), but is correctly predicted to
be ungrammatical by the QUD approach.
(39) * JOHN gave Bill A BOOK and PETER SUSAN.
Under the QUD approach, (39) is ruled out, because the focus structure of the an-
tecedent gives rise to a QUD of the form ‘who gave Bill what?’ whereas the el-
lipsis clause provides an answer to the question ‘Who gave whom a book?’. Un-
der the Parallelism account, on the other hand, ellipsis should be allowed, since
John gave Bill a book is of the required form x gave y a book. The key difference
between this example and the cases in (38) is that the remnants in (39) are con-
trastively focused. As pointed out by Griffiths and Lipták (2014), contrastively fo-
cused remnants of clausal ellipsis require contrastively focused correlates (this has
been noted for Gapping in Sag, 1976; Hartmann, 2000; Repp, 2009). The following
felicity condition on ellipsis captures this (adapted from Griffiths and Lipták, 2014).
(40) Felicity condition on contrastive remnants:
Contrastive remnants are only felicitous if their correlate is contrastively fo-
cused.
The condition in (40) is a condition independent from Parallelism. Whatever the
source of the condition in (40), it is this condition that rules out (39). If we were
to tighten the Parallelism condition to rule out (39), we would no longer be able to
account for (38), as those examples crucially require a ‘loose’ notion of identity in
which the antecedent must match the ellipsis clause but not (also) the other way
around.
3.2.3 The discourse-linking approach of López (2000)
López (2000) develops an account in which ellipsis licensors are functional cate-
gories that have the property of connecting with a discourse topic.12 Licensors in
this conception are D(iscourse)-linking elements, where D-linking is syntactically
encoded with a D-linking feature on the licensing head. For the sake of the discus-
sion I will again concentrate on Sluicing in what follows. For Sluicing, López argues
that the licensor is C. This means that C is equiped with a D-linking feature that in-
structs the interpretative component to ‘connect with a discourse topic’. Note that
D-linking here should not be understood in the sense of Pesetsky (1987). Pesetsky
sets out to explain the differences between D-linked wh-phrases, such as which
DP, and non D-linked wh-phrases, such as who and what. In López’ proposal, all
interrogative wh-phrases are taken to be D-linking (except for aggressively non-D-
linked ones, see below). For López, the elliptical category is an X0 pro-form. This
pro-form has to adjoin to the licensing head. The derivation of a typical case of
Sluicing is given in (41).
(41) [Ann invited someone] but I don’t know who [proi C[D−l i nki ng]] ti ]
12AnderBois (2011) proposes a D-linking account for Sluicing. His account is targeted to capture Sluic-
ing, but not all ellipsis types. I will not discuss the account here, but I will discuss it in chapter 5.
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According to López, the adjunction of pro to C is necessary, as it locates the pro-
form in the checking domain of C (i.e. the licensing head). Being in the checking do-
main, the pro-form is resolved by the discourse topic that the D-linking feature on
the licensing head links to. The guiding idea here is that a null pronoun cannot re-
trieve an antecedent in and of itself. The licensing head mediates the establishment
of the discourse link that connects the pro-form to its antecedent. López’ account is
in part based on the observation that aggressively non D-linked wh-phrases do not
license Sluicing, as shown in (42). Assuming C does not have a D-linking feature in
this case, ellipsis is correctly predicted to be ungrammatical. If C lacks a D-linking
feature (i.e. the ability to connect to a discourse topic), this means it lacks the ability
to mediate the link between pro-form and antecedent that is necessary to license
ellipsis.
(42) * I know Pat wants to buy something, but I don’t know what the hell. (López,
2000, p.185)
What is unclear in López’ account is why Sluicing is impossible in (30), repeated
here as (43), where the sluice is headed by a non-interrogative wh-phrase. As it
stands, the property of D-linking (i.e. being able to connect with a discourse topic)
is simply encoded as a feature. For the account to be explanatory, the presence of
this feature on a functional head should follow from an independent property that
is inherent to this head.
(43) a. * Someone has done the dishes, but I don’t know the person [who]i [ ti
has done the dishes]
b. * We thought it was Abby who stole the car, but it was Ben [who]i [ti
stole the car]
Setting aside the problem that (43) poses for López’ account, it is clear that López’
specific implementation is incompatible with our current assumptions. Specifi-
cally, the idea that the ellipsis site is a pro-form is problematic, since in chapter 2 I
have adopted and argued for the view that there is a full-fledged syntactic structure
in the ellipsis site. Hence, the idea of the ellipsis site moving to the licensing element
cannot be adopted, as this would mean that an XP (the ellipsis site) would move to
a head position (adjoined to the licensing head). This problem, however, does not
seem insurmountable. One could, for example, assume that the wh-phrase itself
has the D-linking property (cf. AnderBois, 2011).
Ignoring the problems for López’ account for the moment and turning to Gap-
ping and Fragments, the D-linking theory shows some promise in that it postulates
that a certain relation must hold between the ellipsis clause and the antecedent. As
we have seen, Gapping and Fragments are sensitive when it comes to the relation
they bear to their antecedent. It should be noted, though, that just as for the other
theories of ellipsis licensing, the D-linking theory does not directly carry over to
Gapping and Fragments. Since there is no licensing element in Gapping and Frag-
ments, the necessary D-linking relation between a Gapping/Fragments clause and
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an antecedent cannot be established. Hence, ellipsis is predicted to be ungram-
matical in Gapping and Fragments, as no antecedent can be retrieved from the dis-
course. I show in section 5 that a theory that bears a strong resemblance to López’
D-linking theory can account for the distribution of Gapping and Fragments.
3.3 Summary
In this section, I reviewed the literature on licensing ellipsis. I compared two types
of approaches, the syntactic approach and the discourse approach. The main prob-
lem for the syntactic approaches is that they overgenerate when it comes to Gap-
ping and Fragments. In general, it seems to be the case that one cannot simply
postulate that whatever licenses Sluicing and VP-ellipsis also licenses Gapping and
Fragments, as it would lead to the prediction that Gapping and Fragments have
the same distribution as Sluicing and VP-ellipsis. This being said, the discourse li-
censing accounts seem the most promising to pursue for Gapping and Fragments,
since they postulate that a particular relation must hold between ellipsis clause and
antecedent. We saw in section 2 that a Gapping or Fragments clause must indeed
be in a particular relation with regard to its antecedent. In section 5, I present an
account of Gapping and Fragments inspired by the D-linking approach. To set the
stage, I first present in the next section evidence that the distribution of Gapping is
not determined by syntax.
4 The role of boolean connectives in Gapping
In this section, I present two arguments that show that Gapping is not licensed in
the syntax. In section 4.1, I report on the observation by Van der Heijden and Klein
(1995) that the connectives that allow for Gapping do not form a uniform syntac-
tic class. Therefore, it is impossible to refer to a particular class of syntactic envi-
ronments that allow for Gapping. In section 4.2, I show that asymmetric coordi-
nations are really coordinations syntactically. Nonetheless, they do not allow Gap-
ping. Since what distinguishes asymmetric from symmetric coordinations cannot
be syntax, the factor that determines whether Gapping is allowed can also not be
syntactic.
4.1 The connectives that allow for Gapping
According to Van der Heijden and Klein (1995), the generalization that Gapping is
only possible in coordinations is a simplification of the facts. They show that Gap-
ping is licensed in any conjunction headed by, what they call, an ‘arithmetic con-
nective’. These connectives are divalent semantic operators and can be described











+, ∧ (logic), ∩ (intersection, set theory)
¬p ∧ ¬q (logic), A∗ ∩ B∗ (set theory)
∨ (logic), ∪ (union, set theory)
–, B/A (difference, set theory)
A ∩ B∗ (logic)
=
<
As illustrated in (45) for en ‘and’, in (46) for in plaats van ‘instead of’ and in (47) for
dan ‘than’ (Dutch), arithmetic connectives can connect constituents of any type.
In other words, arithmetic connectives are boolean operators. These are operators
that take two arguments of a boolean type (i.e. <α,t>) and return something of type
t.
(45) a. [DP Jan ] en [DP Marie ]
‘John and Mary’
b. [PP op de tafel ] en [PP onder de stoel ]
‘on the table and under the chair’
c. [AP slim ] en [AP mooi ]
‘smart and pretty’
d. [VP praat ] en [VP luistert ]
‘talks and listens’
e. [CP Jan praat ] en [CP Marie luistert ]
‘John talks and Mary listens’
(46) a. [DP Jan ] in plaats van [DP Marie ]
‘John instead of Mary’
b. [PP op de tafel ] in plaats van [PP onder de stoel ]
‘on the table instead of under the chair’
c. [AP slim ] in plaats van [AP mooi ]
‘smart instead of pretty’
d. [VP praat ] in plaats van [VP luistert ]
‘talks instead of listens’
e. [CP Jan praat ] in plaats van [CP dat Marie luistert ]
‘John talks instead of Mary listens’
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(47) a. liever [DP Jan ] dan [DP Marie ]
‘rather John than Mary’
b. liever [PP op de tafel ] dan [PP onder de stoel ]
‘rather on the table than under the chair’
c. liever [AP slim ] dan [AP mooi ]
‘rather smart than pretty’
d. liever [VP praat ] dan [VP luistert ]
‘rather talks than listens’
e. liever [CP dat Jan praat ] dan [CP dat Marie luistert ]
‘rather that John talks than that Mary listens’
What is important to note is that, syntactically, boolean connectives do not form a
uniform class; they can be coordinators and subordinators alike. En, for example,
conjoins two main clauses. This can be concluded from (45e), where two verb sec-
ond clauses are connected. Subordinators do not select verb-second clauses, but
verb final clauses headed by a complementizer. As can be seen in (46e) for in plaats
van and in (47e) for dan, then, these connectives are subordinators syntactically.
Even though the connectives in (44) do not form a uniform syntactic class, they
nonetheless allow for Gapping, see (48).
(48) a. Max ate the apple and Sally the hamburger.
b. Max didn’t eat the apple nor Sally the hamburger.
c. Max ate the apple or Sally the hamburger.
d. Everybody ate the apple except Sally.
e. Max ate the apple instead of Sally.
f. Max eats apples as often as Sally hamburgers.
g. Max eats more often apples than Sally hamburgers.
Lechner (2004) argues at length that comparatives allow for Gapping. He also notes,
however, that comparatives introduce subordinated clauses and that, given that
Gapping is licensed in coordinations, it is therefore unexpected that they allow for
Gapping. Lechner therefore proposes that a syntactic transformation assimilates
comparatives to coordinative structures. Below, I propose an alternative.
Just like there are syntactic subordinators that allow for Gapping, there are cases
of coordinators that do not allow for Gapping. A case at hand is want ‘because’
in Dutch. Want constitutes an instance of a syntactic coordinator which gives rise
to a subordinative interpretation. Want is not a boolean connective. Instead, want
conjoins two clauses in which the second conjunct is specifying the reason for the
event in the first conjunct. The restriction that want can only select for clausal argu-
ments might therefore follow from its semantics. It does not rule out the possibility
that want is syntactically a coordinator. Indeed, the following tests show that want
passes coordination tests.
Van der Heijden (1999, p.199) notes that want fails the inversion test, a clear
indication that want is, in fact, a (syntactic) coordinator. (49b) shows that the clause
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headed by want cannot invert with the first conjunct, cf. (49a). Compare this to
(50b) where the clause headed by the subordinator omdat can invert with the root




















































As noted above, one test for Dutch that distinguishes coordinators from subordi-
nators is that coordinators conjoin verb second clauses, as in (51a). Subordinators,
on the other hand, introduce a clause with verb final word order, see (51b). Want





















































Another indication that want heads a syntactic coordination is provided by the con-
trast between (52a) and (52b). The example in (52a) with omdat is ambiguous. It
has a reading in which negation takes scope over the omdat-clause and a reading
















= ‘The reason he does not stay home, is because it is raining.’ omdat<¬















= ‘The reason he does not stay home, is because it is raining.’ want<¬
≠ ‘It is not the case that he stays home because it is raining.’ ¬< want
The contrast immediately falls out from the difference in syntax between coordi-
nators and subordinators. As for the case of subordination in (52a), the ambiguity
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stems from the fact that the adverbial clause can adjoin high (TP adjunction) or low
(VP adjunction). In the case of low attachment, as in (53a), negation takes scope
over the purpose clause, which gives rise to the reading ‘it is not the case that he
stays home because it is raining’. In the case of high attachment, see (53b), nega-
tion scopes below the purpose clause instead, giving rise to the reading ‘the reason
he does not stay home, is that it is raining’.









ti t j thuis omdat het
regent
b. TP omdat < niet
TP AdvP








ti t j thuis
If want is a coordinator, it must head a coordination phrase in which the first con-
junct c-commands the second conjunct, as shown in (54). It is clear from this struc-
ture that the negation does not take scope over the want-clause, as it does not c-
command the want-clause. For this reason, the example in (52b) is not ambiguous








The three tests above all indicate that want is a coordinator. Nonetheless, Gapping
is impossible in a conjunction headed by want, as shown in the following example,























‘The general greeted the soldier, because the soldier greeted the gen-
eral.’
b. * De generaal groette de soldaat want de soldaat de generaal.
4.2 Asymmetric coordinations
Cases which look very similar to coordinations headed by want are so-called ‘asym-
metric coordinations’. By definition, these are coordinations in which the meaning
changes when the order of the conjuncts is reversed (cf. Ross, 1967; Schmerling,
1975; Lakoff, 1986; Deane, 1992).
(56) a. John is the smart one and Sally is the pretty one.
= Sally is the pretty one and John is the smart one.
symmetrical coordination
b. John got home and Sally called John.
≠ Sally called John and John came home. asymmetrical coordination
According to this definition, the following examples constitute instances of asym-
metrical coordination. These constructions are characterized by giving rise to an
asymmetric interpretation, as indicated by the paraphrases.
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(57) a. Open the car door again and I’ll slap you. conditional
‘If you open the car door again, I’ll slap you.’ (Chaves, 2007, p.29)
b. Sue became upset and Dan became downright angry cause-effect
‘Because Sue became upset, Dan became downright angry.’
(Levin and Prince, 1986)
c. You hide that loot right now or we’re in big trouble. threat-or
‘Unless you hide that loot right now, we’re in big trouble.’
(Culicover and Jackendoff, 1997)
The fact that asymmetric coordinations give rise to a subordinative interpretation
has led Goldsmith (1985) and Postal (1993) to propose that asymmetric coordina-
tions actually have subordinative syntax. As argued at length by Culicover and Jack-
endoff (1997, 2005), however, asymmetric coordinations are, in fact, coordinations
in the syntax. Among others, they use the following tests to show this. And plus the
‘subordinated clause’ cannot precede the first conjunct, compare (58a) to (58b).
This is unlike subordinated clauses which can precede their ‘host clause’, compare
(59a) and (59b).
(58) a. It was slippery, and John fell.
b. * And John fell, it was slippery.
(59) a. John fell, because it was slippery.
b. Because it was slippery, John fell.
Another indication that asymmetric coordinations have coordinative syntax, is that
and introduces a main clause, unlike subordinators. The fact that and introduces a
main clause can be seen from the fact that it allows for subject-auxiliary inversion
(60). Subordinated clauses strongly resist such inversion, as shown by the attempts
in (61).
(60) You so much as mention the Minimalist Program and how loud does she
scream? (Culicover and Jackendoff, 1997, p.210)
(61) a. * Who does if Big Louie visits, the whole gang goes nuts?
* Who if does Big Louie visits, . . .
* If who does Big Louie visits, . . .
b. * What does if he mention, she kicks him out of her office?
* What if does he mention, . . .
* If what does he mention, . . . (Culicover and Jackendoff, 1997, p.210)
Culicover and Jackendoff (1997, 2005) conclude that asymmetric coordinations are
syntactic coordinations that give rise to a ‘subordinative’ interpretation. They pro-
pose that syntactic coordinations can be mapped onto a subordinative interpreta-
tion at Conceptual Structure, but the exact details remain a little unclear. The con-
clusion that there is no one-to-one correspondence between syntax and semantics
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in conjunction gains support by the work of Cormack and Smith (2005) and Blüh-
dorn (2008).
What is relevant for our current purposes is that asymmetric coordinations do
not allow for Gapping (cf. Levin and Prince, 1986; Kehler, 1994, 2000; Culicover and
Jackendoff, 1997, 2005). Although Gapping in asymmetrical coordinations does not
result in ungrammaticality per se, the subordinative reading of asymmetric coordi-
nations disppears under ellipsis (hence the ∗). This is a clear indication that Gap-
ping is only licensed in symmetric coordinations and not in asymmetric coordina-
tions.
(62) a. Big Louie steals one more car radio and Little Louie ∗(steals) the hub-
caps. (Culicover and Jackendoff, 1997), conditional-and
b. Sue became upset and Dan ∗(became) downright angry.
(Levin and Prince, 1986), cause-effect
c. You kill Georgie, or Big Louie ∗(kills) your dog.
(Culicover and Jackendoff, 1997), threat-or
To sum up, I have considered the class of connectives that allow for Gapping in sec-
tion 4.1. I concluded that this class of connectives does not form a uniform syntactic
class. In this section, I considered asymmetric coordinations. These constructions
show that Gapping is sensitive to whether or not a coordination has a symmetric
or an asymmetric interpretation. Two conclusions can be drawn from the discus-
sion. First, there is no one-to-one correspondence between syntactic coordination
and symmetric interpretation, nor between syntactic subordination and asymmet-

















symmetrical boolean conjunction comparatives,
(and, or, but) except, instead of
asymmetrical asym. coordination, adverbial clauses
want (because, before)
The second conclusion is that Gapping is not sensitive to the syntactic distinction
between coordination and subordination. Gapping is sensitive, however, to the se-
mantic properties of the conjunction. The question now is how we can characterize
the contexts in which Gapping can take place. In order to answer that question, we
have to consider when a symmetrical or asymmetrical interpretation arises. In this
section, we saw that a symmetrical interpretation arises when both conjuncts are
symmetrically conjoined by a boolean connective. In that case, there is no direct
relation between the conjuncts, as both conjuncts are arguments of the connective
and therefore have equal status. In cases where there is an asymmetrical interpre-
tation, on the other hand, there is an asymmetrical relation between the two con-
juncts. According to Bierwisch (2003), in subordinations, the subordinated clause
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takes the root clause as its argument, creating a semantic asymmetry between the
conjuncts.
If licensing is a matter of having the right relation between ellipsis clause and
antecedent in the discourse, as anticipated in section 3, we would like to know how
the facts discussed in this section can be interpreted from a discourse perspective.
This question will be addressed in the next section.
5 A discourse licensing theory of Gapping/Fragments
The discussion of the distribution of Gapping and Fragments in section 2 revealed
that it is important that the ellipsis clause and the antecedent in Gapping and Frag-
ments bear a certain relation to each other. In section 4, we saw that this relation
should not be characterized in terms of syntax. From the discussion on licensing
ellipsis in section 3, the most promising account of licensing was one where ellip-
sis licensing is a matter of having the right discourse relation between the ellipsis
clause and the antecedent. In section 5.2, I show how this idea can be fleshed out
for Gapping and Fragments. In the next section, I first introduce my assumptions
about the discourse component and how semantically symmetrical and semanti-
cally asymmetrical relations are encoded there.
5.1 Setting the scene: coordination, subordination and discourse
representation
In the discourse literature, a distinction is generally made between coordination
and subordination (or ‘nuclei’ and ‘satellites’ in Rhetorical Structure Theory, Mann
and Thompson (1988)). To avoid confusion in terminology, I reserve the terms ‘co-
ordination’ and ‘subordination’ to describe syntactic structures and use the terms
‘hierarchical’ (i.e. semantically asymmetrical) and ‘non-hierarchical’ (i.e. semanti-
cally symmetrical) to describe discourse structure (following Blühdorn, 2008). In
what follows, I adopt a syntax-centered discourse perspective, in which syntactic
structures form the input to the discourse component. Discourse structures are
built by extending the syntactic tree beyond the sentence boundary (cf. Hardt, 2013;
Buch-Kromann, 2006a,b). I assume furthermore that discourse relations can be es-
tablished in two ways. First, a discourse relation between two clauses S1 and S2
can be established by the use of a connective like and or because that connects S1
and S2. Alternatively, a discourse relation between S1 and S2 can be established
anaphorically through the use of discourse anaphors such as therefore, then, other-
wise, instead, etc., see Webber et al. (2003).
Under the hypothesis that syntactic structures feed the discourse component,
whether a hierarchical or a non-hierarchical relation holds between two clauses,
could in principle be a matter of ‘reading off’ this relation from the syntactic struc-
ture. We have seen, however, that whether or not a relation is hierarchical (i.e. se-
mantically asymmetrical), cannot be determined by consulting the syntactic struc-
ture (cf. section 4). Also, ‘reading off’ whether a relation is hierarchical or not is
Licensing ellipsis 79
only possible when there is already a syntactic relation between S1 and S2. In the
absence of syntactic conjunction, the same problem arises, namely; is the relation
between S1 and S2 hierarchical or not? I follow Culicover and Jackendoff (1997,
2005) in assuming that there is a mapping procedure which determines whether a
syntactic conjunction is interpreted hierarchically or non-hierarchically. I assume
furthermore that this mapping procedure also determines whether a relation be-
tween S1 and S2 is hierarchical or not, when S1 and S2 are not conjoined in the
syntactic componenent. To make these assumptions clear, consider the following
examples.
(64) a. [S1 John lives in Italy] and [S2 Mary lives in Spain]
b. [S1 John got upset] because [S2 his favorite cookies were sold out]
In (64a), S1 and S2 have equal status, as neither S1 nor S2 selects or modifies the
other. In (64b), on the other hand, the interpretation is hierarchical in that S2 spec-
ifies the reason for S1. (64a) maps onto a discourse representation in which S1 and
S2 are interpreted non-hierarchically, whereas (64b) maps onto a discourse repre-
sentation in which there is a hierarchical relation between S1 and S2. For exposi-
tory purposes, I adopt Asher’s (1993) notation in which a non-hierarchical relation
is marked as ‘→’ and a hierarchical relation is marked as ‘↓’. It should be noted that
the outcome of the mapping procedure is not structurally reflected in the discourse
representation. ‘→’ and ‘↓’ are used for convenience to reflect the interpretative re-
lation between two conjuncts, not their structural relation.






Culicover and Jackendoff (1997, 2005) argue that, since syntax provides no unam-
biguous clues as to which representation (64a,b) map onto (cf. the table in (63), sec-
tion 4), there must be a semantically driven process that underlies this mapping. I
assume that the mapping procedure which maps (64a,b) to one of the structures in
(65) is the same mapping procedure that determines whether there is a hierachical
or non-hierarchical relation between S1 and S2 when they are not conjoined in the
syntax. Consider the examples in (66).
(66) a. [S1 John lives in Italy] [S2 Mary lives in Spain]
b. [S1 John got upset] [S2 His favorite cookies were sold out]
In these examples, S1 and S2 bear no syntactic relationship to each other. In the
discourse component, however, a relation will be established between S1 and S2.
Specifically, it must be established whether a hierarchical or non-hierarchical inter-
pretation holds between S1 and S2. I suggest that the mapping procedure that de-
termines whether the relation between S1 and S2 is hierarchical or non-hierarchical
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in (64) is the same mapping procedure that determines whether the relation be-
tween S1 and S2 in (66) is hierarchical or non-hierarchical. In (66a), S1 and S2 have
equal status. Both S1 and S2 are asserted and neither S1 nor S2 selects or modi-
fies the other. The mapping procedure that determines whether a relation is hierar-
chical or non-hierarchical therefore maps (66a) onto a discourse representation in
which there is a non-hierarchical relation between S1 and S2, as in (65a). For (66b),
the most salient reading is one in which S2 specifies the cause for S1 (‘John got up-
set, because his favorite cookies were sold out’). Like (64a), therefore, the mapping
procedure maps (66b) onto the discourse representation in (65b). What is impor-
tant here is that both (64a) and (66a) map onto the discourse representation in (65a)
and both (64b) and (66b) map onto the discourse representation in (65b). From a
discourse perspective, then, (64a) and (66a) are fully equivalent, as are (64b) and
(66b).
In section 2, I showed that Gapping and Fragments are subject to a no subor-
dination restriction. However, we saw in the previous section that the distribution
of Gapping is not determined in the syntax. Given what we have said so far in this
section, we expect that what Gapping and Fragments are actually sensitive to is the
output of the mapping procedure that determines whether a relation is hierarchical
or non-hierarchical. To find out more precisely when ellipsis is possible and when
it is not, I consider now when two clauses are mapped onto a hierarchical discourse
relation and when they are mapped onto a non-hierarchical relation. From a cross-
linguistic perspective, it is clear that a multitude of syntactic constructions may
reflect either a hierarchical or a non-hierarchical interpretation (cf. Van Gijn et al.,
2011). This should come as no surprise given that there is no one-to-one correspon-
dence between coordination/subordination and non-hierarchical/hierarchical in-
terpretation (Culicover and Jackendoff, 1997; Blühdorn, 2008, cf. also section 4).
The basic intuition behind the notion of hierarchical interpretation is that it en-
codes a state of affairs in which one of the two clauses is conceptually part of the
state of affairs encoded by the other (Hale, 1976; Cristofaro, 2003; Mithun, 2009).
The notion of hierarchy plays a central role in many theories, though the specifics
vary. As reported in Cristofaro (2008), this asymmetry between events has been de-
scribed in terms of asserted versus non-asserted information (Harris and Camp-
bell, 1995, ch.10), backgrounded versus foregrounded information (Reinhart, 1984;
Thompson, 1987; Tomlin, 1985) or figure versus ground (Talmy (2000, ch.5–6) and
Croft (2001, ch.1)).
In what follows I adopt Blüdorn’s (2008) characterization of the difference be-
tween hierarchical and non-hierarchical relations in terms of relational symmetry.
Non-hierarchical relations are symmetrical in that the related discourse units have
equal semantic weight. Symmetrical relations obtain when the two discourse units
bear no thematic relation to each other. Two discourse units are in a hierarchical
relation, on the other hand, if they have different relational (thematic) roles (in the
case of hierarchical relations, the discourse units will typically be clauses). In that
case, one of them is being connected (the trajector) to the other (the landmark)
(Langacker’s (1987, 231ff) terminology). It should be clear that under this view, a
hierarchical interpretation does not refer to any particular syntactic construction.
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Instead, hierarchy refers to the semantic relation that two discourse units bear to
each other. Three types of hierarchical relations can be distinguished (see Blüh-
dorn (2003, 19f), Blühdorn (2005, 315f)): a situating relation, a conditional relation
and a causal relation. The following examples illustrate these three types.
(67) Illustration of hierarchical relations
a. John had dinner, before Mary came home. situating relation
b. If John already had dinner, Mary doesn’t have to cook.
conditional relation
c. Mary didn’t cook, because John already had dinner. causal relation
Situating relations assign a place in a conceptual domain to the trajector, which is
described by a relation to the landmark. In (67a), John’s having had dinner is the
trajector. This trajector is situated on the time scale in relation to the landmark,
namely the event of Mary coming home. Each of these events has its fixed posi-
tion in time, but the position of the landmark determines the position of the tra-
jector. (67b) exemplifies a conditional relation. In this relation, the landmark event
not only situates the trajector event, but it also influences the value of the trajector
event. That is, whether the trajector event will be realized in the actual world de-
pends on whether the landmark event will be realized in the actual world. In (67b),
whether Mary has to cook depends on whether John already had dinner. (67c) illus-
trates a causal relation. Here, the trajector event is realized in the actual world, but
the landmark event has influenced the realization of the trajector. In short, then,
a hierarchical relation obtains when two discourse units bear one of the relations
in (67). With this background, I now turn to my proposal as to how Gapping and
Fragments are licensed.
5.2 The licensing of Gapping/Fragments and the role of non-hier-
archical relations
The distribution of Gapping and Fragments discussed in section 2 showed that the
ellipsis clause and the antecedent in Gapping and Fragments must bear a certain
relation to each other. From the discussions in sections 3 and 4 it became clear that
the most promising account of licensing is one where ellipsis licensing is a matter of
having the right discourse relation between the ellipsis clause and the antecedent.
In this light, I propose the licensing condition in (68) for Gapping and Fragments to
account for the distributional properties discussed in section 2.
(68) Non-hierarchical Licensing Condition on Gapping and Fragments (NLC):
Gapping and Fragments are licensed when antecedent and ellips are in a
non-hierarchical relation in the discourse component.
(68) expresses that Gapping and Fragments are licensed when the following config-
uration holds in the discourse structure.
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(69) Discourse configuration that licenses ellipsis:
→
S1antecedent S2ellipsis clause
With the NLC in place, I now show how (68) captures the facts discussed in section
2 and 3.4. Let’s first consider how (68) captures the grammatical cases of Gapping
we have considered in (48), repeated here.
(70) a. [S1 Max ate the apple] and [S2 Sally the hamburger.]
b. [S1 Max didn’t eat the apple] nor [S2 Sally the hamburger.]
c. [S1 Max ate the apple] or [S2 Sally the hamburger.]
d. [S1 Everybody ate the apple] except [S2 Sally.]
e. [S1 Max ate the apple] instead of [S2 Sally.]
f. [S1 Max eats apples] as often as [S2 Sally hamburgers.]
g. [S1 Max eats more often apples] than [S2 Sally hamburgers.]
Since Gapping is licensed here, these cases should be in accordance with the NLC.
This means that S1 and S2 may not be in a hierarchical relation with S2. This is
indeed the case. Since S2 is not embedded with respect to S1 in the discourse struc-
ture, S1 and S2 are in a relation. Furthermore, in none of these cases is there a hier-
archical relation between S1 and S2 (cf. (67)). Therefore, all cases in (70) map onto
the representation in (69) which licenses ellipsis according to the NLC in (68).
The same explanation straightforwardly carries over to Fragments. In all of the
cases in (71), S1 and S2 are in a relation in the discourse component, as S2 is not
embedded with respect to S1. Moreover, this relation between S1 and S2 is not a
hierarchical relation (cf. (67)). Therefore, all cases in (71) map onto the discourse
structure in (69) and ellipsis is correctly predicted to be licensed in these examples.
(71) a. A: [S1 Who did you see?]
B: [S2 Bill.] question-answer Fragments
b. A: [S1 I saw someone.]
B: [S2 Yeah, Bill.] elaborative Fragments
c. A: [S1 You saw John.]
B: [S2 No, Bill.] corrective Fragments
(68) predicts that Gapping and Fragments are out when a hierarchical relation holds
between the two conjuncts. This is borne out. Recall that adverbial clauses, asym-
metric coordinations and coordinations headed by want, ‘because’ in Dutch, do
not allow for Gapping, see (72). In all cases in (72), there is a hierarchical relation
between the conjuncts; a causal relation in (72a,c) and a conditional relation in
(72b). Therefore, all cases in (72) map onto the discourse representation in (73),
which does not license ellipsis according to the NLC (cf. the structure in (69)).
Licensing ellipsis 83
(72) a. * Max ate the apple, because Sally the hamburger.






















‘The general greeted the soldier, because the soldier the general.’
(73) Discourse representation of (72a,b,c):
* ↓
S1antecedent S2ellipsis clause
In section 2, I presented the examples in (74) and (75) to argue that the no subor-
dination restriction also constrains the occurrence of Fragments. We can now see
why this is so. Two clauses that are not syntactically connected can be in a hierar-
chical discourse relation, as the example in (66b) showed. Because the examples
in (74) are mapped onto the discourse representations in (65b), ellipsis is correctly
predicted not to be possible, because the configuration in (65b) is not one that li-
censes ellipsis.
(74) a. A: [S1 John has red hair.]
B: (Of course) [S2 His parents have red hair.]
b. * A: [S1 John has red hair.]
B: (Of course) [S2 His parents have red hair.]
(75) a. A: [S1 The moon is shining.]
B: (Of course) [S2 The sun is shining.]
b. * A: [S1 The moon is shining.]
B: (Of course) [S2 The sun is shining.]
The NLC also captures the fact that the ellipsis clause and the antecedent may not
be embedded with respect to each other. Consider again the following examples
which illustrate this.
(76) * [S1 Harry has invited Sue] and [S2 I know [ (that) Bill Mary.]]
(77) a. [S1 Who has John invited?]
b. * [S2 I know [Mary]]
The discourse representation for (76) and (77) is given in (78). Ellipsis is ruled out in
(76) and (77), because the configuration in (78) does not license ellipsis. For ellipsis
to be licensed, the antecedent S1 needs to be in a relation to the ellipsis clause (as
in (69)), which is not the case in (78), since the antecedent S1 is in a relation with S2
instead.
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Also correctly predicted to be grammatical by the NLC are the cases of symmetrical
embedding. The case of embedded Gapping in (79) is mapped onto the discourse
representation shown in (80). The boxed sub-tree corresponds to the discourse rep-
resentation in (69) which licenses ellipsis.
(79) [S1 I know that [[S2 Harry has invited Sue] and [S3 Bill Mary]].








I have now shown that the proposed licensing condition for Gapping and Frag-
ments in (68) correctly captures their distributional restrictions discussed in sec-
tion 2. Recall from chapter 2, though, that Gapping is possible in coordinations of
different sizes (vP, TP and CP coordination). The account proposed in this section
provides a homogeneous account for this distribution. In a syntax-centered view
of discourse in which syntactic structures are input for the discourse component,
the cues for establishing discourse relations are lexical items (such as connectives
and discourse adverbials), and the expressions to be related can in principle be any
constituent in the discourse structure. This is the key to explaining the apparent
heterogeneous behavior of Gapping. The NLC together with the idea that any con-
stituent can be a ‘discourse unit’ correctly predicts the possibility of Gapping in co-
ordinations of varying size. We have already considered above some cases in which
two clauses (TPs or CPs) are coordinated in the syntax (e.g. (70)). Let’s consider now,
then, an example of Gapping in a vP coordination.
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ti drink wine Peter j vinegark
[t j drink tk ]
Ellipsis is licensed in (81) in accordance with the NLC. Recall that syntactic con-
junction and subordination structures form the input for the mapping procedure
that determines whether a relation is hierarchical or non-hierarchical (with the
connective serving as an important cue). The vP coordination in (81b) maps onto
a discourse configuration in which there holds a non-hierarchical relation between
the vP conjuncts. In other words, at the level of discourse the vP coordination cor-
responds to the configuration in (69) in which ellipsis is licensed. For completeness
sake, I also consider an example of Gapping in a TP coordination dominated by a
CP projection (I ignore movement of the auxiliary here).








Mary tell John ti Peter j Susank
[t j tell tk ti ]
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The reasoning for (82) is similar to that for (81): ellipsis is licensed here, because
the relation between ellipsis clause and antecedent is non-hierarchical at the level
of discourse.
The proposal that ellipsis is licensed at the level of discourse has two advantages
that speak for it. First, it eliminates the obstacle that has withheld the linguistic tra-
dition from unifying Gapping and Fragments. The obstacle has been that Gapping
has been considered a ‘coordinative’ phenomenon, whereas Fragments has been
considered an ellipsis type that takes place in a stand-alone utterance. What stands
in the way of unification, then, is the different syntactic contexts in which Gapping
and Fragments occur. If, however, the level at which ellipsis is licensed is the level
of discourse, the relevant factor for ellipsis licensing, namely hierarchical versus
non-hierarchical relationships, holds identically for Gapping and Fragments. Sec-
ond, by postulating ellipsis licensing at the level of discourse, the heterogeneous
syntax of Gapping and Fragments identified in chapter 2 (i.e. the size of the elided
constituent varies) comes out as homogeneous behavior at the level of discourse.
What matters is that two discourse units are in a non-hierarchical relation, and for
that the syntactic category of these units is not of relevance.
6 Exceptions to the NLC: embedded ellips/antecedent
In this section, I discuss some problems for the proposal that Gapping and Frag-
ments are licensed by the NLC. All of the cases in this section involve embedding of
the ellipsis clause relative to the antecedent clause, or the other way around. That
is, in all cases the ellipsis clause and the antecedent are not directly conjoined in
the discourse structure. For the cases in which the ellipsis clause is embedded with
respect to the antecedent, I argue that there is reason to believe that the embedding
is only apparent. In these cases, the NLC is thus satisfied. For the cases where the
antecedent is embedded relative to the ellipsis clause, I argue that they involve ac-
commodation. I show that, although an antecedent may be embedded with respect
to the ellipsis clause, this is only possible when there is no antecedent available that
is not embedded relative to the ellipsis clause.
6.1 Apparent exceptions to the NLC
6.1.1 Embedded ellipsis clauses
The NLC, as stated in (68), predicts that the ellipsis clause is always resolved by the
clause it is non-hierarchically conjoined to. In the majority of cases this prediction
is borne out. (83) provides a typical illustration. The ellipsis clause ‘Peter too’ can
only be resolved by S1 and not by S3, in accordance with the NLC.13 This is because
13Griffiths and Lipták (2014) point out that in Fragments, it is always possible to add, repeat or contrast
a fragment with a sentence final constituent, as in (i). Since such cases of Fragments are likely to be
licensed differently, the examples in the text feature cases where the fragment has a subject correlate
(which are not sentence final).
i. A: John is going to Greece, because he has family there.
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S3 is not in a relation with the ellipsis clause, as illustrated in (84). (85), on the other
hand, shows that the non-elliptical version is well-formed.
(83) A: [S1 [S2 John is going to Greece] because [S3 he has family there.]]
B: [S4 Peter, too.]
= Peter is going to Greece, because he has family there.
≠ Peter has family there, too.
(84) →
S1, ↓ (BECAUSE) S4
Peter, too
S2
John is going to Greece
S3
he has family there
(85) A: John is going to Greece, because he has family there.
B: Peter has family there, too.
Although ellipsis clause and antecedent are in a (non-hierarchical) reltation in the
majority of grammatical ellipsis cases, there appear to be some exceptions. One
type of exception concerns cases where the ellipsis clause is embedded with respect
to the antecedent. The following examples illustrate this.
(86) a. [S1 John will get a gift for his birthday], but [S2 [S3 not Peter] because
[S4 he already celebrated his birthday last week.]]
b. [S1 John ran the marathon.] [S2 [S3 Peter too] after [S4 he had trained a
year.]]
These examples seem to indicate that ellipsis is licensed, even though the ellipsis
clause and its antecedent are not in a relation. (87) is a plausible structure for the
cases in (86). The NLC dictates that ellipsis should not be licensed here, since the








B: A lover, too.
= ‘John has a lover there, too.’
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I argue that ellipsis is licensed here, because there is a point when the NLC is sat-
isfied. This is the point where the discourse contains just the antecedent and the






At this point, the discourse parser encounters the ellipsis site and tries to resolve it
immediately. Ellipsis is licensed, because an antecedent is available that is in a non-
hierarchical relation with the ellipsis site. The idea that clausal discourse units are
attached upon encounter seems inescapable, since postponing attachment implies
that there will come a natural point at which attachment would be better suited.
No such point seems to exist, however, because there are often no cues for what is
about to come. At the point when a third clause enters the discourse, then, the dis-
course tree is reanalyzed into the tree in (87). The illusion of an embedded ellipsis
site in (87) is thus a consequence of the fact that discourse is build incrementally.
If this idea is correct, the prediction is that ellipsis is not possible in S4 in (87) (with
S1 still the antecedent). This prediction is borne out, as the examples in (89) show.
(89) a. * John won the jackpot. Susan is always lucky and, as expected, she won




























‘John is eating a hamburger. Susan also likes hamburgers, but she isn’t
eating a hamburger.’
6.1.2 Bridge verbs
Consider again the examples in (2) and (3) from section 2, repeated here. These
examples show that Gapping and Fragments cannot be embedded relative to their
antecedent.
(90) a. * Harry has invited Sue and I know (that) Bill Mary.
b. * John knows a man that caught a salmon on Sunday and Bill knows a
man (that) a trout on Thursday.
(91) A. Who has John invited?
B. * I know Mary
Somewhat surprisingly in light of (90) and (91), there is a class of verbs that allows
Gapping in their complement (as has been noticed by Morgan (1973), Ebert et al.
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(2003) and Valmala (2007)). I will refer to this class of verbs as ‘bridge verbs’. The fol-
lowing examples illustrate that Gapping and Fragments are fine in the complement
of bridge verbs.14
(92) [Harry has invited Sue] and [John said [ (∗that) Bill Mary]].
(93) A. Who has invited Sue?
B. Bill said (∗that) Harry.
The class of verbs that allow embedded ellipsis corresponds to the class of verbs
that can head reduced parenthetical clause constructions (RPCs) (cf. also Temmer-
man, 2013). RPCs can be divided into two types, report and attitude type (Griffiths,
to appear a). Report RPCs describe the actions of the speaker or another agent (94).
Attitude RPCs express the attitude of the speaker (95).
(94) a. Bobi ’ll make chief cameraman by July, hei reckons.
b. Clint mustn’t, I thought yesterday, blame himself.
c. Dick must, I’ve been told, re-mortgage his house. (Griffiths, to appear a)
(95) a. It’ll be shot in analogue, I hope.
b. All Fassbinder’s films, I declare, are utter rubbish.
c. Eastwood will retire at ninety, I’d have thought.
(where the RPC means ‘I think’) (Griffiths, to appear a)
As the examples in (96) illustrate, Gapping and Fragments are possible in the com-
plement of these types of verbs.
(96) a. John invited Bill and, I {reckon / hope / heard}, Mary Susan.
b. A: Who did John invite?
B: I I {reckon / hope / heard} Bill.
These examples of ellipsis embedded under bridge verbs seem to challenge the
claim that Gapping and Fragments are only possible when they are in a non-hi-
erarchical relation with their antecedent. In order to see whether bridge verbs pose
a real problem for the NLC, or only an apparent problem, we have to consider the
discourse structure of cases in which verbs allow Gapping and Fragments to be em-
bedded.
14Bridge verbs are ambiguous between a parenthetical (or ‘reportative’) use and a non-parenthetical
use. The examples in (ia) and (ib) illustrate this ambiguity. The example in (ii) shows that only the par-
enthetical use licenses ellipsis.
i. John heard that Mary was singing.
= John came to know that Mary was singing.
= John heard (physically) that Mary was singing.
ii. A: Who was singing this morning?
B: John heard Mary.
= John came to know that Mary was singing this morning.
≠ John (physically) heard Mary singing this morning.
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6.1.3 Bridge verbs and parenthetical syntax
Griffiths (to appear b) presents the following analysis for the syntax of RPCs. He
argues that RPCs are simultaneously clausal adjuncts and independent speech acts.
The adjunction of an RPC in the syntactic structure does not influence the semantic
composition of the host clause. As Griffiths notes, this can be achieved in a number
of ways. One way is to adopt De Vries’ par-merge (Vries, 2007, 2008, 2012).15 Par-
merge leads to behindance, where part of the structure is ‘behind’ the syntactic tree,
giving rise to a 3D-tree. Leaving irrelevant details aside, (97a) has the tree-structure
in (97b).
(97) a. John helps, Bill says.
b. TP (helps(John))
DPi VP (help xi )
Par RPC (says(p, Bill))
John VP (helps xi ) Par [Bill says p]
ti helps
At first sight, behindance might seem to provide a solution to our problem, as the
material that prevents the ellipsis clause from being in a relation with the ante-
cedent (i.e. the ‘Bill says’ part) is now in a behindance relation to the rest of the
clause. The important question, then, is how the RPC is integrated in the discourse
structure. Griffiths argues that the order of the speech acts is dictated by derivation
timing. He argues that dominated XPs will be Transferred (Chomsky, 2004) before
undominated XPs (i.e. root clauses). If α is Transferred before β, α precedes β in
the discourse. If correct, RPCs are fully integrated into the discourse representation
at the discourse component. If so, behindance does not provide a solution to our
problem that bridge verbs can embed Gapping and Fragments.
There are independent reasons to believe that an analysis in terms of behin-
dance is not on the right track. First, sentence-first RPCs are sensitive to whether
the host clause precedes or follows them. In Dutch, for example, if the elliptical
host clause follows the RPC, then the word order is subject-verb, see (98a). If, on the
other hand, the elliptical host clause precedes the RPC, the order is verb-subject, as
in (98b). If the RPC is syntactically independent of the host clause, the word order
within the RPC should not be sensitive to the RPC’s position in the host clause.16
15Another way is to postulate a compositional rule such as Pott’s (2005, p.66) isolated CI application.
16It should be noted that, if Gapping indeed occurs in the complement of dacht ‘thought’ in (98b), then
the expectation is that what underlies this example is (i). If (i) involves CP topicalization, the question
arises why the complementizer can be absent here. In chapter 2, we saw that complementizer drop is


















































A second reason to suspect that bridge verbs that allow ellipsis in their complement
are part of the host clause, rather than in a behindance relation with it, is that Frag-
ments for some speakers of Dutch (though not all, hence the %) can ‘move into’ the
RPC (Barbiers, 2000, 2002; Corver and Thiersch, 2001; Temmerman, 2013). This is
illustrated in (99). This example shows that the fragment is part of the RPC, which




























(Int.) ‘He (had) thought that Kim would win the contest.’
I conclude that ellipsis embedding bridge verbs are part of the root clause and that
an analysis of RPCs as adjuncts that are in a behindance relation with the root
clause is not feasible. I therefore turn to another possibility.
6.1.4 Bridge verbs and reportative verbs
It has recently been pointed out that attributive phrases pose a problem for the
idea that discourse is structured via trees (Buch-Kromann et al., 2011; Hardt, 2013).
Interestingly, this problem is independent of ellipis, but is remarkably similar, as
will become clear shortly. As Dinesh et al. (2005) point out, in the following example,
although indicates a contrast relation between S1 and S3, even though although
relates S1 and S2 in the syntax. Cases like (100) thus constitute a syntax-discourse
mismatch. This is a problem for the idea that syntactic structures are the input for
the discourse component.
(100) [S1 The current distribution arrangement ends in March 1990], although
[S2 Delmed said [S3 it will continue to provide some supplies of the peri-
toneal dialysis products to National Medical], the spokeswoman said.
(Dinesh et al., 2005)
Buch-Kromann et al. (2011) present two attempts to retain the idea that syntactic
structures form the input for the discourse component. One solution involves a
modification of the composition function of the connective. The basic idea is that in
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of the connective. The discourse units that this connective conjoins, then, do not
actually contain the attributions.17
Although Buch-Kromann et al.’s account works for attributive cases involving
bridge verbs like say in (100), it is not clear how the account could be extended to
handle attitude bridge verbs. In (101), for example, there is no attribution.
(101) A: Who will come to the party?
B: I hope John.
Moreover, it is unclear how the account could distinguish between bridge verbs
like say and non-bridge verbs like know. Hence, although this solution by Buch-
Kromann et al. works for the problem that attribution poses for the idea that dis-
course representations involve trees, it does not straightforwardly extend to our
problem at hand, namely the fact that only some verbs allow ellipsis to be embed-
ded.
Another solution proposed by Buch-Kromann et al. (2011) is to say that al-
though in (100) indeed relates S1 and S2, rather than relating S1 with S3. The con-
trast relation expressed by although holds between S1 and S2 (= Delmed said S3).
Buch-Kromann et al. (2011) note that it is typical for contrastive relations to arise
between conflicting propositions from different sources. They argue that the source
of S1 is implicitly associated with the speaker. If the contrast relation holds be-
tween ‘speaker says S1’ and ‘Delmed said S2’ then the syntax-discourse mismatch
is eliminated. This solution is worked out further in Hardt (2013). Unfortunately,
this account does not solve our problem that bridge verbs pose for the NLC. Even
if the antecedent clause were to contain an implicit source, this only eliminates the
syntax-discourse mismatch. Crucially, it does not provide an answer as to why el-
lipsis can be embedded in violation of (68). Moreover, although this account works
for reportative bridge verbs, it does not straightforwardly extend to cases involving
attitude bridge verbs like (101).
6.1.5 Bridge verbs do not embed Gapping and Fragments
A final solution I consider here, is to say that the embedded instances of Gapping
and Fragments do not actually involve Gapping or Fragments. Under that scenario,
bridge verbs would be ellipsis licensors and the ellipsis in their complement would
therefore not be licensed by the NLC. There is some empirical support for distin-
guishing ‘bridge verb ellipsis’ from Gapping and Fragments. First, these types have
17The compositional solution of Buch-Kromann et al. (2011) goes as follows. "[S]uppose we have a
discourse of the form ‘X C Y ’ where X and Y may contain a chain of attributions (i.e., Y could be of the
form ‘Delmed said Z’, ’Delmed said Ann claimed Z, ’Delmed said Ann claimed Bob believed Z’, etc.).
Let c denote the standard composition function associated with C, and suppose π is an operator that
given an epistemic formula Kaφ (‘φ is known by agent a’) returns φ. In order to handle attributions in
the compositional semantics, we only have to assume that instead of letting C have a single composi-
tion function c which given arguments X ’,Y ’ computes a meaning representation c(X ’,Y ’), it has a whole
family of composition functions ci j defined by ci j (X ’,Y ’) = c(π
i (X ’),π j (Y ’)) where i,j cannot exceed the
length of the attribution chain in X,Y. When computing the compositional semantics, we then have to
disambiguate not only the correct relation associated with C, but also the correct choice of i,j."
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a different distribution. We have seen that in bridge verb ellipsis, the ellipsis site is
embedded relative to the antecedent. Interestingly, it turns out that the bridge verb
clause itself can be embedded, as well. This is shown in the examples in (102).























‘John collects stamps, but I know a man who thought he collected coins.’
Most solutions we reviewed above to attempt to solve the problem that bridge verbs
embed ellipsis have in common that the clause headed by the bridge verb is some-
how ‘severed’ from its complement. If we apply these accounts to the examples in
(102), all of the material dominating the bridge verb clause must be severed from
the bridge verb’s complement (i.e. the ellipsis clause), too. Under a behindance
analysis of bridge verbs, for example, the material dominating the bridge verb must
be in a behindance relation to the root clause, as well. Looking at the examples in
(102), this seems unlikely, as the material dominating the bridge verb does not have
to be parenthetical, but can be a non-bridge verb, like know in (102a), or a rela-
tivized nominal, as in (102b).
Another reason to distinguish bridge verb ellipsis from Gapping and Fragments,
is that bridge verb ellipsis is possible in hierarchical discourse relations, see (103),
in contrast to Gapping and Fragments.
(103) I hope John will win, even though the expert thinks Bill.
The example in (103) shows that, even if the clause headed by the bridge verb can be
‘ignored’ for the purposes of ellipsis, the antecedent and the ellipsis clause would
still be in a hierarchical relation (unless the connective is ignored as well, but what
then would the relation be between ellipsis clause and antecedent?).
In this section, I have reviewed several accounts that could potentially provide
a solution to the problem that ellipsis under bridge verbs poses for the NLC. All
accounts have in common that the root clause is severed from the ellipsis clause.
Intuitively this seems like an attractive solution, since, for one, the parenthetical
clause that embeds ellipsis is not part of the assertion. Second, if somehow the ma-
terial that embeds ellipsis is ‘ignored’, the NLC would be satisfied. Unfortunately,
all accounts turned out to have some problems. In case any of the accounts does
turn out to be on the right track, it remains to be seen whether the data in (102) and
(103) will fit in. I leave the question of how to analyze ellipsis under bridge verbs for
future research.
6.2 True exceptions and the role of accommodation and inference
Recall from chapter 1 (section 2.1) that ellipsis and deaccenting can be resolved by
an accommodated antecedent. I repeat the relevant definitions here.
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(104) Parallelism:
Every phonologically reduced (elliptical or deaccented) sentence E requires
either
a. that the discourse will contain an antecedent sentence A, which belongs
to the focus value of E (A ∈ F(E)), or
b. that the discourse will contain an antecedent sentence A, which together
with certain shared assumptions entails another sentence, the accom-
modated sentence AC, and AC ∈F(E). (adapted from Fox, 1999, p.73)
(105) Hardt’s (2005b) economy condition on accomodation:
"[F]or a given discourse D, we produce a default LF L. If L violates no seman-
tically visible constraints, it is the preferred interpretation. If L does violate
one or more constraints, inferences can be performed to derive an alter-
native interpretation L’. L’ is a potential interpretation of D if it avoids the
constraint violations. If there are several such alternatives, those LF’s closest
to L are preferred."
(106) Hardt’s (2005b) notion of closest:
"[I]f A entails B and B entails C, then B is closer to A than C."
In this section, I discuss several exceptions to the NLC in (68). I argue that these
exceptions are real and that they involve accommodation.
6.2.1 Embedded antecedents
(107a) and (108a) illustrate cases where the antecedent is embedded with respect
to the ellipsis site. Although these examples are not perfect, they are significantly
better than the examples in (107b) and (108b). The discourse structures of (107a) /
(108a) and (107b) / (108b) are shown in (109a) and (109b), respectively.
(107) a. ? [S1 [S2 The table legs broke] [S3 because John stood on them.]]
[S4 Peter as well (but they were already broken at that point.)]
b. * [S1 [S2 Because John stood on them] [S3 the table legs broke.]]
[S4 Peter as well (but they were already broken at that point.)]
(108) a. ? [S1 [S2 Susan was sad] [S3 because her favorite sweater has worn off.]]
[S4 Her trousers, too (but she wasn’t sad about that.)]
b. * [S1 [S2 Because her favorite sweater has worn off,] [S3 Susan was sad.]]













Recall that when there is a choice in antecedent, the only antecedent available is
the clause that the ellipsis clause bears a relation to:
(110) A: [S1 [S2 John is going to Greece] because [S3 he has family there.]]
B: [S4 Peter, too.]
= Peter is going to Greece, because he has family there.
≠ Peter has family there, too.
The difference between (107a)/(108a) and (110) is that in (107a)/(108a), there is no
suitable antecedent that is in a relation with the ellipsis clause. If ellipsis would
be resolved by S1, the elliptical sentence would mean ‘Peter broke, because John
stood on him, as well’ in (107a), and ‘Susan’s trousers were sad, because her fa-
vorite sweater has worn off’ in (108a). What the examples in (107a) and (108) show
is that in a case where there is no suitable antecedent, an antecedent may be used
that is not in a direct relation to the ellipsis clause. The fact that the example is less
than perfect could be taken as a sign that this strategy involves accommodation.
Only when the NLC is not satisfied, the grammar can look for an antecedent ‘one
step down’ in the clause that the ellipsis clause bears a relation to. The contrast be-
tween (107a)/(108a) and (107b)/(108b) shows that if the ‘one step down’ strategy is
chosen, the antecedent must be the clause that is attached last. That is, the ellip-
sis in (107b), for example, must be resolved as ‘Peter broke, too’, and cannot mean
‘Peter stood on them, too’, even though the latter is a more suited antecedent given
our world knowledge. We can conclude from this example that it is not possible
to ‘skip’ antecedents in Gapping and Fragments. That is, the grammar must always
choose the antecedent that was parsed last. In the following discourse tree, the NLC
dictates that S1 must be the antecedent. If S1 is not a suitable antecedent, accom-
modation is possible and S2 may be the antecedent that resolves ellipsis. S2 can
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Another argument that accommodation is possible when no suitable antecedent
is available comes from a remarkable contrast between antecedents conjoined by
omdat and want (both mean ‘because’ in Dutch). As shown by the example in (112),
if an antecedent contains an omdat-clause, the ellipsis clause will be resolved with
























= Peter will go to Greece, because he has family there.
≠ Peter has family there.
Given the NLC, only the large antecedent is available, as this large antecedent is
the clause that is in a relation with the ellipsis clause. The syntactic structure of the
ellipsis clause in (112) is given in (113). (That the adjunct is adjoined to TP here is




ti goes to Greece because he has family there
Now consider (114), which only differs from (112) in that the connective changed
from want to omdat.
(114) A: [S1 Jan gaat naar Griekenland], want [S2 hij heeft daar familie ].
B: [S3 Peter ook ].
= Peter is going to Greece, because he has family there.
= Peter has family there, too.
In contrast to the case with omdat in (110), the case with want in (114) is ambigu-
ous. Ellipsis can be resolved by the antecedent consisting of S1+S2, but also by just
S2. The syntactic derivation of this short construal is straightforward, as the an-
tecedent is simply the S2 clause.
(115) [S2 Peter has family there]
The antecedent S2 is available through the ‘one step down’ strategy. As noted above,
this strategy involves accommodation. Why is accommodation allowed here? From
Licensing ellipsis 97
the interpretation, the S1 + S2 antecedent seems to be available and, moreover,
when ellipsis is resolved by this antecedent this is in accordance with the NLC. As
noted, omdat and want have different syntactic properties: want is a coordinator
(cf. section 4.2) and omdat is a subordinator. It is likely, therefore, that the difference
between (110) and (114) and the fact that (refch3.ex1060) is ambiguous finds its
source in the different syntactic properties of want and omdat. Consider the syntax




ti goes to Greece Co
want
TP
he has family there
The tree structure in (116) reveals that the antecedent S1+S2 requires the remnant
Peter to move out of the first conjunct of the coordination headed by want. Such






















(Int.) ‘What did Peter buy because John didn’t want to keep it.’
(Van der Heijden, 1999)
If movement of Peter is not allowed in (116), how come the instance of Fragments in
(114) is grammatical? One possibility is that a syntactic repair process takes place
that takes (113) and modifies it to make it into (116). According to Arregui et al.
(2006), syntactic mismatches between antecedent and ellipsis clause can be re-
paired. They argue that the bigger this syntactic mismatch is, the more ungram-
matical the sentence gets. If a repair mechanism would have to transform (113) into
the syntactically dissimilar (116), however, one would expect (114) to be close to un-
grammatical, contrary to fact. Clifton and Frazier (2010) discuss cases of ellipsis in
conditional sentences, which look similar to (114). In an example like (118a), the
ellipsis clause cannot be derived syntactically, as shown in (118b). The embedded
antecedent (he bought twinkies) requires accommodation in the form of the ‘one
step down’ strategy. Although this is an available strategy, this antecedent would
give rise to an incoherent discourse, as the particle too in the ellipsis clause pre-
supposes that someone else bought twinkies, too. The conditional does not entail
that someone bought twinkies, though. Clifton and Frazier (2010) tested sentences
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like (118) experimentally. They found that in such cases the small antecedent is
accepted only 26% of the time, whereas the large antecedent is accepted 74% of
the time. Clifton and Frazier (2010) argue that what underlies ellipsis in the large
antecedent is just the consequent clause (i.e. x bought twinkies). The antecedent
clause of the conditional is inferred from the prior discourse, but not syntactically
present.
(118) a. If John went to the store, he bought Twinkies. George, too.
= If George went to the store, he bought Twinkies, too. 74%
= George bought twinkies, too. 26%
(Clifton and Frazier, 2010, p.285)
b. * [George]i [[if ti went to the store] he bought Twinkies]
I now return to (114). If Clifton and Frazier’s (2010) proposal is on the right track,
we could maintain the following idea. The large antecedent S1+S2 arises when the
ellipsis clause contains Peter is going to Greece and the because-clause is inferred
from the antecedent (and thus not syntactically present in the ellipsis clause). Con-
trary to (118), in (114) the small antecedent is available next to the large antecedent.
This is because in (114), contrary to (118), the small antecedent does not give rise
to an incoherent discourse.
To sum up this section, exceptions to the NLC are allowed when the clause bear-
ing a non-hierarchical relation to the ellipsis clause does not provide an antecedent
for the ellipsis. Only in such cases, an antecedent may be used that is ‘one step
down’ in the antecedent clause (i.e. the clause the the ellipsis clause is in a relation
with). This is a form of accommodation, which is only allowed when no antecedent
is available that does not require accommodation (cf. (105)).
6.3 Islands
A problem closely related to the examples of embedded antecedents in the last sec-
tion concern contexts where there is an indefinite inside an island.
(119) A: They hired someone who speaks a Balkan language.
B: Yeah, Bulgarian.
The fragment in (119) seems to violate a (complex NP) island, as shown in (120).
(120) * [Bulgarian]i they hired someone [who speaks ti ].
There are two lines of research on islands. One starts with Ross (1967) and holds that
there is indeed an island violation in (119), but that the island violation is ‘repaired’
by ellipsis. The other line of research assumes that islands can never be violated;
ellipsis plays no role in this. What ellipsis does is cover up the true source of the el-
liptical utterance. Barros et al. (to appear), for example, argues that what underlies
(119) is (121), a ‘short source’.
(121) [Bulgarian]i s/he speaks ti .
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For reasons to be made clear in chapter 4, I will adhere to the ‘small antecedents
view’ on islands. If (119) indeed involves a short construal, it constitutes another
case of ellipsis in which the antecedent is embedded. If (121) is the antecedent for
ellipsis in (119), this involves accommodation in that a small antecedent is chosen
over the large island-containing one (see also Craenenbroeck, 2012). The rest of the
antecedent (they hired someone) can be inferred from prior discourse as I argued
was the case for (114)/(118). The assumption that inference is possible seems es-
pecially necessary when we consider contexts in which the island is headed by an
intensional verb.
(122) A: They want to hire someone who speaks a Balkan language.
B: Yeah, Bulgarian.
B’: #Yeah, s/he speaks Bulgarian.
B”: Yeah, s/he should speak Bulgarian.
If a short source underlies the fragment utterance of B’, it must be the case that a
modal is inferred from the context, as seen in the contrast between B’ and B”. This
modal in B” is not present in the ellipsis clause. This inference of a modal does
not pose a problem for the small antecedent approach to islands, as such cases of
inference also occur elsewhere. Johnson (2012) notes that infinitival sluice clauses
headed by how also require such inference. This is illustrated in (123) for Dutch,
which especially makes clear that inference of a modal should be possible under
ellipsis. The sluice in (123) can only be continued by the striked out material, cru-























‘Decorating is easy, as long as you know how to decorate.’
Summing up, under a small antecedent approach to islands, cases in which an an-
tecedent contains an island violate the NLC. This is so, since the antecedent clause
containing the island cannot resolve the ellipsis site, as in that case the remnant
of ellipsis would have to have illicitly moved out of the island, wrongly predicting
that ungrammaticality ensues. Island containing antecedents thus require accom-
modation in that a smaller antecedent is chosen. This could be seen as an instance
of the ‘one step down’ strategy. This is only possible when the full antecedent is
unavailable to resolve ellipsis. In that sense, the cases involving island containing
antecedents pattern with the rest of the cases considered in this section.
7 Conclusion and open questions
In this chapter, I have been concerned with the distribution of Gapping and Frag-
ments and how it follows from the licensing condition on ellipsis. Regarding their
distribution, we have seen that Gapping and Fragments are severely restricted in
their occurrence. Specifically, Gapping and Fragments clauses cannot be embed-
ded nor bear a hierarchical relation with respect to their antecedent. I reviewed the
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literature on licensing and showed that none of the theories on licensing can ex-
tend to Gapping and Fragments. All of the syntactic theories overgenerate. As for
the discourse accounts, I showed that the QUD approach likewise does not cover
the full range of Gapping/Fragments cases. Although López’ D-linking account also
doesn’t cover Gapping and Fragments, it showed promise in that it hypothesizes
that a discourse relation must hold between the Gapping/Fragments clause and
an antecedent. Based on this approach, I argued that Gapping and Fragments are
licensed when the discourse configuration holds in which the ellipsis clause and
the antecedent are in a non-hierarchical relation. This theory accounts for the re-
stricted distribution of Gapping and Fragments. At the same time it is capable of
explaining the variable size of the ellipsis site in these ellipsis types.
I have shown in chapter 2 that, syntactically, the derivations of Gapping and
Fragments are identical. In this chapter, I have shown that the distribution of Gap-
ping and Fragments is identical, as well. If the ideas in this chapter are on the right
track, the similar distribution follows from the fact that Gapping and Fragments are
both licensed by the same licensing condition. For all intends and purposes then,
we no longer have any reason to formally distinguish Gapping and Fragments.
CHAPTER 4
Exceptional movement under ellipsis
1 Introduction
In chapter 2, I have argued, (following Merchant, 2004), that the remnants of Gap-
ping and Fragments move out of the ellipsis site, as shown in (1).
(1) a. Max ate the apple and Sally [the hamburger]i [ate ti ] Gapping
b. Who did you see? - [Bill]i [I saw ti ] Fragments
The analysis of Gapping and Fragments in (1) raises many questions, such as why
remnants must move out of the ellipsis site and how they do so. These questions are
most prominent in the case of remnants that appear in an ‘exceptional’ position.
For example, in (1a), the hamburger appears in a position where it cannot normally
surface. Witness the non-elliptical version of (1a) in (2).
(2) * Max ate the apple and Sally [the hamburger]i [ate ti ]
Following Thoms (2013), I call the movement of the hamburger ‘exceptional move-
ment’ (henceforth EM), a movement that only occurs under ellipsis. Although the
existence of EM has been acknowledged in the literature, a satisfactory account
of this phenomenon is still lacking. The only dedicated account of EM is Thoms
(2013), but, as I show in section 3.2, this theory does not answer all the questions
pertaining to EM. A theory of EM should at least address the following questions.
First and foremost, it must account for why EM is parasitic on ellipsis. That is, why
is movement of the hamburger possible in the elliptical (1a), but not in the non-
elliptical (2)? Throughout, I will refer to this as the ‘ellipsis question’. A theory of
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EM should also explain the locality conditions that EM is subject to (i.e. the ‘local-
ity question’). Finally, a theory of EM should explain what type of movement EM
is (e.g. A vs A’) and what causes this movement to take place (i.e. the ‘trigger ques-
tion’). These three questions are listed in (3).
(3) Questions to be answered by a theory of EM:
• Why is EM parasitic on ellipsis? (Ellipsis question)
• What locality conditions is EM subject to? (Locality question)
• What triggers EM? (Trigger question)
In section 2, I review some well-known ellipsis constructions and discuss whether
or not they involve EM. In sections 3.1 and 3.2, I review the literature on EM. I show
that the accounts in the literature are not able to answer the questions in (3). In
section 4, I introduce Fox and Pesetsky’s (2005) theory of Spell-out Domains as a
first step towards a theory of EM. According to this theory, Spell-out involves the
transfer of a Spell-out Domain to the PF interface, where ordering statements are
calculated and added to an ordering table. I show, following Fox and Pesetsky (2005)
and Takahashi (2004), that exceptional movement gives rise to conflicting ordering
statements and that ellipsis has the ability to eliminate conflicting ordering state-
ments. Fox and Pesetsky’s theory thus provides a solution to the ellipsis question. I
proceed by arguing that Fox and Pesetsky’s theory also provides an explanation for
the fact that EM always lands next to the ellipsis site, but only if we assume that EM
takes place counter-cyclically. As for the answer to the locality question, I show in
section 5 that EM is finite clause bound. If EM is clause bound, it patterns neither
with A- nor with A’-movement. It does, however, pattern with Quantifier Raising,
which is also finite clause bound (cf. May, 1985). Taking the results of section 5 into
account, I propose in section 6, that EM instantiates the same type of movement as
Quantifier Raising, namely movement that is driven by ‘interface goals’ in the sense
of Reinhart (2006). For EM, I hypothesize that this interface goal is recoverability. In
the final part of this chapter, I discuss the consequences of my theory for the ‘re-
pair by ellipsis’ hypothesis, according to which ellipsis can repair ungrammatical
outputs of the grammar.
2 Exceptional movement
EM occurs in many ellipsis constructions (cf. Abe and Hoshi, 1997; Merchant, 2004;
Takahashi, 2004; Lasnik, 1999a; Takaki, 2011; Park and Kang, 2007; Lasnik, 2013;
Thoms, 2013, a.o.), though not every. This section gives for English an overview of
well-known elliptical constructions and whether or not they involve exceptional
movement.
Merchant (2001) argues that Sluicing involves ellipsis fed by regular wh-move-
ment. The wh-phrase in Sluicing, see (4b), occurs in the same position as in non-
elliptical sentences, see (4a). According to Merchant, the wh-phrase in (4b) moves
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to spec,CP in the same way as the wh-phrase does in (4a). Under this assumption,
Sluicing does not involve exceptional movement.
(4) Sluicing - No EM
a. I saw someone, but I don’t know [who]i [I saw ti ]
b. I saw someone, but I don’t know [who]i [I saw ti ]
Multiple Sluicing in English, on the other hand, involves exceptional movement
of the second wh-phrase. As shown in example (5a), the movement of the second
wh-phrase is impossible in the absence of ellipsis, as English lacks multiple wh-
fronting. As for the first wh-phrase, I adopt the null hypothesis that it undergoes
regular wh-fronting, similar to the single wh-phrase in (4).
(5) Multiple Sluicing - EM
One of the students spoke to one of the professors, but . . .
a. * I don’t know which [to which]i [spoke ti ]
b. I don’t know which [to which]i [spoke ti ]
Merchant (2004) extends Merchant’s (2001) analysis of Sluicing to Fragments. He
argues that fronting operations in English, such as focus movement and topicaliza-
tion, drive the movement of a remnant in Fragments. Under that hypothesis, the
movement we observe in (6a) is the same movement as the movement in (6b).
(6) Fragments - No EM
a. A: Who did you see? B: [Bill]i [I saw ti ]
b. A: Who did you see? B: [Bill]i [I saw ti ]
Multiple Fragments involves an elliptical answer to a multiple wh-question.1 Mul-
tiple Fragments differs from Fragments in that it leaves two remnants instead of
one. As shown in (7), the second remnant in Multiple Fragments undergoes EM. By
hypothesis, the first remnant fronts non-exceptionally, just as the single remnant in
Fragments.
(7) Multiple Fragments - EM
A: Who bought what?
a. * B: John [a book]i [bought ti ] (and Mary a pencil)
b. B: John [a book]i [bought ti ] (and Mary a pencil)
As noted in chapter 1, I assume Stripping to be an instance of Gapping with one
remnant. Just like the other single-remnant constructions, Sluicing and Fragments,
Stripping does not involve exceptional movement. In a run-of-the-mill Stripping
case, the movement of the remnant patterns with conjunction internal fronting.
1Since multiple wh-questions in English require a pair-list answer, the examples of Multiple Frag-
ments involve a pair of Multiple Fragments. This second instance of Multiple Fragments is not necessary
to illustrate its properties.
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(8) Stripping - No EM
a. John ate macaroni and [spaghetti]i , [John ate ti ] too
b. John ate macaroni, and [spaghetti]i , [John ate ti ] too
By definition, Gapping leaves two or more remnants. The first remnant is assumed
here to front in a similar fashion to the single remnant in Stripping. However, since
English lacks multiple fronting, as in (9a), the second remnant can only move to its
surface position exceptionally.
(9) Gapping - EM
a. * John ate macaroni and Bill [spaghetti]i [ate ti ]
b. John ate macaroni and Bill [spaghetti]i [ate ti ]
Pseudogapping is standardly taken to involve VP ellipsis involving one surviving
remnant (cf. Jayaseelan, 1990; Lasnik, 1995, 1999a,b; Takahashi, 2004; Gengel, 2013;
Thoms, to appear). An example is given in (10). The movement of to India in this
example can only be exceptional, since the remnants of Pseudogapping cannot sur-
face in this position in the absence of ellipsis, see (10a).
(10) Pseudogapping - EM
a. * John has travelled to Spain and Bill has [to India]i [travelled ti ]
b. John has travelled to Spain and Bill has [to India]i [travelled ti ]
The findings of this section are summarized in (11).
(11) EM in elliptical constructions in English:
Sluicing ✗
Multiple Sluicing 1st remnant ✗
2nd remnant ✓
Fragments ✗
Multiple Fragments 1st remnant ✗
2nd remnant ✓
Stripping ✗
Gapping 1st remnant ✗
2nd remnant ✓
Pseudogapping ✓
One noteworthy property of EM that can be deduced from the cases in this section,
is that EM always lands next to the ellipsis site. In the case of clausal ellipsis, one
might attempt to explain this observation by saying that if EM did not land next to
the ellipsis site, this would be ruled out because ellipsis could have deleted more
than it did. This would not work for cases involving Pseudogapping, since in Pseu-
dogapping, ellipsis targets a sub-clausal constituent anyway, namely a VP. Still, EM
must land next to (i.e. target the sister position) of the ellipsis site, as illustrated by
the contrast between (12a) and (12b).
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(12) Pseudogapping
a. John has travelled to Spain and Bill has [to India]i [travelled ti ]
b. John has travelled to Spain and Bill [to India]i has [travelled ti ]
I will henceforth refer to the puzzling contrast between (12a) and (12b) as the ‘land-
ing site question’. I provide an explanation for it in section 4.2.
3 Theories of exceptional movement
3.1 Rightward movement
In the literature, Gapping, Multiple Sluicing and Pseudogapping have all been ar-
gued to involve rightward movement of the remnants that we have established to
undergo EM in the previous section. The rightward movement account is attractive
in that it eliminates the need to postulate exceptional leftward movement in many
instances of ellipsis. To see why this is so, consider (5a), repeated here as (13a), un-
der a rightward movement analysis, as in (13b).
(13) Multiple Sluicing - EM
One of the students spoke to one of the professors, but . . .
a. I don’t know which [spoke ti ] [to which]i
b. I don’t know which [spoke ti ] [to which]i
(13) shows that, if rightward movement is possible in non-elliptical contexts (13a),
then there is no need to postulate exceptional movement in elliptical contexts, as
shown in (13b). The hypothesis that only regular syntactic movement is possible
under ellipsis is the null hypothesis. This section reviews the rightward movement
proposals that have appeared in the literature.
3.1.1 Gapping
Jayaseelan (1990) argues that Gapping involves ellipsis fed by leftward movement
of the first remnant, and rightward movement of the second remnant. His analysis
of an example such as (1a) is sketched in (14).
(14) Max at the apple and [Sally]i [ti ate t j ] [the hamburger] j
Jayaseelan provides several arguments in favor of the analysis in (14). First, he notes
that this analysis explains why Gapping cannot leave more than two remnants (cf.
Jackendoff, 1971; Kuno, 1976; Pesetsky, 1982). The reason, according to Jayaseelan,
is that no more than one phrase can move rightward; this is shown in (15a). In the
same vain, the Gapping example in (15b) is ungrammatical, because two remnants
undergo rightward movement.
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(15) a. * John built ti t j yesterday [with a hammer] j [the house that he will live
in]i .
b. * John built the house with a hammer and [Mary]i [ti built t j tk ] [the
garage] j [with a saw]k
The rightward movement account of Gapping moreover provides an explanation
for the clause-boundedness of the second remnant. As Jayaseelan points out, if the
second remnant in Gapping undergoes rightward movement, the prediction is that
this remnant is subject to Ross’s (1967) Right Roof Constraint. (16) shows that this
prediction is borne out. In this example, the second remnant has moved rightwards
crossing a finite clause boundary. Since this is in violation of the Right Roof Con-
straint, the example is ungrammatical.
(16) * John thinks that Bill will see Susan and [Harry] [ ti thinks [that Bill will
see t j ]] [Mary] j
A third piece of evidence that Jayaseelan puts forth in favor of the rightward move-
ment account of Gapping is that it correctly predicts that a second remnant can-
not strand a preposition. The example in (17b) illustrates this. As Jayaseelan points
out, the ban on P-stranding follows immediately from the rightward movement ac-
count, because P-stranding is not possible under rightward movement, see (17a).
(17) a. * I talked about ti yesterday [the man I recently met]i
b. * John talked about Bill and [Mary]i [ti talked about t j ] [Susan] j
Although Jayaseelan’s arguments seem to support a rightward movement account
of Gapping, this account is not without problems. One problem is that it overgen-
erates. Specifically, Park and Kang (2007) observe that rightward movement of the
subject of an ECM infinitival clause is impossible (18a), while the case of Gapping in
(18b) shows that movement of the remnant Mary out of the ECM infinitival clause
is allowed.
(18) a. * I believe ti to be dishonest [the politician with high profile in interna-
tional affairs]i .
b. Some believe John to be the best candidate, and others Mary.
Similarly, Thoms (to appear) observes that the direct object of a ditransitive verb
cannot move rightwards. Again, contrary to what the rightward movement account
of Gapping predicts, the direct object of a ditransitive verb can be a remnant in
Gapping.
(19) a. * John gave ti a lot of money [the people that deserved it most]i .
(Thoms, to appear)
b. John gave Bill a lot of money, and Mary Susan.
Moreover, non-heavy pronominals may be remnants too (20b), but they may not
undergo Heavy NP Shift, see (20a).
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(20) a. * I saw ti yesterday [you]i . (Thoms, to appear)
b. Fred tries to treat his parents well, and they him. (Hudson, 1989)
The rightward movement account of Gapping predicts that Gapping should be im-
possible in languages that lack rightward movement. This prediction is not borne
out, though. The examples in (21) show that, whereas PPs can extrapose in Dutch
(21a), DPs cannot (21b). Since the DP in (21b) is heavy, this example also shows that
Dutch lacks Heavy NP Shift. Contrary to what the rightward movement of Gapping






















































The examples in (18)-(22) show that the rightward movement account of Gapping
undergenerates: phrases that may not undergo rightward movement are nonethe-
less possible as non-initial remnants in Gapping. In the face of (17)-(19), one might
suppose that Gapping in English involves rightward movement, whereas Gapping
in Dutch does not. Aelbrecht (2007), for instance, argues that Dutch Gapping is
derived by ellipsis fed by leftward focus movement of the remnants. If in English,
the second remnant of Gapping moves rightwards, whereas all remnants move left-
wards in Dutch, this might explain why there is a restriction on the number of rem-
nants in English that is not found in Dutch. Whereas English only allows for two
remnants under Gapping, in Dutch, there is no restriction on the number of rem-























‘John has given Mary a book and Peter has given Susan a CD.’
If the limitation on the number of remnants only holds for English, it might be
that remnants escape ellipsis by rightward movement only in English. However,
the hypothesis that English Gapping differs from Dutch Gapping in the way the






















(Intended:) ‘John thinks Bill will see Susan and Harry thinks Bill will see
Susan.’
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The idea that remnants in Dutch escape ellipsis by leftward movement is plausi-
ble, given that rightward movement is unavailable, at least for DPs. Consequently,
the fact that the movement of a non-initial remnant is finite clause bound can-
not be taken as an argument for rightward movement. As this also holds for En-
glish, the rightward movement account of Gapping loses much of its appeal. More-
over, we have already seen that the rightward movement account undergenerates
for English. Taking all of this into account, I conclude that Gapping in English and
in Dutch, is not derived by rightward movement of the remnants. I adopt the hy-
pothesis that the remnants of Gapping uniformly move leftwards, both in English
(cf. Coppock, 2001; Johnson, 2004, 2009) and in Dutch. This hypothesis is in line
with the facts that both English Gapping and Dutch Gapping are extremely similar.
That is, English and Dutch Gapping have the same syntax (cf. chapter 2), show the
same distribution and are licensed in the same way (cf. chapter 3). These observa-
tions strongly favor a uniform analysis. The only problem left for a uniform leftward
movement account of the remnants in Gapping are the P-stranding facts. As we will
see below, the facts about P-stranding under ellipsis are complicated and, at this
point, do not warrant any conclusions about the direction of movement.
3.1.2 Multiple Sluicing
Nishigauchi (1998) and Lasnik (2013) observe that the second wh-phrase in Multi-
ple Sluicing is clause bound, just as the second remnant in Gapping. This is illus-
trated in (25a). For this and other reasons, Nishigauchi and Lasnik adopt Jayasee-
lan’s (1990) Gapping analysis for Multiple Sluicing. (25b) illustrates why (25a) is un-
grammatical under the rightward movement account. The reason is that the second
remnant violates the Right Roof Constraint.
(25) a. * One of the students said that Mary spoke to one of the professors, but
I don’t know which student to which professor.
b. * One of the students said that Mary spoke to one of the professors, but
I don’t know [which student]i [ ti said that Mary spoke t j ] [to which
professor] j
The rightward movement account of Multiple Sluicing is further supported by the
fact that the second wh-remnant cannot strand a preposition. As shown in (26b), if
the second remnant moves rightward, P-stranding leads to ungrammaticality. Un-
der a rightward movement account, this ungrammaticality follows from a general
ban on P-stranding under rightward movement, illustrated in (26a).
(26) a. * A linguist spoke about ti yesterday [some paper about Sluicing]i .
b. ?* Some linguist spoke about some paper on Sluicing, but I don’t know
[which linguist]i [ ti spoke about ti ] [which paper on Sluicing] j .
To give further support for the rightward movement analysis, Lasnik notes that the
grammaticality of Multiple Sluicing tracks the possibility for the second remnant to
undergo rightward movement. In (27a), extraposition of the PP to who is possible.
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(27b) shows that this PP can also be a second remnant in Multiple Sluicing. The
‘light’ DP what in (28a), on the other hand, cannot extrapose. As correctly predicted
by the rightward movement account, this light DP also cannot be a second remnant
either, see (27b).
(27) a. Who was talking ti yesterday [to who]i ?
b. Someone was talking (yesterday) to someone, but
I don’t know [who] [ti was talking t j ] [to who] j .
(28) a. ?* Who bought ti yesterday [what]i ?
b. ?* Someone bought something, but I don’t know
[who] [ti bought t j ] [what] j .
Lasnik furthermore points out that if the second wh-phrase is ‘heavier’, Heavy NP
Shift is possible (29a) and so is Multiple Sluicing (29b).
(29) a. Which linguist criticized ti yesterday [which paper about sluicing]i ?
b. ? Some linguist criticized (yesterday) some paper about Sluicing, but I
don’t know
[which linguist]i [ti criticized t j ] [which paper about Sluicing] j .
(25)-(29) illustrate that the possibility of Multiple Sluicing seems to pattern with
the availability of rightward movement. However, there are also cases in which the
availability of rightward movement and the possibility of Multiple Sluicing diverge.
We saw in (18a), repeated here as (30), that rightward movement of the subject of an
ECM infinitival clause is impossible (Park and Kang, 2007). Nonetheless, as shown
in (31), subjects of an ECM clause can be the second remnant in Multiple Sluicing.
As Park and Kang (2007) point out, the grammaticality of (31) is unexpected under
the rightward movement analysis, since this analysis predicts that Multiple Sluicing
should only be possible when rightward movement is also.
(30) a. * I believe ti to be dishonest [the politician with high profile in interna-
tional affairs]i .
(31) a. One of the boys believes behind one of the trees to be the best place
to hide, but I don’t know [which] [behind which tree].
b. One of the RAs expects from one of the cells to emerge a tiny being,
but I don’t know [which] [from which cell].
Similarly, we saw that the direct object of a ditransitive verb cannot move right-
wards (Thoms, to appear). This is shown in (32a), repeated from (19a). (32b) shows
that a direct object of a ditransitive verb can be a remnant in Multiple Sluicing.
This is problematic for the rightward movement account of Multiple Sluicing for
the same reason the examples in (31) are.
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(32) a. * John gave ti a lot of money [the people that deserved it most]i .
(Thoms, to appear)
b. Some student gave some professor a lot of money, but I don’t know
[which student] [which professor].
It is clear from (31) and (32) that Multiple Sluicing is not fed by (regular) rightward
movement. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Multiple Sluicing even oc-
curs in languages such as Dutch and Korean, which do not allow rightward move-
ment (nor do they have multiple wh-fronting). As we saw in the previous section,
DPs in Dutch cannot undergo rightward movement (cf. (21b)). This is once again il-
lustrated in (33a,b), this time for wh-phrases. Problematic for the rightward move-
ment account of Multiple Sluicing, is that the DP that fails to undergo rightward




















‘Which linguist criticized which paper on Sluicing today?’







































‘A linguist criticized a paper on Sluicing today, but I don’t know which
linguist which paper on Sluicing.’
Park and Kang (2007) show that Korean also has Multiple Sluicing, see (34a). Yet,
just like Dutch, this language lacks rightward movement. They also point out that





















































‘Mary said to someone that [John liked some food], but Mary cannot
remember to whom which food.’ Park and Kang (2007)
The contrast in (35) shows that the clause boundedness of second remnants in Mul-
tiple Sluicing is observed in Dutch, too.



























































Since Dutch and Korean do not allow rightward movement, the clause bounded-
ness of Multiple Sluicing observed in (34) and (35) cannot be caused by rightward
movement. This conclusion deprives the rightward movement of one of the core
arguments in favor of it. The argument that still stands is that the second remnant
in Multiple Sluicing patterns to a large extent (crucially, as we have established from
(31) and (32), not to the full extent) with phrases capable of undergoing rightward
movement. I will provide a tentative alternative explanation for this observation in
section 6. The other argument in favor of a rightward movement account of Multi-
ple Sluicing is the impossibility of P-stranding under Multiple Sluicing. As already
mentioned, though, the P-stranding facts do not warrant any decisive conclusions.
At this point, there is no conclusive evidence for the rightward movement ac-
count of Multiple Sluicing. However, as I showed in this section, there are several
facts that argue against it. For this reason, I adopt the leftward movement account
of Multiple Sluicing as it appears in Merchant (2001) and Richards (2001).
3.1.3 Pseudogapping
Jayaseelan (1990) provides an analysis of Pseudogapping in terms of VP ellipsis
plus rightward movement of the remnant. The main argument in favor of postulat-
ing rightward movement is that the remnant cannot strand a preposition. As (36a)
shows, stranding a preposition is not possible under rightward movement. Under
Jayaseelan’s analysis, the ungrammaticality of (36b) is due to the fact that the rem-
nant that moves rightwards strands a preposition.
(36) a. * John counted on ti for support [a total stranger]i .
b. * You cannot count on a stranger,
but you can [VP count on ti ] [a friend]i .
Jayaseelan’s analysis predicts that remnants in Pseudogapping can never strand a
preposition. Lasnik (1999a,b) points out, however, that the result of P-stranding un-
der Pseudogapping is not always ungrammatical (cf. also Thoms (to appear) who
reports that his informants disagree that (36b) is ungrammatical).
(37) John spoke to Bill and Mary should Susan.
Another problem for the rightward movement account is that some phrases that
cannot undergo rightward movement, can nonetheless be remnants of Pseudo-
gapping. Indirect objects, for example, can be remnants, see (38b) (repeated from
(32a)), but they cannot undergo Heavy NP Shift, as shown in (38a).
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(38) a. * John gave ti a lot of money [the people that deserved it most]i .
(Thoms, to appear)
b. ? John gave Bill a lot of money, and Mary will Susan.
(Lasnik, 1999b)
Likewise, non-heavy pronominals may be remnants too (39b), but they cannot be
the target of Heavy NP Shift either (39a).
(39) a. * I saw ti yesterday [you]i . (Thoms, to appear)
b. ? I didn’t expect John to like it, but I did you. (Lasnik, 1999b)
These arguments constitute strong evidence that the remnant in Pseudogapping
does not survive ellipsis by rightward movement (i.e. Heavy NP Shift or extraposi-
tion). Therefore, I adopt the hypothesis that the remnant of Pseudogapping under-
goes leftward movement to an IP-internal position (Jayaseelan, 2001; Gengel, 2013;
Thoms, 2010, 2013).2
3.1.4 Summary
In this section, I have reviewed the theories that postulate that remnants move
rightwards. All of these theories fall short for two main reasons. First, all of the the-
ories undergenerate. For all of Gapping, Multiple Sluicing and Pseudogapping, we
have seen cases in which a phrase that cannot move rightwards survives as a rem-
nant. Second, Gapping and Multiple Sluicing are possible in languages that lack
rightward movement. What’s more, all of these theories beg the question as to why
a remnant would move rightwards in the first place.3
Finally, I would like to consider how the rightward movement theories fair with
regard to the questions in (3) (repeated here as (40)), which any theory of movement
under ellipsis should account for. The rightward movement accounts postulate that
rightward movement of remnants involves extraposition or Heavy NP Shift. This
predicts that the movement that remnants undergo is possible outside of ellipsis
contexts. As we have seen in this section, this is correct. The rightward movement
2Lasnik argues that the remnant of Pseudogapping moves leftward to spec,AgrOP to get case. Thoms
(to appear) points out that this analysis undergenerates. First, PPs can be remnants in Pseudogapping,
yet they do not need case. Second, objects of embedded clauses (ia), indirect objects (ib) and direct ob-
ject in ditransitives (ic) can be remnants in Pseudogapping. As Thoms points out, all of these remnants
should induce an A-Minimality violation because another case-bearing phrase is in the way.
i. ? Kathy wants to study astronomy, but she doesn’t meteorology. (Lasnik, 2006)
ii. ? The DA will prove Jones guilty and the assistant will Smith. (Lasnik, 1999b)
iii. ? Although John wouldn’t give Bill the book, he would the paper. (Baltin, 2003)
3Abe and Hoshi (1997) suggest for Gapping that the second remnant moves rightwards, because only
one phrase can adjoin to a constituent. They argue that the leftward moved remnant adjoins to TP and
that the rightwards moved phrase adjoins to T’ (where the direction of adjunction is indirectly governed
by the head parameter). I refer the reader to the original paper for their precise implementation. It
should be clear, however, that the hypothesis that only one phrase can adjoin to a constituent, is not
able to account for why there is no limit on the number of remnants in languages like Dutch.
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account also answers the locality question. If the second remnant in Gapping and
Multiple Sluicing and the single remnant of Pseudogapping move rightwards, the
clause boundedness immediately follows, since rightward movement is subject to
the Right Roof Constraint. Lastly, the trigger question reduces to the question of
what triggers extraposition and HNPS, a question not directly related to ellipsis.
(40) Questions to be answered by a theory of EM:
• Why is EM parasitic on ellipsis? (Ellipsis question)
• What locality conditions is EM subject to? (Locality question)
• What triggers EM? (Trigger question)
All in all, then, the rightward movement account does an admirable job at account-
ing for the properties of movement under ellipsis. The main problem for the right-
ward movement account is that it undergenerates. For English, I have shown that
phrases incapable of undergoing rightward movement can nonetheless be rem-
nants of ellipsis. From a cross-linguistically perspective, the problem of undergen-
eration is arguably even more severe. The fact that most of these elliptical construc-
tions are also possible in languages that lack rightward movement, means that,
whatever the direction of the movement of remnants is in these languages, it will
always be exceptional movement. This is so, because the movement is not possible
in non-elliptical contexts, neither rightward nor leftward.
All of the accounts that postulate rightward movement of (non-initial) rem-
nants have brought forth the argument that they disallow P-stranding. For Pseu-
dogapping, we have seen that P-stranding is, in fact, possible. As noted by Thoms
(2013), Multiple Fragments also allow for P-stranding:
(41) A: Who did you speak to about what?
B: Mary (about) the weather, and Rab (about) the government.
In section 2, I showed that the second remnant in Multiple Fragments moves ex-
ceptionally. At this point, then, it is not clear what exactly the link is between EM
and P-stranding. I leave this topic for future research.
3.2 LF parallelism
In this section, I discuss Thoms’ (2013) theory of EM. His proposal is based on LF
parallelism and builds on the works by Fox and Lasnik (2003) and Griffiths and Lip-
ták (2014). I provide a summary of the account in the next section. In section 3.2.2,
I show that Thoms’ LF parallelism theory suffers from conceptual and empirical
problems. Moreover, I show that it does not meet the requirements on a theory of
EM (cf. (40)).
3.2.1 Thoms (2013)
Thoms (2013) argues that EM is not constrained by syntax, but that its application is
subject to an LF parallelism constraint, as informally stated in (42). It follows from
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the definition in (42) that LF parallelism is a condition that is only active under
ellipsis.
(42) LF parallelism (Fox and Lasnik, 2003):
Variables in the antecedent A and the elliptical clause E must be bound from
parallel positions.
Thoms shows that LF parallelism captures why, in ellipsis constructions with more
than one remnant, the two remnants must be clause mates (the Clause Mate Con-
dition, Lasnik 2013). Consider the contrast between the Multiple Sluicing examples
in (43) and (44). In both (43) and (44), the wh-phrase what in the antecedent takes
scope over the matrix clause at LF. As dictated by LF parallelism, the trace/variable
of the remnant in the ellipsis site must be bound from the same position. This is the
case in (43), where a book takes matrix scope. In (44), on the other hand, the wh-
phrase what takes clause bound scope at LF in the antecedent (cf. Dayal, 2002). The
corresponding remnant in the ellipsis site, a book, on the other hand, takes scope
over the matrix clause, where it binds its trace. LF parallelism is thus not satisfied
in (44) and the sentence is therefore ungrammatical.4
(43) a. A: Who bought what?
B: John a book (and Mary a pencil).
b. LFA [[who]i λx.[what] j λy.[xi bought y j ]]
LFE [[John]i λx.[a book] j λy.[xi bought y j ]]
(44) a. A: Who said you bought what?
B: ∗John a book (and Mary a pencil).
b. LFA [[who]i λx.[xi said [what] j λy.[you bought y j ]]
LFE [[John]i λx.[a book] j λy.[xi said you bought y j ]]
Next, we consider elliptical structures with a single remnant, comparing cases in
which there is a contrastive correlate in the antecedent with cases where there is a
non-contrastive correlate in the antecedent. To begin with the latter, consider (45),
which features a non-contrastive correlate a Balkan language. This correlate can
be bound in situ from the matrix clause via choice function mechanisms (cf. Rein-
hart, 1997). The fact that the correlate takes matrix scope in the antecedent, allows
the corresponding remnant, Serbo-Croatian to move to, and take scope from, the
corresponding position in the ellipsis clause (even crossing an island boundary).
(45) a. A: I heard they hired someone who speaks a Balkan language fluently.
B: Yeah, Serbo-Croatian.
b. LFA ∃f[I heard they hired someone who speaks f(a Balkan language)].
LFE [Serbo-Croatian] λxi .[I heard they hired someone who speaks xi ]
4I refer the reader to Thoms (2013) and Park and Kang (2007) for the LF parallelism account of Multi-
ple Sluicing, which runs parallel to the discussion in the main text about Multiple Fragments.
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According to Thoms, contrastively focused phrases take clause bound scope at LF
by undergoing Quantifier Raising. This explains the contrast between (45) and (46).
In (46), the contrastively focused correlate Bulgarian takes clause bound scope at
LF, see LFA in (46b). The corresponding remnant in LFE , Serbo-Croatian, takes ma-
trix scope. Since the traces of the correlate Bulgarian and the remnant Serbo-Croa-
tian are not bound from identical positions, this derivation is ruled out by LF par-
allelism.
(46) a. A: I heard they hired someone who speaks BULGARIAN fluently.
B: ∗No, SERBO-CROATIAN.
b. LFA [I heard they hired someone [Bulgarian]i λx.[who speaks xi ]].
LFE [Serbo-Croatian]i λx.[I heard they hired someone who speaks xi ]
To summarize Thoms’ (2013) theory, the idea is that EM is not constrained in the
syntax, but its application is subject to the independent requirement of LF paral-
lelism. Part of the elegance of the LF parallelism theory is that it makes use of a
condition for which there is independent support outside the domain of EM.5 Un-
fortunately, this theory suffers from several conceptual and empirical problems.
3.2.2 Problems for the LF parallelism account of EM
In this section, I discuss several problems for the hypothesis that EM is constrained
by LF parallelism. To begin with, the LF parallelism theory fails to meet all the re-
quirements that a theory of EM should meet. That is, it fails to address all the ques-
tions in (40), repeated here as (47).
(47) Requirements on a theory of EM:
• Why is EM parasitic on ellipsis? (Ellipsis question)
• What locality conditions is EM subject to? (Locality question)
• What triggers EM? (Trigger question)
One question that the LF parallelism theory does answer is the locality question.
The answer to this question is that EM is not constrained by any locality condi-
tions (cf. the island violation in (45)). One of the problems with the claim that EM is
not constrained by syntactic locality conditions, is that it leaves no room for cross-
linguistic variation. That is, if EM is unconstrained under ellipsis, it should be so in
any language. In section 5, I show that there is, contrary to what the LF parallelism
theory predicts, cross-linguistic variation with regard to movement under ellipsis.
Since LF parallelism is a condition on ellipsis, it may appear as if the LF paral-
lelism theory also answers the ellipsis question. This is not the case, though. Under
the LF parallelism theory, the question remains what constrains EM when no ellip-
sis applies. Because LF parallelism does not come into play when no ellipsis takes
place, the expectation is that nothing constrains EM when no ellipsis applies. This
5LF parallelism was first postulated in Fox (2000) to explain scope parallelism in conjunctions.
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is clearly incorrect, as EM only occurs under ellipsis, but in the absence of ellipsis,
EM is impossible, see the contrast between (48a) and (48b).
(48) a. * John has travelled to Spain and Bill has [to India]i travelled ti
excepti onal movement
b. John has travelled to Spain and Bill has [to India]i [VP travelled ti ]
The answer to the trigger question under the LF parallelism theory is that it is not
triggered at all. Application of EM is free, as long as LF parallelism is obeyed. Again,
this is problematic when non-elliptical structures are considered. If nothing trig-
gers EM, why can’t EM be triggered in the absence of ellipsis?
These considerations lead to the conclusion that EM is constrained by some fac-
tor and that this factor is absent when ellipsis applies and not the other way around.
EM is not more constrained (e.g. by LF parallelism) when ellipsis applies, rather it
is less constrained: a movement is possible in elliptical, but not in non-elliptical
structures. Likewise, there must be something that triggers EM under ellipsis, and
this trigger must be absent when no ellipsis applies (see section 6).
Another theoretical problem for the LF parallelism theory is the following. Un-
der the LF parallelism theory, the LF position of the correlate determines the LF
position of the remnant. However, it does not follow from this that the LF position
of the remnant should be the same as the PF position of the remnant. Since May
(1977), it is well-known that PF spell-out position and LF scope position do not al-
ways coincide. To make the problem more concrete, consider the example in (49).
Nothing in the LF parallelism theory rules out (49a) with the derivation in (49b).
In this derivation, LFA and LFE satisfy LF parallelism: the remnant a book and its
corresponding correlate what take scope over the embedded clause, binding their
trace from an identical position. At PF, a book is spelled out in a left-peripheral po-
sition in the matrix clause. In other words, a book has moved into the matrix clause
in the syntax, but at LF reconstructs to (i.e. is interpreted in) a position where it
scopes only over the embedded clause, thereby satisfying LF parallelism. The prob-
lem is even more severe if the de dicto reading in (49), in which John and Mary do
not have a specific book and pencil in mind, involves narrow scope of the indefinite
with respect to the intensional verb (Russell, 1905; Fodor, 1970; Montague, 1973;
Partee, 1974; Cresswell and Stechow, 1982; Keshet, 2008, a.o.). In that case, (49b) is
in fact the only possible LF/PF representation for (49aB).
(49) a. A: Who believed you bought what?
B: ∗John a book, and Mary a pencil.
b. LFA [[who]i λx.[xi believed [what] j λy.[you bought y j ]]
LFE [John]i λx.[xi believed [a book] j λy.[ you bought y j ]]
PFE [[John]i [a book] j [ ti believed you bought t j ]]
Next to these conceptual problems, there are empirical problems for the LF par-
allelism theory, as well. One problem is that, if contrastively focused correlates take
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clause bound scope by Quantifier Raising, (50) should be ungrammatical, since no
LF parallelism obtains. The focused correlate Greek takes scope over the embedded
clause at LF, but the corresponding remnant Albanian takes matrix scope (50b).6
(50) a. A: Did Abby claim she speaks GREEK fluently?
B: No, ALBANIAN.
b. LFA [did Abby claim [Greek]i λx.[she speaks xi fluently]]
LFE [[Albanian] λxi [Abby claimed she speaks xi fluently]]
A final drawback of the LF parallelism theory, is that it leaves unexplained what
I have called the landing site question (i.e. why EM must land next to the ellipsis
site), illustrated by the contrast between (51a) and (51b).
(51) a. John has travelled to Spain and Bill has [to India]i [VP travelled ti ].
b. * John has travelled to Spain and Bill [to India]i has [VP travelled ti ].
Under the LF parallelism theory, the landing site of EM is constrained by the LF po-
sition of the correlate. The answer to the question why the remnant lands next to
the ellipsis site, is thus that it is a coincidence: the correlate happens to be in an
identical position in the non-elliptical antecedent. It seems the LF parallelism the-
ory overlooks a generalization here. I provide an answer to the landing site question
in section 4.2.
To sum up, Thoms’ (2013) theory of EM in terms of LF parallelism suffers from
conceptual as well as empirical problems. Moreover, I showed that it fails to meet
the requirements on a theory of EM (cf. (47)). In the next section, I explore an alter-
native view on EM, retaining the idea that EM involves leftward movement.
4 EM and ordering statements
In this section, I answer the ellipsis question and the landing site question. I will
implement my proposal in Fox and Pesetsky’s theory of Spell-out Domains.
4.1 Answering the ellipsis question
Fox and Pesetsky (2005) (henceforth F&P) present a theory of Spell-out Domains
that is based on Chomsky’s (2000; 2001) notion of phases (vP and CP). However,
F&P’s theory differs from Chomsky’s in how cyclicity is derived in that it does not
postulate ‘phase impenetrability’.7 Under F&P’s conception, it is not the uninter-
pretability of features that drives movement of a phrase out of a Spell-out Domain
6Thoms (to appear) solves this issue by arguing that focused correlates in clausal ellipsis can also
take scope by in situ choice function mechanisms. Since this addition does not solve any of the other
problems of the LF parallelism theory, I refrain from discussing it here.
7Under Chomsky’s conception, phasal domains are sent off to the PF and LF interfaces at the point
of Spell-out. After sending a phase off to the interfaces, it is impenetrable for further syntactic compu-
tations. The main consequence of phase impenetrability is that any uninterpretable feature must have
vacated the Spell-out Domain prior to Spell-out. If it does not, this unvalued uninterpretable feature will
be unable to become valued and consequently cause the derivation to crash at (one of) the interfaces.
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(and thus cyclic movement), but considerations of linear precedence. At the point
of Spell-out, Linearization applies. I give F&P’s definitions of Spell-out Domain and
Linearization in (52).
(52) Spell-out Domains
a. Spell-out Domain: domains whose construction is immediately followed
by linearization (roughly Chomsky’s notion of phases (CP, DP, vP/VP).
b. Linearization adds new ordering statements to the set of statements es-
tablished by the linearization of previous Spell-out Domains.
Linearization adds ordering statements to an ordering table. What drives cyclic
movement is that, once a phrase α gets ordered, say after another phrase β, α
cannot come to precede β in a later stage of the derivation. α can only come to
precede β by moving across β prior to Spell-out (i.e. prior to the calculation of or-
dering statements). To illustrate how this derives cyclicity, consider the following
schematic scenario’s.
The Spell-out Domain D in scenario 1 in (53) contains X, Y and Z. At the point
of Spell-out, Linearization applies and ordering statements of the elements within
D are added to an ordering table, see (53a). Upon Spell-out of the next Spell-out
Domain D’, Linearization adds new ordering statements to the ordering table. Note
that X has moved from an edge position of D to a position within D’. This is possible,
since X preceded all other elements within D.
(53) Scenario 1 (Movement from an edge position)









(54) Scenario 2 (Movement from non-edge position)




b. * [D′ . . . Y W [D X tY Z ]
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Scenario 2 in (54) illustrates what happens when a phrase moves out of a Spell-out
Domain when it does not precede all other elements within that Spell-out Domain.
Upon Spell-out of D in (54a), Y is ordered before Z and after X (i.e. X<Y, Y<Z). In
(54b), Y has moved out of D into D’ crossing W. Upon Spell-out of D’, the ordering
statements Y<W and Y<X are added to the ordering table. At this point, the order-
ing table contains an ordering contradiction, namely X<Y and Y<X.8 That is, Y is
required to both preceed and follow X. Subsequently, this derivation will crash at
the PF interface.
Cyclicity follows in F&P’s theory, as a consequence of the fact that the linear
ordering of syntactic units is fixed at the point of Spell-out. If a phrase must check
features in a higher Spell-out Domain, the only way for it to get there, is to move via
the edge of its current Spell-out Domain.
F&P argue that ellipsis makes non-edge movement possible. They submit that
ellipsis eliminates all ordering statements making reference to elements contained
in the ellipsis site. Consider scenario 3 in (55), which differs from scenario 2 in (54)
in that D gets elided. The ordering conflict (X<Y, Y<X) caused by movement of Y
in (55b) is resolved by ellipsis when ellipsis applies in (55c). Ellipsis eliminates all
ordering statements that make reference to elements within the ellipsis site. In this
case, the ellipsis site contains X and Z. Hence, all ordering statements that make
reference to X and Z will be eliminated. Since this includes the ordering statements
X<Y and Y<X, the ordering conflict that caused the derivation in scenario 2 to crash,
is resolved.
(55) Scenario 3 (Movement from non-edge position (i.e. scenario 2) fol-
lowed by ellipsis)




b. [D′ . . . Y W [D X tY Z ]
! Updated ordering table:
Y<W, Y<X, Y<Z, Y<Z
W<X, W<Z
X<Y, X<Z
c. [D′ . . . Y W [D X tY Z ]
Updated ordering table:
Y<W, Y<X, Y<Z, Y<Z
W<X, W<Z
X<Y, X<Z
Let’s now consider an empirical illustration of scenarios 2 and 3. Takahashi (2004)
shows that F&P’s theory of Spell-out Domains, plus the assumption that ellipsis
8I indicate an ordering table that creates an ordering conflict with !. This indicates that there is an
ordering conflict, but it does not mean that the derivation will ultimately turn out to be ungrammatical.
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eliminates ordering statements, explains why EM is possible in Pseudogapping.
Consider first the case in (56), where no VP ellipsis applies (this example corre-
sponds to scenario 2 in (54)). Within the VP Spell-out Domain, we have the order-
ing statement travelled<to India.9 When to India moves to a position outside the
VP, see (56b), this PP comes to proceed travelled. Upon spell-out of the TP Spell-out
Domain, the ordering statement to India<travelled is added to the ordering table,
creating an ordering conflict, see the ordering table in (56b).
(56) * (John has travelled to Spain and) Bill has [to India]i travelled ti .
a. [VP travelled to India].
Ordering table VP Spell-out Domain:
travelled < to India
b. to India undergoes EM:
[TP Bill has [to India]i [VP travelled ti ]].
! Ordering table TP Spell-out Domain:
Bill < has, Bill < to India, Bill < travelled
has < to India, has < travelled
to India < travelled
travelled < to India
The example in (57) illustrates scenario 3 in (55), with D as the VP. Ellipsis of the
VP eliminates all the ordering statements that make reference to elements within
the VP. Since the VP includes travelled, both ordering statements travelled<to India
and to India<travelled are deleted from the ordering table. The ordering conflict is
thus resolved by ellipsis and the derivation is grammatical. Note that it is crucial to
stipulate that the movement of to India does not take place via the edge of the VP. If
to India were to move to the edge of VP prior to spell-out of the VP, to India will not
be stated to follow travelled at any point in the derivation. The prediction in that
case is that the derivation without ellipsis would be grammatical as well, contrary
to fact (cf. (51a)).
(57) (John has travelled to Spain and) Bill has [to India]i [VP travelled ti ].
a. [VP travelled to India].
Ordering table VP SOD:
travelled < to India
b. to India undergoes EM
[TP Bill has [to India]i [VP travelled ti ]].
! Ordering table TP SOD:
Bill < has, Bill < to India, Bill < travelled
has < to India, has < travelled
to India < travelled
travelled < to India
9For convenience sake, I am abbreviating ‘to<India’ here as to India.
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c. VP ellipsis:
[TP Bill has [to India]i [VP travelled ti ]].
Updated ordering table:
Bill < has, Bill < to India, Bill < travelled
has < to India, has < travelled
to India < travelled
travelled < to India
At this point, we have answered the ellipsis question: EM is possible only in ellipsis
contexts, because in ellipsis contexts the conflicting ordering statements induced
by EM can be deleted, a form of repair by deletion.
4.2 Answering the landing site question
Next, I address the landing site question. The question is, why does to India have
to land next to the ellipsis site in (51a)? That is, why is (51b) ungrammatical? As it
stands, there is nothing that leads us to suspect this example to be ungrammatical.
Consider the derivation in (58a-c). At the point of spell-out of the VP, to India is
not ordered with respect to has, because has has not been merged in the structure
yet. At the point of spell-out of the TP, to India has moved over has, leading to the
ordering statement to India<has. The only ordering conflict, namely travelled<to
India - to India<travelled, is resolved by VP ellipsis as before.
(58) * John has travelled to Spain and Bill to India has.
a. [VP travelled to India].
Ordering table VP Spell-out Domain:
travelled < to India
b. to India undergoes EM
[TP Bill [to India]i has [VP travelled ti ]].
! Ordering table TP Spell-out Domain:
Bill < to India, Bill < has, Bill < travelled
to India < has, to India < travelled
has < travelled
travelled < to India
c. VP ellipsis:
[TP Bill [to India]i has [VP travelled ti ]].
Updated ordering table:
Bill < to India, Bill < has, Bill < travelled
to India < has, to India < travelled
has < travelled
travelled < to India
As a solution to the landing site problem, I propose that EM is counter-cyclic. After
Spell-out, a phrase may undergo EM and ‘tuck-in’ somewhere in the structure. With
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F&P’s theory in place, we can actually explain why this tuck-in position must be the
position right next to the ellipsis site. Consider the schematic derivation in (59). In
(59a), the Spell-out Domain D’ has been spelled out and ordering statements have
been calculated for it. In (59b), Z moves counter-cyclically to a position next to D,
which contains Y. Consequently, a new ordering statement, namely Z<Y is added
to the ordering table. This ordering statement is in conflict with the ordering state-
ment Y<Z. When D is deleted in (59c), all ordering statements that make reference
to the elements within D are eliminated. This includes the ordering conflict Z<Y-
Y<Z. The example in (60) is similar to (59). The difference is that in (60), Z moves
out of YP to a position above X. This adds to the ordering table in (60a), the ordering
statements Z<Y and Z<X, creating the conflicts Z<Y-Y<Z and Z<X-X<Z. The first of
these ordering conflicts is resolved by ellipsis. The second, on the other hand, is not
elliminated by ellipsis. The reason is that neither Z nor X are part of the ellipsis site.
Hence, ordering statements containing both X and Z will not be eliminated.
(59) Illustration: EM lands next to the ellipsis site.
a. [D′ X [D Y Z]]
Ordering table:
X < Y, X < Z
Y < Z
b. [D′ X Z [D Y tz]]
! Updated ordering table:
X < Y, X < Z
Y < Z
Z < Y
c. Ellipsis of D:
[D′ X Z [D Y tz]]
Updated ordering table:
X < Y, X < Z
Y < Z
Z < Y
(60) Illustration: EM lands higher than right next to the ellipsis site.
a. [D′ X [D Y Z]]
Ordering table:
X < Y, X < Z
Y < Z
b. [D′ Z X [D Y tz]]
! Updated ordering table:
X < Y, X < Z
Y < Z
Z < X, Z < Y
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c. Ellipsis of D:
[D′ X Z [D Y tz]]
! Updated ordering table:
X < Y, X < Z
Y < Z
Z < X, Z < Y
To see how this proposal works for Pseudogapping, consider the derivation in (61)
for a standard case of Pseudogapping. After construction of the TP Spell-out Do-
main (cf. (61a,b)), to India moves to a VP-external position. In this case this adds the
ordering statement to India<travelled to the ordering table giving rise to the order-
ing conflict to India<travelled - travelled<to India. As before, this ordering conflict
is eliminated by VP ellipsis.
(61) John has travelled to Spain and Bill has to India.
a. [VP travelled to India].
Ordering table VP Spell-out Domain:
travelled < to India
b. [TP Bill has [VP travelled to India]].
Ordering table TP Spell-out Domain:
Bill < has, Bill < travelled, Bill < to India
has < travelled, has < to India
travelled < to India
c. Countercyclic EM of to India:
[TP Bill has [to India]i [VP travelled ti ]].
! Updated ordering table:
Bill < has, Bill < travelled, Bill < to India
has < travelled, has < to India
travelled < to India
to India < travelled
d. VP ellipsis:
[TP Bill has [to India]i [VP travelled ti ]].
Updated ordering table:
Bill < has, Bill < travelled, Bill < to India
has < travelled, has < to India
travelled < to India
to India < travelled
Now consider the derivation in (62), where, after spell-out of the TP Spell-out Do-
main, to India moves counter-cyclically and tucks in between Bill and has. After this
movement, the ordering statement to India<has is added to the ordering table. This
ordering statement conflicts with the statement has<to India. Since neither has nor
to India are in the VP, the ordering conflict is not resolved by VP ellipsis.
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(62) * John has travelled to Spain and Bill to India has.
a. [VP travelled to India].
Ordering table VP Spell-out Domain:
travelled < to India
b. [TP Bill has [VP travelled to India]].
Ordering table TP Spell-out Domain:
Bill < has, Bill < travelled, Bill < to India
has < travelled, has < to India
travelled < to India
c. Countercyclic EM of to India
[TP Bill [to India]i has [VP travelled ti ]].
! Updated ordering table:
Bill < has, Bill < travelled, Bill < to India
to India < has, to India < travelled, has < travelled, has < to India
travelled < to India
d. VP ellipsis:
[TP Bill [to India]i has [VP travelled ti ]].
! Updated ordering table:
Bill < to India, Bill < has, Bill < travelled
to India < has, to India < travelled, has < travelled, has < to India
travelled < to India
To sum up this section, I have shown that F&P’s theory provides us with an answer
to the landing site question if EM is counter-cyclic. In that case, the answer to the
landing site question is that EM can only target a position next to the ellipsis site,
because if EM lands any higher, it will induce an ordering conflict with the non-
elliptical material it crosses. In the next section, I show that the counter-cyclic na-
ture of EM correctly predicts that there are cross-linguistic differences with regard
to EM.
4.3 A note on reordering of remnants
If EM takes place counter-cyclically, it is predicted that the ‘regular syntax’ (i.e. the
syntax that is incrementally build by feature driven merge, in accordance with the
Extension Condition) feeds EM. Since languages show differences in their syntax,
the prediction is that there is cross-linguistic variation when it comes to movement
under ellipsis. This variation should not be due to EM, as no reordering between
remnants is possible under EM, but due to the differences in the regular syntax
of these languages. Any reordering must have been established in the regular syn-
tax, prior to EM. To see this, consider the following schematic derivations. In (63),
XP and ZP reorder in the regular syntax. In (63a), XP moves over ZP within D. This
results in an ordering statement XP<ZP. In (63b), ZP undergoes EM to a position
below XP. This does not add a new ordering statement to the ordering table. Ellipsis
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subsequently targets D and the ordering statement XP<ZP determines that we end
up with a string XP ZP. In (64), reordering happens by EM. In (64a), the ordering
table of D’ contains ZP<XP. When EM takes place of ZP in (64b), an ordering state-
ment XP<ZP (and also XP<Y) is added to the ordering table. This gives rise to an
ordering conflict XP<ZP-ZP<XP. Because neither XP nor ZP are part of the ellipsis
site, this conflict is not resolved by ellipsis, since ellipsis only eliminates ordering
statements which contain elements that are in the ellipsis site.
(63) Remnants XP and ZP reorder prior to EM.
a. XP moves over ZP within D’: no ordering conflict:
[D′ XP [D txp Y ZP txp]]
Ordering table:
XP < Y, XP < ZP
Y < ZP
b. EM of ZP under XP:
[D′ XP ZP [D txp Y tzp txp]]
Updated ordering table:
XP < Y, XP < ZP
Y < ZP ZP < Y
c. Ellipsis of D:
[D′ XP ZP [D txp Y tzp txp]]
Updated ordering table:
XP < Y, XP < ZP
Y < ZP ZP < Y
(64) Remnants XP and ZP reorder by EM.
a. [D′ ZP [D Y XP ]]
Ordering table:
Y < XP
ZP < Y, ZP < XP
b. EM of XP resulting in reordering of XP and ZP:
[D′ XP ZP [D Y txp]]
! Updated ordering table:
XP < ZP, XP < Y
ZP < Y, ZP < XP
Y < XP
c. Ellipsis of D:
[D′ XP ZP [D Y txp]]
! Updated ordering table:
XP < ZP, XP < Y
ZP < Y, ZP < XP
Y < XP
126 4. EM and ordering statements
The prediction that reordering under ellipsis is only possible when the reordering
is possible in non-elliptical contexts is borne out cross-linguistically. Let’s first con-
sider English. Contrary to common assumptions (see e.g. Hartmann, 2000), Gap-
ping does not require strong syntactic parallelism (Abeillé et al., 2014). As first noted
by Sag et al. (1985) for English, the order of remnants in the ellipsis clause does not
necessarily parallel that of their correlates in the antecedent, see (65).
(65) a. A policeman walked in at 11, and at 12, a fireman walked in.
b. A policeman walked in at 11, and at 12, a fireman. (Sag et al., 1985)
(63) and (64) showed that remnants cannot reorder by EM. Any reordering of rem-
nants must be established prior to EM (i.e. must be allowed by regular syntactic
movement). This explains why (66b) is ungrammatical. (66a) shows that the re-
ordering of rice and Bill is not possible in the regular syntax. Consequently, this
reordering is not possible under ellipsis either. This is so, since EM, which is only
possible under ellipsis, cannot reorder rice and Bill. This is illustrated in (67).
(66) a. * John eats macaroni and rice, Bill eats.
b. * John eats macaroni and rice, Bill.
(67) Remnants Bill and rice reorder by EM.
a. [TP Bill [VP eats rice ]]
Ordering table:
Bill < eats, Bill < rice
eats < rice
b. reordering of Bill and rice by EM of rice:
[TP ricei Bill [VP eats ti ]]
! Updated ordering table:
rice < Bill, rice < eats
Bill < eats, Bill < rice
eats < rice
c. Ellipsis of VP:
[TP rice Bill [VP eats ti ]]
! Updated ordering table:
rice < Bill, rice < eats
Bill < eats, Bill < rice
eats < rice
As Abeillé et al. (2014) point out, languages with free word-order, like Romanian,
allow remnants to be ordered freely under ellipsis. In this language, any of the word-
orders possible in the regular syntax is also possible under ellipsis.





























































‘I wash the dishes in the morning, and Ioana in the evening.’
(Abeillé et al., 2014)
To sum up this section, reordering of remnants under ellipsis is only possible when
this reordering of remnants is possible independent of ellipsis. The reason is that
EM cannot reorder remnants, because this reordering leads to contradictory order-
ing statements. Note that this only follows from a theory of EM if EM takes place
counter-cyclically. The ordering conflict that arises from reordering arises because
an ordering statement established in the ‘EM cycle’ contradicts an ordering state-
ment in the ‘regular syntax cycle’. If EM did not take place counter-cyclically, it is
unclear why reordering is not possible in (66b) (repeated here as (69c)), as it should
pattern with (69b) in that case.
(69) a. John eats macaroni and Bill [VP eats rice]
b. EM of rice below Bill
John eats macaroni and Bill ricei [VP eats ti ]
c. * EM of rice above Bill
John eats macaroni and ricei , Bill [VP eats ti ]
5 Answering the locality question
In this section, I consider the locality of EM. In section 5.2, I discuss ellipsis types
which leave a single remnant. In section 5.3, I discuss ellipsis types which leave
multiple remnants.
5.1 Exceptional movement is finite clause bound
As already anticipated in section 2, EM is very local. In that section, I also hypoth-
esized that there is a difference between exceptional and non-exceptional move-
ment with regard to locality. In the ellipsis types in which the remnant is able to es-
cape ellipsis by non-exceptional movement, the remnant may cross a finite clause
boundary. In the ellipsis types in which the remnant escapes ellipsis by EM, the
remnant cannot cross a finite clause boundary. This is shown in the following ex-
amples. For the first remnant in multiple remnant constructions, the locality re-
striction is hard to test independent of the second remnant. Like above, I assume
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that initial remnants move like they do in single remnant constructions. This is in
line with the theory of EM sketched so far, as the assumption has been that the
regular syntax provides the input for ellipsis/EM.
(70) Sluicing - Non-exceptional movement
I admitted I saw someone, but
I forgot [who]i [I admitted [I saw ti ]]
(71) Multiple Sluicing - Exceptional movement
One of the students said that Mary spoke to one of the professors, but
I don’t know which student [to which professor]i [spoke ti ]
(72) Fragments - Non-exceptional movement
A: Who did you admit you saw?
B: [Bill]i [I admitted [I saw ti ]]
(73) Multiple Fragments - Exceptional movement
A: Who said you bought what?
* B: John [a book]i [said [I bought ti ]] (and Mary a pencil)
(74) Stripping - Subject remnant: No EM
a. John claimed that birds can fly, and [bats]i , John also claimed can fly
ti .
b. John claimed that birds can fly at the conference, and also [bats]i
[John claimed [ ti can fly at the conference ]]
(75) Stripping - Direct object remnant: No EM
a. Lucie didn’t write that bees make jam, but [honey]i , Lucie wrote (that)
bees make ti .
b. Lucie didn’t write that bees make jam in her book, but [honey]i [Lucie
wrote [bees make ti in her book ]]
(76) Gapping - Exceptional movement
* John thinks that Bill will see Susan and Harry [Mary]i [thinks [that Bill
will see ti ]]
(77) Pseudogapping - Exceptional movement
* Kathy thinks Henry should study astronomy
but she doesn’t [meteorology]i [think [Henry should study ti ]].
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(78)
Ellipsis type in English EM Clause bound
Sluicing ✗ ✗
Multiple Sluicing 1st remnant ✗ ✗
2nd remnant ✓ ✓
Fragments ✗ ✗
Multiple Fragments 1st remnant ✗ ✗
2nd remnant ✓ ✓
English Stripping ✗ ✗
Gapping 1st remnant ✗ ✗
2nd remnant ✓ ✓
Pseudogapping ✓ ✓
The conclusion to be drawn from this table is that EM is finite clause bound. In
section 6, I provide a tentative explanation for why this is the case.
5.2 Ellipsis with a single remnant
Let’s see how the fact that EM is finite clause bound together with F&Ps theory ac-
counts for the locality of remnants under ellipsis.
In F&P’s theory of Spell-out Domains, spell-out of D only involves Linearization
of the elements within D. This means that all Spell-out Domains remain accessible
throughout the course of the derivation. Hence, the expectation is that counter-
cyclic movement is not constrained by locality. In the previous section I showed
that, contrary to expectation, this prediction is incorrect. Rather than unbounded,
EM is finite clause bound. To illustrate this, consider first the case of Pseudogap-
ping in (79). This example involves EM of meteorology to a position outside the VP
headed by want.
(79) Pseudogapping, local EM.
a. Kathy wants to study astronomy, but she doesn’t meteorology.
b. Exceptional movement of meteorology:
. . . she doesn’t [meteorology]i [VP want to study ti ]
c. VP Ellipsis:
. . . she doesn’t [meteorology]i [VP want to study ti ]
Consider now the ungrammatical (80) again. In this example, meteorology moves
out of the VP headed by thinks. The ungrammaticality of (80) must be due to the
fact that EM of meteorology crosses a finite clause boundary, because there is no
ordering conflict, since meteorology lands next to the ellipsis site (cf. section 4.2)
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(80) * Kathy thinks Henry should study astronomy but she doesn’t meteorology.
a. Exceptional movement of meteorology across finite clause bound-
ary:
! . . .she doesn’t [meteorology]i [VP think [Henry should study ti ]]
b. VP ellipsis (can’t save the day):
* . . .she doesn’t [meteorology]i [VP think [Henry should study ti ]]
The Fragments case in (81) involves movement of Albanian across a finite clause
boundary. Recall, however, that the single remnant in Fragments is not an instance
of EM, see (78) (cf. section 2). The input for ellipsis in (81b) is thus not a phrase
marker with Albanian in its base position, but rather a phrase marker with Albanian
in topicalized position, as indicated in (81a).
(81) A: Did Abby claim she speaks GREEK fluently?
B: No, ALBANIAN.
a. Topicalization of Albanian:
[Albanian]i [Abby claims [she speaks ti fluently]]
b. Ellipsis:
[Albanian]i [Abby claims [she speaks ti fluently]]
The data in (80) and (81) shows that a remnant can cross a finite clause boundary,
but only if it does so via regular syntactic movement, not by EM. The cross-linguistic
prediction, then, is that languages that allow for a particular type of movement,
also allow for this movement under ellipsis. This prediction is borne out. Consider
the example in (82) from Spanish (taken from Saab 2010). This example shows that
Clitic Left Dislocation can feed ellipsis.10 In languages lacking CLLD, such as En-
glish, the equivalent of (82a) in (83a) is ungrammatical, and so is the equivalent of







































[TP dijiste qua lai desaprobaron]
(83) a. * I did not say that Mary failed nor [Anna]i [did I say failed ti ]
b. * I did not say that Mary failed nor [Anna]i [did I say failed ti ]
10I assume here that CLLD involves movement, an assumption that is not uncontested. The important
point here, however, is that the regular syntax of a language feeds ellipsis and that EM is constrained.
This point can be made regardless of the correct analysis of CLLD.
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Note that the contrast between (82) and (83) is not predicted by the LF parallelism
theory of EM (cf. section 3.2). In that theory, EM is not constrained in the syn-
tax. What matters is that the variables in the antecedent and the ellipsis clause are
bound from identical positions. Regardless of whether LF parallelism is satisfied in
(82) and (83), the LFs of the antecedent and ellipsis site in English should pattern
with those in Spanish. Given this, (82) and (83) should thus have the same gram-
maticality status, contrary to fact.
The Italian examples in (84)-(86) (Laura Migliori p.c.) illustrate the same point
as the Spanish data above. These examples all involve CLLD. (85) and (86) involve
CLLD from an adjunct island. As the b-cases show, Stripping is possible in Italian in
cases where, according to the interpretation, the remnants seem to have extracted
from an island context.

































‘We are happy that everyone loves Mary, and also Susan.’





























‘I will leave if John arrives, and also Peter.’



































‘I will prepare myself before speaking to John, and also to Peter.’
I take it that the a-cases underlie the ellipsis in the b-cases. This analysis explains
why the corresponding Stripping cases in English are ungrammatical, as shown in
b-cases in (87)-(89). This is so, since the syntax of English does not allow for move-
ment out of the islands in the non-elliptical a-cases in (87)-(89). These data again
support the hypothesis that the regular syntax of a language feeds ellipsis and that
EM under ellipsis is constrained.
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(87) a. * Maryi , we are happy that everyone loves ti .
b. * We are happy that everyone loves Mary, and also Susan.
(88) a. * John, I will leave if ti arrives.
b. * I will leave if John arrives, and also Peter.
(89) a. * [To John]i , I will prepare myself before speaking ti .
b. * I will prepare myself before speaking to John, and also to Peter.
5.3 Ellipsis with multiple remnants
I now turn to discuss ellipsis types with multiple remnants. Consider the Multiple
Fragments example in (90). This example is derived by EM of a book to a position
below John, as shown in the derivation of (90) in (90a-c).
(90) A: Who bought what?
B: John the book, (and Mary the bicycle).
a. Build TP:
[TP John bought the book]
b. EM of the book:
[TP [John] [the book]i [T′ bought ti ]]]
c. Ellipsis:
[TP [John] [the book]i [T′ bought ti ]]]
Next, I consider a more complicated example of Multiple Fragments, which in-
volves movement across a finite clause boundary, as in the example in (91).
(91) A: Who said you bought what?
B: ∗John the book (and Mary the bicycle).
There are two derivations to consider for (91). The first derivation is one in which
the book undergoes EM across the finite clause boundary. I showed in the previous
section that EM is not possible across a finite clause boundary. The derivation in
(92) is thus ruled out due to a locality violation, as shown in (92b).
(92) Multiple Fragments with non-local EM of second remnant.
a. Build matrix TP:
[TP John said I bought the book]
b. EM of the book across a finite clause boundary, and EM of John:
* [TP [John] j [the book]i [T′ t j said I bought ti ]]]
c. Ellipsis:
* [TP [John] j [the book]i [T′ John said I bought ti ]]]
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The second possible derivation for (91) is one in which the book undergoes regular
syntactic movement (i.e. topicalization) across the finite clause boundary, see (93).
After building the matrix TP and topicalization of the book, the ordering table in-
cludes a statement the book<John. The next step is EM of John over the book, after
which the ordering statement John<the book is added to the ordering table. At this
point, there is an ordering conflict, namely the book<John - John<the book. This or-
dering conflict cannot be resolved by TP ellipsis, as neither John nor the book are
included in the ellipsis site, see (93c).
(93) Multiple Fragments with non-local regular movement of second remnant.
a. Build matrix TP plus topicalization of the book:
[TP [the book]i [TP John said I bought ti ]]
Ordering table:
the book < John, the book < said, the book < I, the book < bought
John < said, John < I, John < bought
said < I, said < bought
I < bought
b. Exceptional movement of John:
[TP [John] j [TP [the book]i [TP t j said I bought ti ]]]
! Updated ordering table:
the book < John, the book < said, the book < I, the book < bought
John < the book, John < said, John < I, John < bought
said < I, said < bought
I < bought
c. Ellipsis:
[TP [John] j [TP [the book]i [TP t j said I bought ti ]]]
! Updated ordering table:
the book < John, the book < said, the book < I, the book < bought
John < the book, John < said, John < I, John < bought
said < I, said < bought
I < bought
Just as with single remnant ellipsis types, we also find cross-linguistic variation with
multiple remnant ellipsis. Serbo-Croatian has multiple wh-fronting. Importantly, a
second wh-phrase can move over a finite clause boundary, see (94). As explained
in section 4.2, my account predicts that the regular syntax of a language should
feed ellipsis (possibly followed by an instance of EM). Serbo-Croatian shows that
this prediction is borne out. A derivation with multiple wh-fronting in which the
second wh-phrase moves over a finite clause boundary in the regular syntax, feeds
Multiple Sluicing, see (94b).







































[ ti neko misli da is Ivan t j pojeo]
‘I wonder who what.’ (Lasnik, 2013)
Russian is a multiple wh-fronting language. As shown in (95a), Russian allows mul-
tiple wh-fronting in a single clause. Russian differs, however, from Serbo-Croatian
in that it does not allow multiple wh-fronting where the second wh-phrase is ex-
tracted across a finite clause boundary, see (95b). As correctly predicted, my ac-
count of EM in which EM is clause bound correctly predicts that Multiple Sluicing






















































(Int.) ‘Someone thinks Peter has eaten something, but I don’t know












































In a language which lacks multiple wh-fronting, such as English, cases like (94a) are
ungrammatical. An example is given in (97a). As shown in (97b), the corresponding
Multiple Sluicing case is ungrammatical, as well. The reason is that the second wh-
phrase cannot cross the finite clause boundary in the regular syntax (cf. (97a)), nor
can it move over this finite clause boundary by EM, because that would violate the
locality condition on EM that it cannot apply across a finite clause boundary.
(97) a. * One of the students said that Mary spoke to one of the professors, but
I don’t know [which student]i [to which professor] j [ ti said that Mary
spoke t j ]
b. * One of the students said that Mary spoke to one of the professors, but
I don’t know [which student]i [to which professor] j [ ti said that Mary
spoke t j ] (Lasnik, 2013)
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To sum up this section, I have shown that the answer to the locality question is that
EM is finite clause bound. This means that any appearance to the contrary must
involve regular syntactic movement, potentially feeding an additional instance of
EM. I have also shown that the hypothesis that EM is finite clause bound correctly
predicts that there is cross-linguistic variation as to what is possible under ellipsis
regarding reordering and locality (a prediction that is not made by the rightward
movement accounts in section 3.1 nor by the LF parallelism theory of EM in section
3.2).
6 Answering the trigger question
In the previous sections, I have shown that EM and its properties can be accounted
for in Fox and Pesetsky’s (2005) theory of Spell-out. Two ingredients were crucial
in accounting for all of EM’s properties. The first ingredient is that EM is counter-
cyclic and the second is that EM is finite clause bound. In this section, I account
for why EM has these properties. I propose that EM is an interface movement in
the sense of Reinhart (2006). Below, I first discuss the motivation behind interface
movement.
6.1 Interface movement
It is important to realize that it is unlikely that EM is driven by features. Chomsky’s
(1995) Minimalist Program strives for a theory in which the computational system
(i.e. syntax, henceforth CS) is a mechanical system driven by the feature specifica-
tion of lexical items, such as the need to value φ or Case features. Valuation of fea-
tures is necessary for these features to be legible to the interface. This hypothesis
has several consequences. First, there is no room for optionality in such a system.
This is so, because for any given numeration N, the CS can only give one output O.
In other words, the CS is deterministic. Second, the hypothesis that the CS involves
a blind mechanical procedure, means that the interfaces cannot be inspected dur-
ing it. A direct consequence of the postulation of a purely mechanical CS, is that
every property of language must be encoded in the lexical items. However, as Rein-
hart (2006) points out, if the properties encoded directly in the lexicon do not, in
fact, belong there, we are heading for a dead end. Reinhart argues extensively that
there are phenomena that better not be encoded directly in the CS. I consider one
such phenomenon in detail.
Quantifier Raising (QR) is a phenomenon which is problematic for the Mini-
malist Program for at least two reasons. First, QR is optional and second, QR is not
feature driven. Reinhart points out that, although it is possible to encode QR in
the CS by postulating a QR-feature (cf. Szabolcsi, 1997; Beghelli and Stowell, 1997),
this is against the spirit of the Minimalist Program, as there is no morphological
evidence for such a feature. Fox (2000) presents a view of QR, which does not face
these problems, though at the cost of deviating from a strict Minimalist theory in
that it allows for some consultation of the interfaces.
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Sag (1976) and Williams (1977) note that there is a contrast between (98a) and
(98b).
(98) a. A doctor will examine every patient. (∃ <∀, ∀<∃)
b. A doctor will examine every patient, and Lucie will too. (∃ <∀, ∗∀<∃)
Clearly, VPE is the cause for the contrast in (98). Importantly, Hirschbühler (1982)
points out that the wide scope reading of the universal is possible in (99). Crucially,
(99) also involves VPE.
(99) An American flag was hanging in front of every building and a Canadian flag
was too.
Fox (2000) presents the following account for the data in (98)-(99). Fox’s solution is
based on the notion of LF parallelism, repeated here from (42).
(100) LF parallelism (Fox and Lasnik, 2003):
Variables in the antecedent A and the elliptical clause E must be bound from
parallel positions.
The representation of (99) is given in (101). In both conjuncts, the universal quan-
tifier binds its trace/variable from the same position.
(101) [every building]i [an American flag was [VP hanging in front of ti ]] and
[every building]i [a Canadian flag was [VP hanging in front of ti ]] too.
If QR applies optionally, then it should be possible for (98b) to receive a similar rep-
resentation as (101). To rule out wide scope in (98b), Fox hypothesizes that QR is
not optional, but rather, it can only apply when its application results in a seman-
tically distinct scope construal. Under this view, the LF representation for the wide
scope construal of (98b) is as in (102).
(102) [every patient]i [a doctor will [VP examine ti ]] and
[Lucie will [VP examine every patient ]] too.
If QR does not apply freely, but must have an effect on output, QR cannot apply in
the second conjuct in (102). The reason is that QR of every patient over Lucie will not
yield an interpretation that differs from the narrow scope construal with the uni-
versal quantifier in situ. With these assumptions, then, it is clear why wide scope in
the first conjunct in (98b) is impossible. The reason is that the wide scope construal
as represented in (102) violates LF parallelism: a universal quantifier binds a vari-
able in a TP-adjunction position in the antecedent, but there is no parallel variable
binding in the elliptical conjunct. The facts in (98)-(102) strongly suggest that QR
does not apply optionally, but only when movement derives a semantically distinct
scope construal.
Even though QR is not optional, it can still not be directly encoded in the CS
without further assumptions. An important insight deducible from Fox’s theory, is
that whether or not QR applies or not is not a matter of feature checking. Rather,
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to determine whether or not QR can apply, the interface must be consulted to see
whether QR has an effect on interpretation. Consulting the interface, however, is,
as I mentioned, not possible in a purely deterministic conception of the CS. The
solution to this problem proposed by Golan (1993) and Reinhart (1993), is to al-
low for at least some consultation of the interface. As Reinhart (2006) puts it, intu-
itively, the idea behind interface economy is that, ‘in actual human practice, deriv-
ing sentences is not an activity motivated just by a compulsion to check features,
but speakers use their innate tools to express ideas, or reach other interface goals.’
In the case of QR, the ‘interface goal’, is obtaining a distinct interpretation. Fox
(2000) formally implements this intuition into the definition of Reference Set: the
set out of which interface economy selects the most economical derivation (this set
includes only derivations derived from the same numeration). The line explored in
Reinhart (2006) is that considerations of economy apply at the interface, and not in
the CS. If correct, this means that any operation driven by interface goals will fol-
low the derivation in the CS. Although Reinhart doesn’t go this far, this view actu-
ally explains some of the peculiarities of QR. As Bianchi and Chesi (2010) point out:
‘With regard to the current definition of MOVE, QR remains exceptional [. . .]’ They
note that QR is not feature driven, is counter-cyclic and is finite clause bound (cf.
May, 1985). The first two of these properties fall out immediately from the system
sketched above. QR is not feature driven, because it takes place at the interface (not
in the CS), where it is driven by interface goals. Because QR takes place at the inter-
face, it takes the output of the CS as its input, hence its counter-cyclicity. Its finite
clause boundedness can be accounted for if finite CPs are phases. Under this view,
finite CPs would be shipped off from the CS to the interface. The fact that interface
operations are confined to finite clauses, follows from the fact that it receives CPs
as input. Note that, under the view that vPs are phases, too, there is no one-to-one
correspondance between what are phases for in CS and what are phases at the in-
terface. In essence, this would mean that we need two different notions of phases.
Since we currently have a very poor understanding of what phases are (cf. Boeckx
and Grohmann, 2007), I will not enter into an elaborate discussion of phases. I do
note, however, that if the view outlined here is on the right track, it provides an ar-
gument for taking CPs, and only CPs, as phases.
The view of interface movement just sketched has an important consequence
for our understanding of reference sets. Under the view just sketched, a reference
set contains an output of the CS, call it α, plus a set of derivations which differ from
α only in that they involve an instance of interface movement. This picture of ref-
erence sets is significantly less complex than the earlier picture where reference
sets (given a numeration) contain a set of pairs of possible derivations and inter-
pretations. Under the current view of reference sets, economy becomes a matter
of whether performing an operation on the output of the CS satisfies an interface
goal.
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6.2 EM as an interface movement
I now return to EM. I propose that EM is also a movement driven by interface needs.
Just like QR, EM is not feature driven, is counter-cyclic and is finite clause bound.
Setting aside the last property, the first two properties follow immediately under the
view that EM is driven by interface goals, as just explained for QR. If EM is driven
by interface goals, the question, of course, is what this interface goal is. In other
words, what need of the interface is satisfied when EM applies in the output of the
CS? I propose that EM is licensed by the interface goal of recoverability. The effect
of EM is that the moved phrase is taken out of the background (i.e. the material that
is given). This sets up a new/given-partition that ellipsis subsequently takes as its
input.
There is good reason to believe that something along these lines is on the right
track. As is well-known, only given material can be targeted by ellipsis. The stan-
dard view is that only given material can elide because given material is recoverable
from the context. This contrasts with focused material, which is new information
and is hence not recoverable from the context (cf. Nakao, 2008). The idea is that, if
focused phrases cannot undergo ellipsis because their content is not recoverable,
EM must take place to ensure that all syntactic units with semantic content are re-
coverable in an elliptical expression. This hypothesis predicts that if recoverability
is not at stake, EM is ruled out by interface economy. In other words, EM of α is only
licensed when α is not given. This hypothesis provides an explanation for the well-
known restriction on remnants of ellipsis that they be focused. (103), for example,
is ungrammatical under my proposal, because a banana moves out of the ellipsis
site by EM in violation of interface economy. Interface economy dictates that EM
can only take place when the derivation without EM would give rise to an irrecov-
erable instance of ellipsis, which is not the case in (103), as a banana is given in the
antecedent.
(103) * John eats a banana and [Bill]i [a banana] j [ ti eats t j ], too.
We have seen that EM and QR share a set of properties (namely, non-feature driven,
counter-cyclic and clause-bound) and that this can be explained if both are taken as
instances of interface movement. Further support for the idea that EM and QR are
both instantiations of the same type of movement (though not necessarily interface
movement) is that both are subject to the same locality restrictions. The examples
in (104)-(106) (taken from Thoms (2013)) show that both EM and QR are possible
out of a control complement (104), but not out of an ECM complement (105). More-
over, both QR and EM are possible across a finite clause boundary when the subject
of the embedded clause is coreferent with the subject of the matrix clause (106).
(104) a. QR out of control complement.
Someone wants to visit everyone. ∀>∃
b. EM out of control complement.
A: Who wants to talk about what?
B: Mary the weather, and Rab the government.
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(105) a. QR out of ECM complement.
Someone wants John to visit everyone. (Lasnik, 2006), ∗∀>∃
b. EM out of ECM complement.
A: Who wants John to talk about what? (Pair-list unavailable)
?* B: Mary the weather, and Rab the government.
(106) a. QR out of finite complement, coreferent subjects.
[At least one of these men]i thinks hei is in love with each of these
woman. ∀>∃
b. EM out of finite complement, coreferent subjects.
A: Which lawyeri said hei was representing which war criminal?
B: Cochrane Milosevic, and Derschowitz Sharon.
6.3 Interface movement and ordering statements
I have adopted F&P’s idea that Spell-Out involves shipping off a Spell-Out domain
to the interface, at which point ordering statements are calculated. I have argued
that interface movement may take place after Spell-Out. That is, interface move-
ment is a counter-cyclic movement operation that takes the output of the CS as its
input, hence its counter-cyclic nature. To put it differently, interface movement is
a ‘second cycle’ operation. In light of F&P’s theory, the consequence of this view on
interface movement in general is that interface movement must be order preserv-
ing. This is so, since ordering statements have already been calculated for the Spell-
out Domains shipped off from the CS. These ordering statements cannot be contra-
dicted by interface movement in the next cycle. Interface movement must thus be
order preserving. If it is not, like in the case of EM, ellipsis must take place to elim-
inate the conflicting ordering statements. Another possibility for interface move-
ment to take place without inducing ordering conflicts, is to move covertly. This is
precisely what happens in the case of QR. When the interface movement is covert
(i.e. when only the semantic and formal syntactic features of a phrase are copied,
cf. Drummond (2013)), semantically motivated interface movement becomes pos-
sible.
In this respect, it is interesting to recall the facts of Lasnik (2013) which identify
many similarities between EM and rightward movement in the form of Heavy NP
Shift. ‘Heavy’, of course, has no place in a deterministic conception of the CS. In
light of the current discussion, then, it is an interesting question whether HNPS
can be analyzed as an interface movement. If so, it would explain why it doesn’t
seem to be feature driven, why it is clause bound and why it is similar to EM.
7 Can ellipsis repair locality violations?
Since Ross (1969), ellipsis is widely believed to have the ability to repair ungram-
matical outputs of the grammar, a hypothesis sometimes referred to as ‘repair by
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ellipsis’ or ‘salvation by deletion’. Ross discovered that ellipsis has an ameliorating
effect on structures that contain an island violation. Island violations were already
briefly considered in chapter 3, section 6.3. In this section, I outline the theory of
Barros (to appear), which holds that there is no island repair under ellipsis. This
theory nicely complements the claims of this chapter, in particular the claim that
exceptional movement under ellipsis is finite clause bound.
Compare the non-elliptical example in (107a) with the grammatical Sluicing ex-
ample in (107b).
(107) a. * They hired someone who speaks a Balkan language, but I don’t know
[which]i they hired someone who speaks ti .
b. They hired someone who speaks a balkan language, but I don’t know
[which]i [they hired someone who speaks ti ]
The example in (107a) is ungrammatical, because it involves an island violation:
which has moved out of a complex NP. Ross hypothesizes that the same derivation
underlies (107b). Surprisingly, this example is grammatical.
In recent work it has been argued that the ameliorating powers of ellipsis are
actually not at work in examples like (107) (cf. Merchant, 2001; Fukaya, 2007; Abels,
2011; Barros, to appear; Barros et al., to appear; Marušič and Žaucer, 2013). These
works argue that (107a) is not the source of (107b). Rather, the ellipsis site contains
a ‘short’ antecedent, in which there is no island to begin with. In these theories the
source that underlies ellipsis in (107b) is (108).
(108) They hired someone who speaks a balkan language,
but I don’t know [which]i [(s)he speaks ti ]
Barros (to appear) presents a theory of (illusive) island repair based on Roberts’
(1996) theory of information structure. In this theory, F-marking presupposes con-
gruence with a Question under Discussion (QUD) (cf. chapter 3, section 3.2.1).
(109) Presupposition of prosodic focus in an utterance, U:
U is congruent to the QUD at the time of utterance.
From (109) it follows that the focus value of the antecedent in (108) must be equiva-
lent to the QUD (i.e. JAntecedentK f = JQUDK0). Barros argues that no QUD is set up
in (108), because the antecedent contains no contrastive focus and can therefore be
construed with broad focus. Since it is the antecedent of the ellips which introduces
the QUD that the elliptical utterance must be congruent with, there are two possi-
ble construals for (108); a ‘short’ one (110a) and a ‘long’ one’ (110b). That is, either
the ellipsis clause is congruent to the QUD in (110a) or it is congruent to the QUD
in (110b). In both cases (109) is satisfied. Barros argues that, although both QUDs in
(110a) and (110b) are in principle available for the ellipsis clause to be congruent to,
the long construal is ruled out, because it entails an island violation in the ellipsis
clause, as shown in (111).
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(110) a. QUDT P1: {They hired someone who speaks x: x ∈ D⟨e⟩ }
b. QUDT P2: {s/he speaks x: x ∈ D⟨e⟩ }
(111) They hired someone who speaks a Balkan language,
but I don’t know [which]i [they hired [ someone who speaks ti ]
Barros’ theory captures why contrast Sluicing and contrast Fragments cannot repair
islands. Consider the example in (112).
(112) A: Did Ben leave the party because SALLY didn’t dance with him?
B: ∗No, CHRISTINE
The QUD that A’s utterance gives rise to is given in (113).
(113) JBen left the Party because SallyF didn’t dance with himK
f
= {Ben left the party because x didn’t dance with him: x ∈ D⟨e⟩ }
= JQUDK0
The QUD that licenses the focus marking in speaker A’s Yes/No question is an im-
plicit wh-question, roughly paraphrasable as ‘who is such that Ben left the party
because s/he wouldn’t dance with him?’ B’s fragment answers this implicit QUD. As
(114b) shows, B’s fragment is congruent with the QUD set up by the focus marking
in the antecedent. The problem with (114b) is that it involves an island violation,
and is therefore ruled out. This leaves only the QUD in (114a) as a possible con-
strual for B’s fragment. The problem with (114a) is that this short construal does
not answer the QUD. That is, ‘Christine didn’t dance with him’ does not answer the
QUD ‘who is such that Ben left the party because s/he wouldn’t dance with him?’
(114) a. JChristineF didn’t dance with himK
f
= {x didn’t dance with him: x ∈ D⟨e⟩ }
/= JQUDK0
b. JChristineF,i Ben left the party because ti didn’t dance with himK
f
= {Ben left the party because x didn’t dance with him: x ∈ D⟨e⟩ }
= JQUDK0
In general, contrastively focused remnants cannot occur in island contexts, be-
cause a short construal is unavailable: a short construal does not answer the im-
plicit QUD. A long construal, which does answer the QUD, involves an island viola-
tion.
As Marušič and Žaucer (2013) point out, a theory in which ellipsis fixes islands
overgenerates, since it predicts that every improper movement can be repaired by
ellipsis. This cannot be the case, since there is variation as to which islands can be
ameliorated (see, in particular, Barros et al. (to appear)). Also, it is well-known that,
whereas clausal ellipsis shows island amelioration (cf. Merchant, 2008b), VP ellip-
sis doesn’t (e.g. Fox and Lasnik, 2003). If ellipsis has ameliorating powers when it
comes to locality violations, such variation is surprising. This chapter supports the
idea that ellipsis does not repair locality violations. This is so, because, if that were
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the case, it would not be expected that EM is finite clause bound. If ellipsis repairs
locality violations, the prediction would be that EM could move in an unbounded
fashion. Moreover, a consequence of the hypothesis that ellipsis repairs locality vi-
olations, is that ellipsis has this power in every language. If that were the case, the
cross-linguistic variation observed in section 5 would be surprising. The observed
intra- and cross-linguistic variation with respect to locality can be made sense of in
a theory of information structure like Barros’ theory outlined above and a theory of
EM as advocated in this chapter.
8 Summary
In this chapter, I have shown why EM is allowed by the grammar and what prop-
erties it has. I have argued that EM is only possible in ellipsis contexts, since el-
lipsis repairs the conflicting ordering statements that it induces. I identified three
peculiar properties of EM: it is counter-cyclic, finite clause bound and non feature
driven. Since EM shares these properties with Quantifier Raising, I proposed that
EM and QR are both instantiations of movement driven by interface goals. For EM,
I proposed that it is driven by the interface requirement of recoverability.
The theory of EM advocated in this chapter supports the ‘repair by ellipsis’ hy-
pothesis (Lasnik, 2001; Merchant, 2001, 2002; Craenenbroeck and Dikken, 2006;
Craenenbroeck, 2010) in that ellipsis has the ability to eliminate problematic or-
dering statements due to illicit movements by removing them from the ordering
table.
CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and future prospects
1 Summary of the dissertation
This dissertation has been concerned with the syntax and licensing of Gapping and
Fragments and the movement of the remnants in these and other kinds of ellipsis,
which in many cases involves exceptional movement.
In chapter 2, based on Merchant’s (2004) argument for Fragments, I argued
that there is syntactic structure in the ellipsis site in Gapping, as well. Moreover, I
showed that Gapping, like Fragments, involves movement of the remnants of ellip-
sis out of the ellipsis site, as illustrated in (1a) for Gapping and (1b) for Fragments.
(1) a. Max ate the apple and [[[DP Sally]i [DP the hamburger] j [XP ti ate t j ]]]
b. Who did you see? - [[DP Bill]i [XP I saw ti ]]
I argued that there is no fixed constituent targeted by Gapping or Fragments. That
is, XP in the examples in (1) can be any category (i.e. AP, vP, TP and CP). This flex-
ibility in ellipsis size seems adverse to the severely restricted distribution of Gap-
ping and Fragments. In chapter 3, I showed that Gapping and Fragments cannot be
embedded with respect to their antecedent, nor can the antecedent be embedded
with respect to the ellipsis site. On the basis of these and some other observations,
I argued that Gapping and Fragments are licensed by the condition in (2).
(2) Non-hierarchical Licensing Condition on Gapping and Fragments (NLC):
Gapping and Fragments are licensed when antecedent and ellips are in a
non-hierarchical relation in the discourse component.
144 1. Summary of the dissertation
(2) expresses that Gapping and Fragments cannot be embedded with respect to
their antecedent or vice versa, and that Gapping and Fragments cannot be in a
hierarchical relation with their antecedent. Interestingly, in the discourse model I
adopted in chapter 3 – in which the output of syntax forms the input for the dis-
course component – (2) explains why the ellipsis site can be of variable size. Under
this view, any lexical item or constituent may constitute a discourse unit in princi-
ple. Since non-hierarchical relations are not confined to hold between clauses, by
(2), ellipsis is also predicted to be licensed when a non-hierarchical relation holds
between smaller constituents. (2) thus correctly predicts that ellipsis is licensed
when antecedent and ellips are in a semantically symmetrical coordination in the
syntax. Ellipsis is thus possible in vP, AP, TP and CP coordinations alike (as long as
the discourse relation between the conjuncts will be non-hierarchical).
Under the here adopted movement plus deletion approach to ellipsis, Gapping
and Fragments involve deletion of the constituent that has been vacated by the
remnants of ellipsis. This movement out of the ellipsis site is often exceptional in
the sense that the movement is not allowed when no ellipsis takes place. In chapter
4, I have considered what drives movement of remnants out of the ellipsis site and
how they are constrained. I showed that movement of remnants has the following
properties.
(3) • No reordering of remnants is possible under exceptional movement
(EM).
• Remnants always move to a position directly next to the ellipsis site.
• EM is only possible under ellipsis.
These properties were shown to follow from Fox and Pesetsky’s (2005) theory of
cyclic linearization in which ordering statements are calculated for each phase and
added to an ordering table. The fact that reordering is not possible when rem-
nants move follows from the fact that reordering leads to contradictory ordering
statements (and contradictory ordering statements, in turn, lead the derivation to
crash). I argued that the reason why remnants have to move to a position next to
the ellipsis site has a similar cause. In particular, I showed that if a remnant were
to move to a higher position, thereby crossing material that will not be elided, this
too will result in a conflicting ordering statement. For this argument to go through,
a crucial assumption is that EM happens counter-cyclically. This hypothesis is not
without support. First, with this hypothesis in place, the prediction is that the regu-
lar (‘first-cycle’) syntax feeds ellipsis, and possibly exceptional movement. In other
words, the prediction is that languages vary as to what kind of movements they al-
low for under ellipsis, while at the same time the idea can be retained that EM is
constant across languages. Secondly, the idea that EM happens counter-cyclically
puts it in the realm of Quantifier Raising (QR) which also applies counter-cyclically.
Strikingly, EM shares two other properties with QR. First, QR is also clause bound,
and second, QR is not feature driven. Rather, QR is driven by the interface goal to
express a different meaning. For EM, I argued that the interface goal is recoverabil-
ity. That is, movement of remnants out of the ellipsis site is allowed, because if they
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wouldn’t move, they would not be recoverable. The result of EM in Gapping and
Fragments is that it creates a partitioning between the focused material (i.e. the
remnants) and the given material (i.e. the elided constituent).1
2 A classification of ellipsis types in light of the results
As discussed in chapter 1, in the literature Gapping has often been set aside from
(other) ellipsis types, such as VP ellipsis, Sluicing and NP ellipsis (cf. Lobeck, 1995).
Hankamer (1979) puts Gapping and Fragments into one category and VP ellipsis,
Sluicing and NP ellipsis in another. The reason why a two-way split in ellipsis types
has often been suggested, is that not all ellipsis types pattern the same. In chapter 1,
three properties were identified that uniquely distinguish Gapping and Fragments
from other types of ellipsis. I repeat these properties (based on Jackendoff, 1971;
Hankamer, 1979; Williams, 1977; Chao, 1988; Lobeck, 1995) here in current termi-
nology.
(4) • Gapping and Fragments appear to elide non-constituents.
• Gapping and Fragment clauses must bear a non-hierarchical relation
to their antecedent.
• There is no licensing element in Gapping and Fragments.
The first property in (4), that ellipsis operates on phrasal categories, only distin-
guishes Gapping and Fragments from other types of ellipsis under the assumption
that the remnants of ellipsis do not undergo movement. As shown in (5a) for Gap-
ping, if remnants do not move, ellipsis indeed seems to target a non-constituent
(ate quickly). If, however, as argued in chapter 2 and 4, remnants of ellipsis do move
out of the ellipsis site, ellipsis does target a constituent, as illustrated in (5b). Gap-
ping and Fragments, then, are just like Sluicing, VP ellipsis and NP ellipsis in this
respect, see (6).
(5) Gapping
a. Max ate the apple quickly and Sally ate the hamburger quickly.
b. Max ate the apple quickly and [DP Sally]i [DP the hamburger] j [XP ti ate
t j quickly]]]
1What is still an open question at this point is why ellipsis only targets constituents. The answer likely
depends on what ellipsis is, a subject that I haven’t touched upon in this dissertation. One view (within
the framework of Distributive Morphology) is that ellipsis involves non-insertion of lexical material at
Vocabulary Insertion (Bartos, 2000, 2001; Kornfeld and Saab, 2002; Saab, 2009). Under that view, it is not
immediately clear why ellipsis has to target a constituent. Under this approach, the question remains
why we don’t find ‘scattered’ non-insertion (i.e. non-constituent deletion). Another view of ellipsis is
that it involves deletion (either syntactic deletion (e.g. Ross (1967); Sag (1976) or PF deletion e.g. Tancredi
(1992); Chomsky and Lasnik (1993); Merchant (2001)). Under this view, it might follow that ellipsis only
targets constituents. A crucial assumption is that deletion targets a particular syntactic node (one that
dominates a constituent that fulfills Parallelism) and that this node is subject to deletion. In that case, it
follows that everything dominated by this node will also be deleted.
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(6) VP ellipsis
a. Max ate the apple and Sally did [VP eat the apple], too.
Sluicing
b. Max ate something, but Sally doesn’t know whati [TP Max ate ti ].
NP ellipsis
c. Max ate two apples and Sally ate three [NP apples].
The second property of Gapping and Fragments that sets these apart from other el-
lipsis types is that the ellips and antecedent must be in a non-hierarchical relation.
This property of Gapping and Fragments is illustrated in (7). Sluicing, VP ellipsis
and NP ellipsis, on the other hand, are fine in embedded contexts, even if a non-
hierarchical relation holds between the (clause embedding the) antecedent and the
(clause embedding the) ellips, as shown in (8).
(7) Gapping
a. * Harry has invited Sue and I know that Bill Mary.
b. Max ate the apple, because Sally the hamburger.
Fragments
c. A: Who has John invited?
B: ∗I know Mary.
d. * A: [S1 John has red hair.]
B: (Of course) [S2 His parents have red hair.]
(8) Sluicing
a. John has invited someone, although I don’t know who John has invited.
VP ellipsis
b. Harry has invited Sue, after he found out that Bill has invited Sue, too.
NP ellipsis
c. Harry bought two books, after Mary had bought four books.
The third property that sets Gapping and Fragments apart from other ellipsis types
is that there is no licensing element in Gapping and Fragments, as noted in chapter
3. In Sluicing, VP ellipsis and NP ellipsis, ellipsis is only possible when the ellips is
headed by a particular lexical item, the licensor. The licensor in Sluicing is a wh-
phrase heading an interrogative clause, see (9). Sluicing is not licensed by comple-
mentizers (10a) or wh-phrases that head relative clauses (10b) or clefts (10c).
(9) Jack bought something, but I don’t know what.
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(10) a. * Even though Mary hopes that, she wonders if anyone interesting is
speaking tonight.
b. * Someone has done the dishes, but I don’t know the person who.
(Kim, 1997a, p.157)
c. * Somebody stole the car, but noone knew that it was Ben who.
(Merchant, 2001, p.59)
VP-ellipsis is licensed by an ‘AUX-element’ (Lobeck, 1995; Johnson, 2001), such as
auxiliaries, modals and infinitival to, see the examples in (11). Lexical verbs or light
verbs do not license ellipsis, as shown in (12).
(11) a. José Ybarra-Jaegger likes rutabagas, and Holly does, too.
b. José Ybarra-Jaegger ate rutabagas, and Holly has, too.
c. José Ybarra-Jaegger is eating rutabagas, and Holly is, too.
d. Mag Wildwood wants to read Fred’s story, and I also want to.
(Johnson, 2001)
(12) a. * Sally Tomato started running down the street, but only after José
started.
b. * Sally Tomato made Mag laugh, and then José made. (Johnson, 2001)
c. * Fire began pouring out of the building, and then smoke began.
(Bresnan, 1976)
Finally, NP ellipsis is licensed by the quantifiers most, some, all, each and numerals,
see (13a). Plural demonstratives and the possessive suffix ’s also license NP ellipsis,
as shown in (13b) and (13c). The examples in (14) show that NP ellipsis is not pos-
sible with the definite determiner (14a), the indefinite determiner (14b), singular
demonstratives (14c) and the universal quantifier every (14d).
(13) a. The students attended the play, but most/some/all/each/two students
went home disappointed.
b. Although she might order these books, Mary won’t buy those books on
Egyptian art.
c. The fact that John’s analysis was poorly presented made the committee
adopt Mary’s analysis instead. (Lobeck, 1995, p.42)
(14) a. * A single protestor attended the rally because the protestor apparently
felt it was important.
b. * Mary toyed with the idea of buying a windsurfer, then decided she
didn’t want a windsurfer at all.
c. * Although John doens’t like this air conditioner that he bought at Sears,
he likes that new air conditioner that Mary got at K-mart.
d. * John called out the children’s names, and every child answered.
(Lobeck, 1995, p.44,45)
148 3. Towards a unified theory of ellipsis licencing
The examples in (9)-(14) show that Sluicing, VP ellipsis and NP ellipsis are only li-
censed when the ellipsis site is headed by a particular lexical item, a ‘licensor’. This
property sets Sluicing, VP ellipsis and NP ellipsis apart from Gapping and Frag-
ments.
3 Towards a unified theory of ellipsis licencing
Ideally, we would like to somehow relate the three properties that uniquely distin-
guish Gapping and Fragments from Sluicing, VP ellipsis and NP ellipsis (cf. (4)). In
chapter 3, I have shown for Gapping and Fragments that they are licensed when a
discourse relation holds between ellips and antecedent. In this section, I explore
for Sluicing the possibility that this ellipsis type is licensed in the same way. That
is, I explore the possibility that Sluicing is licensed when a discourse relation holds
between ellips and antecedent. In section 3.3, I show that, if on the right track, this
proposal sheds light on the properties in (4) that set Gapping and Fragments apart
from other ellipsis types.
3.1 López’ (2000) account of licensing Sluicing
In chapter 3, I discussed López’ (2000) account of ellipsis licensing in which ellip-
sis licensors are functional categories that have the property of connecting with a
discourse topic. According to López, the functional head that licenses Sluicing is C.
Licensors in López’ conception are D-linking, which is syntactically encoded with a
D-linking feature on the licensing head. In Sluicing, C is equipped with a D-linking
feature that instructs the interpretative component to ‘connect with a discourse
topic’. It is not exactly clear to me what constitutes a ‘discourse topic’. Therefore, I
set this point aside here, and characterize the D-linking relation in different terms
below.
The elliptical category is an X0 pro-form. This pro-form has to adjoin to the
licensing head. This is shown in (15) for Sluicing.
(15) [Ann invited someone] but I don’t know who [proi C[D−l i nki ng]] ti ]
The adjunction of pro to C locates the pro-form in the checking domain of C. Con-
sequently, the pro-form is resolved by the discourse topic that the D-linking feature
on the licensing head links to. The guiding idea here is that a null pronoun cannot
retrieve an antecedent in and of itself. The licensing head mediates the necessary
link between pro-form and antecedent.
The attractiveness of López’ proposal is that it attempts to explain the licens-
ing condition from the independent principle of recoverability. As noted in chapter
3, López specific implementation is incompatible with some of the assumptions
I have made in this dissertation. The idea of ellipsis being a pro-form, for exam-
ple, is incompatible with the view that there is a full-fledged syntactic structure in
the ellipsis site (cf. chapter 2). As noted in chapter 3 section 3.2.3, the idea of the
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ellipsis site moving to the licensing element means that elided constituent would
have to move to a head position. Another problematic assumption is that if C is
present in Sluicing, this predicts that material in C can survive ellipsis, which is not
the case (Merchant, 2001; Thoms, 2010), observe the contrast between (16a) and
(16b). These facts strongly suggests that C is part of the ellipsis site in Sluicing and
is therefore unlikely to be the licensor.
(16) A: John bought something.
a. B: [CP What [C′ did John buy]]?
b. B’: ∗[CP What did [TP John buy]]?
Stripping down López’ proposal to its essentials, the main idea is that ellipsis sites
are unable to retrieve an antecedent in and of themselves and that therefore this
retrieval must be mediated by a D-linking licensor. We can retain this basic idea
even if we assume that it is the licensor itself that D-links the ellipsis site to the
antecedent.
In the next section, I present some data involving Sluicing that support the hy-
pothesis that D-linking the ellips to an antecedent licenses ellipsis.
3.2 Sluicing and D-linking
One piece of data supporting López’ D-linking account is the impossibility of Sluic-
ing with aggressively non D-linked wh-phrases, see (17). By assumption, the wh-
phrase does not have the ability of D-linking in this case and thus also lacks the
ability to mediate the link between pro-form and antecedent . Ellipsis, therefore,
cannot be resolved (see Sprouse (2006) for an alternative explanation of the un-
grammaticality of Sluicing with aggressively non-D-linked wh-phrases).
(17) * I know Pat wants to buy something, but I don’t know what the hell.
(López, 2000, p.185)
The idea that Sluicing involves a wh-phrase that D-links the ellipsis clause to an an-
tecedent does not immediately rule out the cases of Sluicing in relative clauses and
clefts in (10b,c), repeated here as (18). If the D-linking account of ellipsis licensing is
on the right track, these examples must be ungrammatical because the wh-phrase
is not D-linking. Therefore, ellipsis cannot be resolved.
(18) a. * Someone has done the dishes, but I don’t know the person [who]i [ ti
has done the dishes]
b. * We thought it was Abby who stole the car, but it was Ben [who]i [ti
stole the car]
One thing to note is that interrogative wh-phrases (e.g. what in (16a)) have a differ-
ent feature specification than the wh-phrases in (18). This can be established from
the fact that languages may spell them out differently. In Dutch, for example, the
interrogative wh-phrase corresponding to ‘who’ is wie, as shown in (19a). In the
Dutch examples in (19b,c) corresponding to (18a,b) , however, a relative pronoun
shows up that is homophonous with the singular demonstrative.























































































The examples in (19) show that interrogative wh-phrases and relative pronouns
differ in their feature specification. One could speculate that this difference stems
from the presence of a D-linking feature in the wh-phrases versus the absence of
this feature in relative pronouns, but in lack of further support, I lay this specula-
tion to rest.
AnderBois (2011) presents some interesting facts that support the idea that in-
terrogative wh-phrases are D-linking. In particular, he notes a restriction on Sluic-
ing much similar to the ban on Sluicing with non D-linked wh-phrases. The restric-
tion Anderbois observes is that Sluicing cannot occur when the antecedent is in an
appositive clause.
(20) a. * Joe, who once killed a man in cold blood, doesn’t even remember who.
b. * Amy, who coined a new word last night, forgot what.
Anderbois explains these facts in the framework of inquisitive semantics. I sketch
here the basic idea. A crucial ingredient of Anderbois’ account is the idea from
Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) and others that one of the core semantic proper-
ties of indefinites is to evoke a set of alternatives. This set of alternatives is said to
introduce an issue into the discourse as to which alternative holds. According to An-
derbois, an interrogative clause anaphorically retrieves this issue. In other words,
there is an anaphoric discourse link between the interrogative wh-phrase and the
indefinite correlate. We can represent this idea as follows.
(21) a. John bought something but I don’t know what
anaphor i c D−l i nk










Collins et al. (2014) experimentally tested whether Sluicing can retrieve an ante-
cedent from an appositive clause. They found that, although the examples in (20)
are indeed degraded, they are not systematically ruled out. Collins et al. (2014) also
tested examples like (22) with which-phrases (‘contentfull’ in their terminology).
Interestingly, these examples were judged better than the variants with a regular
wh-phrase in (20).
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(22) a. ? Joe, who once killed a man in cold blood, doesn’t even remember
which man.
b. ? Amy, who coined a new word last night, forgot which word.
The difference in acceptability between (20) and (22) suggests that D-linking is in-
volved in Sluicing. Since the content of appositives is less ‘at issue’ than the content
of the main clause, retrieving an issue from an appositive is more difficult than re-
trieving an issue from a main clause. Which-phrases have a strong link to the dis-
course (Pesetsky, 1987), and are therefore better equipped to establish an anaphoric
link with an issue raised in an appositive than regular wh-phrases. This might be
because the contentfull noun helps establish this relation.2 The idea that it is the
wh-phrase itself that establishes the anaphoric relation with the antecedent cor-
rectly predicts the contrast between (20) and (22).
The idea that the wh-phrase in Sluicing establishes a link with the indefinite
correlate in the antecedent is further supported by examples such as the one in
(23) (from Ginzburg (1992, p.301-302) via López (2000)). This example shows that
Sluicing can only retrieve an antecedent which contains an issue raised by an in-
definite. This holds for the antecedent in (23a), where the issue of which students
John likes is retrieved by the wh-phrase. The absence of the interpretation in (23b)
shows that it is not possible for the sluice to be resolved by an antecedent that does
not involve the issue raised by the indefinite.
(23) John likes some students, but I don’t know who.
a. = I don’t know who the students that John likes are.
b. ≠ I don’t know who John likes.
The example in (24) provides another illustration that the idea that the wh-phrase
must be D-linked to an indefinite in the antecedent is on the right track. In (24),
there is no indefinite correlate in the antecedent at all. The fact that Sluicing is un-
grammatical in this case firmly supports the idea that the wh-phrase in Sluicing is
anaphoric and must D-link to an antecedent in which an indefinite raises an issue.
(24) * John whispered that he liked the movie, but I couldn’t hear what John
whispered.
In the next section, I move on to discuss how the three properties in (4), that set
apart Gapping/Fragments from other ellipsis types, follow from the theory of li-
censing ellipsis through D-linking.
3.3 Towards a unified theory of ellipsis licensing
It can be concluded from the above discussion that Sluicing is dependent on an
anaphoric relation between the sluice and an antecedent. If López (2000) is cor-
rect, this dependency follows from the general condition that an ellipsis must be
D-linked to an antecedent in order to be licensed. I state this hypothesis in (25).
2Compared to aggressively non-D-linked wh-phrases, which-phrases can thus be viewed as sitting
on the opposite end of the spectrum when it comes to how strongly they link to the discourse. Regular
wh-phrases fall somewhere in between.
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(25) Discourse licensing condition on ellipsis
Ellipsis is licensed when the ellipsis site can be D-linked to an antecedent.
As said, the intuition behind the hypothesis in (25) is that ellipsis is unable to re-
trieve an antecedent in and of itself. I have argued in chapter 2 that ellipsis sites are
full-fledged syntactic structures subject to deletion. The fact that ellipsis sites must
be D-linked might follow then from these two factors: first, ellipsis sites are silent.
Therefore, there is no overt indication that could be taken as an instruction as to
how to link the ellipsis to the discourse. The second reason ellipsis sites must be
D-linked is that, unlike pronouns, they are not indexical expressions. Ellipsis sites
lack the property/feature of pronouns to instruct the grammar to D-link them to
an antecedent or referentially anchor them to an event or individual in the context.
An advantage of (25), then, is that it attempts to explain ellipsis from the D-linking
property of the licensor (the wh-phrase in Sluicing) and the lack of this property of
the ellipsis site. In other words, (25) is not an ellipsis specific licensing condition.
In fact, given (25), ellipsis can be taken to apply freely. The only requirement on
ellipsis is that the ellips can be D-linked to an antecedent. Rather than an ellipsis
specific requirement, (25) follows from a general requirement on recoverability.
Let us now turn to the question why there is no licensing element in Gapping
and Fragments. In (26) I present the licensing condition on Gapping and Fragments
as formulated in chapter 3.
(26) Non-hierarchical Licensing Condition on Gapping and Fragments (NLC):
Gapping and Fragments are licensed when antecedent and ellips are in a
non-hierarchical relation in the discourse component.
I argue that (26) can actually be taken as a more specific version of (25). That is, (26)
captures a subset of the ellipsis types that (25) captures. In the model of discourse
adopted in chapter 3, discourse relations between two discourse units can be es-
tablished in two ways. Either there is a direct relation between the discourse units,
which may be established by a connective, as in (27a,b), or a relation is established
anaphorically through the use of discourse adverbials, as the relation between S1
and S3 in (28a,b).
(27) a. S1 (connective) S2
b. [S1 John left] because [S2 Mary arrived.]
(28) a. S1 S2 [S3 . . . adverbial . . . ]
b. [S1 Because Fred is ill] [S2 you will have to stay home.] [S3 Whereas oth-
erwise the two of you could have gone to the zoo.] (Webber et al., 2003)
In the previous section, we established that the wh-phrase in Sluicing establishes
a discourse relation between the ellips and an antecedent anaphorically. The wh-
phrase can therefore be considered a discourse adverbial. As said, retrieving an an-
tecedent is necessary for ellipsis to be resolved, since ellipsis, unlike pronouns, does
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not have the property of D-linking to an antecedent in the discourse. Therefore, D-
linking must be mediated. This is what (25) expresses. (26), on the other hand, states
that ellipsis in Gapping and Fragments is licensed when ellips and antecedent are
in a non-hierarchical relation in the discourse. In this configuration, too, there is
a discourse relation between ellipsis and antecedent, though the relation here is
direct and not anaphorically established. Given this, we can see that (26) merely
expresses a more specific licensing configuration than (25). If we view Gapping and
Fragments in light of (25), it follows that there is no licensing element because the
ellipsis site is directly D-linked to the antecedent. Hence, no licensing element is
necessary to D-link the ellips to an antecedent.
It remains to be seen whether the D-linking account of ellipsis licensing in (25)
can capture VP ellipsis and NP ellipsis, as well. In order for the D-linking account to
succesfully capture those ellipsis types, one needs to show that the ellipsis licensors
in VP ellipsis and NP ellipsis (cf. (11) and (13), respectively) are D-linking. I refer the
reader to López (2000) for some preliminary ideas.
If the D-linking account in (25) is on the right track, the properties in (4), re-
peated here as (29), can be shown to be related.
(29) • Gapping and Fragments appear to elide non-constituents.
• Gapping and Fragment clauses must bear a non-hierarchical relation
to their antecedent.
• There is no licensing element in Gapping and Fragments.
The fact that Gapping and Fragments, as opposed to Sluicing, VP ellipsis and NP
ellipsis, appear to elide a non-constituent, is because these ellipsis types delete the
whole phrase that is in a non-hierarchical relation to its antecedent. This means
that everything that is not given within the constituent targeted for ellipsis must
vacate this constituent. In Sluicing, VP ellipsis and NP ellipsis, on the other hand,
what is deleted is the sister of the licensing element. This phrase may be deleted if
this phrase is given. In case this phrase is given, no movement of remnants is nec-
essary. The second and third property follow straightforwardly from (25). If ellipsis
must be D-linked, it follows that, in the absence of a D-linking licensor, there must
be a direct relation between ellipsis and antecedent. Of course, the opposite also
holds. In the case of NP ellipsis, VP ellipsis and Sluicing, the presence of a D-linking
licensor allows ellipsis to take place in a phrase that does not bear a direct relation
to the antecedent.
Summing up, if the hypothesis that elliptical phrases must be D-linked in order
to be retrievable is correct, the two-way split in ellipsis types follows from the fact
that there are two ways of D-linking, either the elliptical phrase bears a direct rela-
tion to its antecedent or this relation is established anaphorically. More research is
needed to see whether this hypothesis is correct. Importantly, if this theory proves
to be on the right track, the fact that there is a two-way split in ellipsis types does
not warrant the conclusion that ellipsis itself is not a uniform phenomenon.
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Dutch summary
In hoofdzaak handelt deze dissertatie over ellipsis. Meer specifiek gaat deze disser-
tatie in op twee ellipsisconstructies, Gapping en Fragments. Deze twee construc-
ties zijn geillustreerd in (1). Gapping wordt doorgaans gedefinieerd als ellipsis die
plaatsvindt in het tweede conjunct van een coördinatie en Fragments als ellipsis in
een op zichzelf staande zin. Het voorbeeld in (1b) is een voorbeeld van Fragments
in een vraag-antwoordpaar.
(1) a. Jan ziet Marie en Karel ziet Suzan. Gapping
b. A: Wie heeft Jan gezien?
B: Jan heeft Marie gezien. Fragments
In zowel (1a) als (1b) is tenminste het werkwoord onderhevig aan ellipsis. De overge-
bleven zinsdelen, Suzan in (1a) en Marie in (1b), zijn de zogenaamde remnants van
ellipsis. In Gapping worden er twee of meer remnants achtergelaten en in Frag-
ments maar een. Dit is echter niet de enige mogelijkheid. Gapping met één remnant
en Fragments met twee of meer remnants is ook mogelijk. Alhoewel deze construc-
ties respectievelijk Stripping en Multiple Fragments worden genoemd, neemt men
vaak aan dat dit subtypen zijn van Gapping en Fragments. Ook ik neem in deze dis-
sertatie aan dat de constructies in (1a) en (2a) hetzelfde type ellipsis zijn, net als
(1b) en (2b), al is de aandacht voornamelijk gericht op Gapping en Fragments.
(2) a. Jan ziet Marie en Karel ziet Marie ook. Stripping
b. A: Wie heeft wie gezien?
B: Jan zag Marie en Karel zag Suzan. Multiple Fragments
De belangrijkste claim in deze dissertatie is dat niet alleen Gapping en Stripping,
en Fragments en Multiple Fragments subtypen van elkaar zijn, maar dat alle con-
structies in (1) en (2) hetzelfde type ellipsis behelzen. Ik bereik deze conclusie door
aan te tonen dat Gapping en Fragments dezelfde syntaxis hebben. Bovendien toon
ik aan dat de distributie van deze ellipsistypes hetzelfde is. In de literatuur wordt
aangenomen dat de distributie van ellipsis wordt bepaald door hoe ellipsis is geli-
censeerd. Ellipsis kan alleen plaatsvinden als is voldaan aan bepaalde condities.
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Deze condities worden formeel gevangen in een licenseringsconditie op ellipsis.
Mijn claim is dus dat Gapping en Fragments op dezelfde wijze worden gelicenseerd
door dezelfde licenseringsconditie. Een belangrijke claim hierbij is dat licenseren
een discourseaangelegenheid is en dat de syntaxis hierbij geen rol speelt. Ik kom
hier dadelijk op terug.
In hoofdstuk 1 zet ik uiteen wat voor typen ellipsis er onder andere zijn en
wat voor theorieën er zijn voorgesteld als verklaring voor dit fenomeen. Een van
de debatten in de literatuur gaat over wat een ellips eigenlijk is. Sommige theo-
rieën gaan ervan uit dat ellipsis een pronomen is zonder syntactische structuur dat
niet fonetisch wordt gerealiseerd. Andere theorieën gaan ervanuit dat een normale
syntactische structuur ten grondslag ligt aan ellipsis, waarbij de morfemen in deze
syntactische structuur niet fonetisch worden gerealiseerd. In deze dissertatie sluit
ik me aan bij de aanhangers van de laatste theorie (waarvoor ik in hoofdstuk 2 ver-
scheidene argumenten naar voren breng). Naast het uiteenzetten van wat ellipsis
is en hoe we dit fenomeen kunnen verklaren, ga ik dieper in op de Gappingcon-
structie. Ik bespreek verscheidene eigenschappen van Gapping, waaronder de zeer
restricte distributie (meer hierover in hoofdstuk 3). Met verscheidene argumenten
toon ik aan dat de huidige theorieën van Gapping niet alle feiten kunnen verklaren.
In de hierop volgende bespreking van Fragments benadruk ik de gelijkenis tussen
deze constructie en Gapping. De hoofdstukken 2 en 3 richten zich vervolgens op
het nader onderzoeken van deze gelijkenis, wat uiteindelijk leidt tot een nieuwe
analyse die zowel de eigenschappen van Gapping als Fragments verklaart.
In hoofdstuk 2 toon ik aan dat Gapping en Fragments dezelfde syntaxis hebben.
Ten eerste toon ik aan, op basis van connectiviteitsrelaties tussen de remnants en
de ellips, dat er syntactische structuur aanwezig is in de ellips. Deze conclusie gaat
op voor zowel Gapping als Fragments. Sommige connectiviteitsrelaties tonen niet
alleen de aanwezigheid van structuur in de ellips aan, ook vormen zij een argument
voor de aanname dat de remnants verplaatsen uit de ellipsissite. Wederom lopen
de argumenten voor Gapping hier parallel aan die voor Fragments. De gelijkenis
tussen Gapping en Fragments houdt niet op bij de aanwezigheid van structuur in
de ellips, ook is er gelijkenis tussen de variabele grootte van de elliptische structuur.
In de literatuur is vaak beweerd dat de eigenschappen van Gapping alleen kunnen
worden verklaard als wordt aangenomen dat de grootte van de ellipsische structuur
variabel is. Deze aanname is bijvoorbeeld nodig om de ambiguë bereikeigenschap-
pen van negatie en coördinatie te verklaren. Ik beargumenteer dat er in Fragments,
in tegenstelling tot wat wordt beweerd in de literatuur, geen bewijs is voor een vaste
constituent die wordt geëlideerd. Aannemelijker is dat de grootte van de ellips vari-
abel is in Fragments, net als in Gapping.
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat over het licenseren van ellipsis. Nu in hoofdstuk 2 is aange-
toond dat Gapping en Fragments dezelfde syntaxis hebben, is de meest prominente
vraag wat het verschil is tussen Gapping en Fragments op het niveau van de gram-
matica. In de literatuur wordt aangenomen dat ellipsis gelicenseerd moet worden
om plaats te vinden. De hypothese dat licenseren nodig is voor ellipsis is gebaseerd
op de observatie dat niet elke context ellipsis toelaat. Om een voorbeeld te geven,
in (1a) is Gapping mogelijk in een nevenschikking met en. Gapping is echter niet
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mogelijk in een ondergeschikte zin met omdat als hoofd, zie (3a), noch is Gapping
mogelijk als de ellips niet direct is genevenschikt aan het antecedent, zoals geïllus-
treerd in (3b).
(3) a. * Jan zag Marie omdat Piet Karel.
b. * Jan zag Marie en ik weet dat Piet Karel.
Een belangrijke observatie voor de claim dat Gapping en Fragments hetzelfde type
ellipsis behelzen, is dat de restricties op Gapping ook opgaan voor Fragments. Merk
als eerste op dat twee losstaande zinnen (die dus niet zijn verbonden door een on-
derschikkend voegwoord) desalniettemin de interpretatie van een onderschikking
kunnen hebben. In (4a) bijvoorbeeld, geeft B aan dat de maan schijnt omdat de zon
schijnt. De aanwezigheid van deze onderschikkende interpretatie heeft tot gevolg
dat ellipsis niet mogelijk is hier, zoals te zien is in (4b). Ik beargumenteer dat wat
ten grondslag ligt aan de ongrammaticaliteit van (4b) ook ten grondslag ligt aan de
ongrammaticaliteit van (3a). Verder is Fragments, net als Gapping, onmogelijk als
de ellips is ingebed, zie (5).
(4) a. A: De maan schijnt.
B: Allicht, de zon schijnt.
b. * A: De maan schijnt.
B: Allicht, de zon schijnt.
(5) A: Wie heb Jan gezien?
B: ∗Ik weet Marie.
(vgl. B’: Ik weet dat Jan Marie heeft gezien.)
Syntactisch bezien is er uiteraard een verschil tussen of zinsdelen gecoördineerd
zijn zoals in Gapping of dat er een aaneenschakeling is van twee losstaande zin-
nen zoals in Fragments. De vraag is of dit syntactische verschil relevant is voor
het licenseren van ellipsis. Ik beargumenteer dat dit niet het geval is. Ik bespreek
verschillende theorieën over het licenseren van ellipsis, onder meer syntactisch
georiënteerde theorieën waarin wordt aangenomen dat er een syntactische relatie
moet worden vastgesteld tussen een element buiten de ellips en de ellips zelf. Ook
bespreek ik theorieën waarin wordt gesteld dat er een relatie moet zijn tussen het
antecedent en de ellips. In een notendop is het grootste probleem voor al deze the-
orieën dat de gepostuleerde relatie, of dit nu een syntactische relatie tussen een
element buiten de ellips en de ellips zelf betreft of een relatie tussen antecedent en
ellips, ook tot stand kan komen in de contexten in (3), (4b) en (5). Er wordt door de
theorieën over het licenseren van ellipsis dus foutief voorspeld dat ellipsis mogelijk
zou moeten zijn in deze contexten. Bovenstaand probleem in acht genomen, als-
ook de gelijkenis tussen de distributie van Gapping en Fragments, stel ik voor dat
ellipsis wordt gelicenseerd door de conditie in (6).
(6) Niet-hiërarchische licenseringsconditie op Gapping en Fragments (NLC):
Gapping en Fragments zijn gelicenseerd als het antecedent en de ellips een
niet-hiërarchische relatie hebben in de discourse component.
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Ik laat zien dat de NLC de feiten in (3)-(6) verklaart. Bovendien beargumenteer ik
dat de NLC, omdat deze is gedefinieerd als een conditie die effect heeft in de dis-
course component van de grammatica, een verklaring levert voor het feit dat Gap-
ping enerzijds in sommige gevallen mogelijk is in syntactisch ondergeschikte zin-
nen (bijv. Jan zag Marie, net als Piet Karel zag) en anderzijds soms juist weer niet in
syntactisch nevengeschikte zinnen (bijv. ∗Jan groette Marie, want zij hem).
Een van de conclusies uit hoofdstuk 2 is dat de remnants van ellipsis verplaatsen
uit de ellips. In hoofdstuk 4 doe ik nader onderzoek naar deze verplaatsingen. Meer
specifiek ga ik nader in op drie vragen. De eerste vraag is wat deze verplaatsingen
mogelijk maakt. Zoals is geïllustreerd in (7) is de verplaatsing die de remnant doet
uit de ellips niet mogelijk zonder ellipsis. We noemen dit soort verplaatsing daarom
uitzonderlijke verplaatsing (‘exceptional movement’), kortweg UV.
(7) a. Jan ziet Marie en [[[Karel]i [Suzan] j [ti ziet t j ]]].
b. Jan ziet Marie en [[[Karel]i [Suzan] j [ti ziet t j ]]].
De tweede vraag is aan welke localiteitscondities UV moet voldoen. Ik beargumen-
teer dat UV niet plaats kan vinden over een finiete clause. De derde vraag is wat
UV ‘triggert’. Onder de aanname dat verplaatsingen (en meer algemeen, syntacti-
sche operaties) kostbaar zijn, moet er een trigger aan UV ten grondslag liggen. Deze
trigger lijkt, onder meer door de verscheidenheid aan mogelijke verplaatsingen on-
der ellipsis, afwezig te zijn. Samen vormen de localiteitsconditie en de afwezigheid
van een syntactische trigger een zeer opmerkelijke gelijkenis met de verplaatsing-
en van kwantoren. Op basis van deze parallel beargumenteer ik dat UV een inter-
faceverplaatsing is: een verplaatsing die plaatsvindt om aan een interface conditie
te voldoen. De interfaceconditie waaraan UV moet voldoen is het dat de remnant
die verplaatst nieuwe informatie moet bevatten. Alleen in dat geval mag, en moet,
een remnant UV ondergaan. De reden dat een remnant moet verplaatsen is dat de
betekenis van deze constituent niet meer te achterhalen is als deze onderhevig is
aan ellipsis. De aanname dat UV moet voldoen aan een interfaceconditie verklaart
ook waarom verplaatsing niet mogelijk is als de remnant géén nieuwe informatie
bevat, zoals in (8). In dit geval is Jan al eerder genoemd en daarom mag de DP Jan
niet verplaatsen. Indien deze DP zou verplaatsen zou dit een schending opleveren
van de interfaceconditie dat verplaatsing alleen mag plaatsvinden als dit nodig is.
(8) * Jan ziet Marie en [[[Karel]i [Suzan] j [ti ziet t j ]]].
Hoofdstuk 5 is de conclusie. Dit hoofdstuk bevat een samenvatting, plus een
mogelijke verklaring voor de NLC. Zoals de NLC is voorgesteld in (6), is deze con-
ditie op het licenseren van Gapping en Fragments een stipulatie. In hoofdstuk 5
schets ik een theorie die een verklaring geeft voor de NLC. De hypothese is dat een
ellips een relatie in de discoursecomponent aan moet gaan met een antecedent.
Het idee hierachter is dat een ellips hierin niet verschilt van een pronomen. Een
pronomen is een element dat de inherente eigenschap heeft een relatie te moeten
aangaan met een antecedent in de context of in de discourse om zo betekenis te
krijgen. Een ellips daarentegen, heeft al betekenis, gezien deze bestaat uit een nor-
male syntactische structuur. Deze syntactische structuur heeft in tegenstelling tot
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een pronomen echter geen inherente eigenschap om een relatie aan te gaan met
een antecedent in de discourse. Deze relatie is echter noodzakelijk om de beteke-
nis van een ellips te kunnen achterhalen. Ik stel voor dat ellipsis in Gapping en
Fragments mogelijk is in de contexten die aan (6) voldoen, omdat precies in deze
contexten de benodigde discourserelatie tussen ellips en antecedent aanwezig is.
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